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: : ABSTRACT r / //;/////
Pan-Arab nationali sm -seeks;; a cios er form; of poll tic al / /'// 
union between the Arab states* Arab natiohallst writers con*- 
sider that such a union will enable the Arabs to achieve 
>>: complete; freedom and .allow 'them to enjoy rapid social ;and 
- economic /pro|^es^^^^ a;;nation can be
/;prpye.d;yto/ - e k i s t If:a;fgronii;'of Jpeople /have a common language, 
culturey historyV territory ^3^ economic Interests; they 
; :. seek t o ; prc^e, employing vague, /arguments^ -all the Arabic*
;■ epeakihg peoples do formv\^up^^ / /v‘:
■V v ria^ bi;piasLIhib*t wr*iiiez*s:Va,11enipti" t;o; suggest in 1 ■-%
:///detail /what £prm . the '/.panrAf ab lunt^^ show
little unanimity ahd^tkelf/conel conflict
with theform;/of!gdvermenttto United Arab
Republic*
;■: ;The relationship between Arhb/mlibnaiis^ religion
//Is/ seen to be /. very c ompllc a ted; there seems wi de spread 
disaccord among Arab nationalist writers concerning, in 
particular, the place of Islam In the proposed Arab union;.
The attitude shown by Arab nationalist writers towards 
.the Western Powers and Israel show clearly their complete
'■/ disliked a ^ /  distrust/ 6f ; their intentlohs and/ihbir pbliples •
: ? Only a minority see a need to give credit; to any benefits
' /■■•/////'theinfluence of the West - may have brohghfe world*
In contrast to this, Arab nationalists ^ although they //,/ /
 ^ : criticisecommunist ideology , are s e e n t o b e  extremely
^gya/ibe;Sui//-;rfcoy^apcL^ /^blie:. dpxamoM^ h e lp  i t  has g iv e n
/ / / . ; /  ; thdm v in /ithe lr^^  s t ru g g le  d /i;th  t h e i r  1 im p e r ia lis t/"e n e m ie s  *v
 ^//a;'///' //kahysupporters d f  pab.~Ara^ Jamal '■//
*Abd al-Hasir the personificatipn. of the Arabst/siruggie/f orv 
/-;. -/unity /axad/prbgr^s-j;; a n  examination of ;
// / :;: . shows;/that untii/tfe .frequently i
/ ' / / ; dx^essed; himself, as; an Egyptian -first and/anrAr^b/ only / : \
oii^ X'jr• * :. :/ /// / / -//'/-b/ v /^ ./-■ ^ /^/^r.; ;■/?
/; ;///■ / Opposition tb Arab nationalism Is examined superficially 
t//-^ •*'• in son^ ;^ prks in^ a u ^ o r ^ / o f  c pan-Arab unity* / /,: / :;,////.;;
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PREFACE
?;/l3should; like to;acknowledge my dpbt^  ^ all
ZthdseZ/whp/hdyehelped me/ ih>any way /in/the)preparation of this 
-/study* / itjwasL begun in.'the ,Aptumn ofv1958> after f a Summer 
/in-^/wbloh//Arablim beeh' the/subject of widespread
/liiternatiphalconcern and comments ; '■/;/
I shouldlike to thank/Miss; Slizabeth^^rik^b0>f of St . 
Anthony *s College:,- Oxfofly/:fpf/^ in making me/ decide ;
: that a study of thi s; naturewould be of Interest; and some 
value, ^ i y . thanks ar e ; particularly due to - Prof t  R .B.: Ser j eant', 
iProfessor./ of /Jk>derh/;^ a b i b  at; the/University; of ■ London, for; , 
the / cbnf idenc e / he has shown in me and the invaluable; ad vie e 
he has/zglyetKln/.s^
,//-/' I have been particularly fortunate in having had the 
opportunity, with: for travelling expenses 
fr o #  the' Central Research Fund of the University; of London, 
to/carry out /the,major/part of the re s earch.for;thi s study 
fro# A ^ l l / t o  December,/ 1959i :#t/ the/Ameri of
Beirut, Lebanon, under the general supervision of Dr . 
Constantine Zurayq* Distinguished Professor of History and 
Vice-President o f v that university• I sincerely - hope that
both he and'.'-my . other v & a b / m t l o n a l l s ^  
that this ;sthdy/Was/ with a genuine desire to
underdtaM/ai^lhpt/ merely ipit'^fin&fault/with-the: yiovement 
they support* I should like to stress that what criticism 
of the ideology.0^  is implied in this
study is based on my purely personal assessment• /
I/ :/ - / I/should like also to thank/ZMiss J .0 # Quhss f or her 
/detailed 'criticism of the first drafts.
•* T . y Le^  Gabsick:*
INTRODUCTION
The Pan-Arab nationalist movement of the present day has as 
its, basic stated aims the complete liberation of the Arab 
world from foreign and Zionist influence, the dissolution 
of the present boundaries dividing the Arab countries from 
one another and the subsequent formation of a United Arab 
State. Arab nationalist writers look back to the days of 
the Arab Empire as an historical.precedent for this proposed 
united state. Whether the Arab Empire of the Ummayads and \
the Caliphate of the !Abbas;Ids did in fact constitute an
- , '■ ' Z ' - 1
effective Arab union is largely a matter of opinion; * it
is clear, however/that" since the destruction of Baghdad
: and the ;* Abbas id Caliphate in 1258 by the.Mongol invaders
the Arab world has remained politically and economically
. divided:. . The Ottoman Turks, their, occupation effectively .
stemming from the conquest of Egypt in 1517* ruled the
1. Hazim Nusaibah,concludes a short discussion of early 
Arab_history and the rise and fall of the !Ummayad and 
■ ^bb&sid Caliphates with the pertinent comment: ”The 
foregoing digest of Arab political fortunes reveals.a 
somewhat tenuous and short-lived period of national 
hegemony. It appears rather incongruous, therefore,
. that modern Arab nationalism should look back compla­
cently to that period and to the movement which, when 
fully developed and implemented, thwarted and event­
ually crushed the nationalist Arab state.” "The Ideas 
of Arab Nationalism.Cornell, 1956, p. 27.
Arabs politically, militarily and economically* As the,
Turkish grip over the Arab world diminished and grew weaker, , 
Arab revivalist movements, some with religious and some with 
purely secular bases grew more active and vocal throughout 
the Arab world *
In the 18th. century the Wahhabi movement, inspired 
by the leadership of Muhammad ibn *Abd al-Wahhab? a reform*- 
ative yet conservative Islamic revivalist, arose in the 
Hejd* This movement is seen by some Arab writers to have 
been an early expression of Arab nationalism. Similarly, 
the achievements of Muhammad rAli, the ruler of Egypt who 
attempted to unify.the Arab world by Egyptian military 
conquest in the early 19th century, are considered by some
-■ * ' ■ q
writers to have been an expression of Arab nationalism* *
Again In the 19th century, Jamal al-Dih al-Afghani, a . ' 
Persian-speaking Afghan of probable Arab descent who actively 
propagated the idea of the need for a modernist, reformist 
and pan-Islamic Arab movement, Is also considered to have been 
a, forerunner of the present day movement seeking Arab unity* 
*Abd a1-Rahman al-Kawakabl (1849-1903), a native of Aleppo 
and contemporary and disciple of a1-Afghani, advocated, too,
1. c*f* u*A.R/y ufearbdok for 1959“, p. 15 s “Muhamed *Ali,
however, did not stick to the path he had chosen at first,. 
the path of Arab nationalism and soon got busy building 
a kingdom1 for himself and his offspring, benefiting from 
the labour of the".Arabs who had made him-what he was.1*
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a pan-SSlamic revival to meet the challenge of the European 
encroachments in the Arab .world, while at the same time he 
emphasised the.superior position of the Arabs in Islam and 
suggested the formation of an Arab caliphate centred at 
Mecca
Growing European power and influence in the Arab world 
and the failure of the Ottoman central government to deal 
effectively with this danger * helped to add to the growing 
dissatisfaction with Turkish mile among Arab intellectuals 
influenced by Western political and nationalist philosophies* 
From the year 1875, when a club with basically Arab nation­
alist aims and principles was formed by Christian Arab 
students at the-Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, until 
the outbreak of- the First World War, secret' societies
actively conspired in Syria and Istanbul itself against
2Ottoman rule of the Arab world. *
At the first Arab Congress, held in Paris in 1913, 
delegates from throughout the Arab world had the opportunity 
to express their desires for greater Arab freedom from 
Ottoman control. They argued that a common historical and
1* Bee Nusaibah, Op* cit., Chapter Three. . In considering all 
these movements expressions of Arab nationalism, it seems 
clear that contemporary Arab nationalist theorists do not 
agree with Elie Kedourie who wrote,nNationalism is a doc­
trine invented in Europe at the beginning of the 19th 
century.^ nNatiomlismM, London, I960, p. 1=13.
2. See, George Antonius: nThe Arab Awakening.n London, 1938, 
p. 79 st. seq* „ , _
cultural heritage and common racial and language unity did 
bind together all Arabs, and that therefore the Arab nation 
did in .-fact.exist.’*’* It was, at this conference that the basic 
ideology-'.of contemporary Arab nationalism seems to have been 
formulated. The delegates insisted on the need for religious 
equality in state a.ffairs and stressed" the contributions of 
Christians in the history of the Arabs. Ahmed Tabara, a 
delegate from Beirut, stressed that:"By Arab we mean all 
Arabic speaking peoples without distinction between Muslim 
and non-Muslim.'"^*
During the First World War, the obvious mutual interests 
of both the Allies and the Arabs in destroying the power of 
■of Turkey in the Arab world' led to official contacts and 
exchanges between the family of the Ruler of Mecca, the 
Sharif Hussain, and the British authorities. The Sharif had, 
through the contacts made.by his son Faisal in 1915 with the 
secret Arab nationalist societies "al-^ahd" and H a 1-fat at1 
in Damascus, gained their, formal recognition as the "spokesman 
of the Arab race" * in the negotiations with the Allies. The 
British, too, were content to negotiate with the Hashimite
1., Bee Nusaibah, Op. cit., p. 51-3*
2. Ibid., p. 51*
3* Antohius, Op. cit., p. 158*
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‘.family, the traditional rulers of Mecca and the only Arab 
yfamily qualified; to found a, ruling monarchy* The details 
concerning the tortuous and,vaguely worded correspondance 
which followed from duly, 1915 to January 1916, between Sir 
Henry Macmahon, the British High Qommissioner in Egypt and the 
Sherif Hussain and the signing, some months later by Britain, 
France and Russia of the secret Sykes-Piopt Agreement which 
contradicted the British promises to the Arabs, are well 
known. Suffice,it to say that the Arabs, aware that there'
\were still unresolved difficulties over the details concerning 
the precise boundaries of the proposed "Arab kingdom", which 
both sides had agreed should be eventually created, considered; 
that it was in their interests to proclaim a-formal revolt 
against the Turks.. This revolt, proclaimed officially on the 
5th* of June, .1916, is considered by many contemporary Arab
nationalist writers to have been a concrete expression of Arab ;
2 ■ - ' :' 
nationalism. * .
1. c.f* Charles Pi&ier: "Les Cherifs constituent la seule.aris^ 
tocratie du san^ qui axiste dans les pays musulmans." "bejour 
c'hea le grandclierif de la Mecque." Paris, 1857* Quoted ..in 
"The Rulers of Mecca," by deraid de Gaury, London, 1951,P#!?*
2 + There was, of course,yat this time ..no question of the in­
clusion of Egypt, Sudan and North 4frica into the proposed_ 
■independent; Arab state. The deposition of Hussain*s son All 
from the Kingdom of the Hedjazi by King_Saud in 1925, the ass^ 
a,ssinations of his} grandson *Abd al-Ilah and great-grandson 
Faisal,, King of Ir'aq in July-1958 and the break up of the 
short-lived "Arab Federation" of Jordan and iraq^ are all 
. events which-se^m to probe the existence of strong elements 
y 'of various .kinds throughout the Arab world which would have 
been most unlikely to agree to_the establishment of a perm­
anent Arab Kingdom under the;Hashimites.
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After the defeat of the Turks and the conclusion of the 
yt or Id War, Arab demands for the fulfilment of the promised 
creation of an Arab independent state were not met. British 
and French imperial and strategic interest-s and Zionist claims 
for a "national home" in Palestine, agreed in principle by - 
the British government in November, 1917, required the estab­
lishment of separate mandatedstates in Syria, Lebanon, Trans­
jordan, Palestine and Iraq* As Bernard Lewis has recorded:
"Arab disappointment, rendered more vocal by the rapid edonomic 
and cultural development of the inter-War years, found express** : 
ion in a series of vigorous nationalist movements, still ;
religiously coloured, still conditioned in their leadership
1 ;and many of their policies by the old social order*" * j
One has, I think, to agree with the Palestinian writer
Fa!iz> Sayigh who considers that it is at this stage that one 
has to seek the more specific origins of the present-day pan- 
Arab nationalist movement. The religious revivalist movements 
of 18 th and 19th centuries in the Arab world sought primarily 
for the creation of a pan-Islamic state based on the institution 
of the caliphate and the precepts of the classical Islamic 
codes of law. In contrast to them, the niajority of contemp­
orary pan-Arab nationalists insist on the need to build a 
United Arab state in which the government should be completely
1* "The Arabs in History", London, 1950, p* 176*
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divorced from the influence of any particular religion*
Sayigh maintains that the Ottoman rule had, in fact, ensured 
a. political and administrative unity embracing the major 
part of the Arab world and that‘ .the decisions taken at the 
San Remo conference of 1920 and the cons extent creation of the 
separate Arab countries from the Fertile Orescent destroyed 
this unity •***• The ‘Arab uprisings at the time were, however,' 
without success and! "from then on, the desire to preserve an 
existing unity was transformed into the desire to restore and 
reestablish a recently destroyed unity. Unity became a 
principal,goal ©f the Arab nationalist movement. The idea of 
Arab unity was born."^*
In the period between the World wars, the movement seeking 
pan-Arab unity had little chance of achieving success. Fal~ 
estine, Syria and Lebanon, Iraq as well as Egypt, Sudan and 1 
North Africa‘ail remained under varying degrees of European' 
control* The rise to power of Sa*ud as King of the Nejd and
1. See also C.A. Hourani: "The Ottoman regime, with all its 
defects,/had preserved many of the externals of unity. If 
the Arab lands were dominated from without, it was from 
one centre; and the compensation of the inclusion in a 
large empire did something to offset the fragmentation of 
Arab society." Reprinted from M.E.J., VoL. If, No* 2* April
. 1947 and issued as a pamphlet by the Arab Office, Washington. 
D.O . p* 3. (No date)'.
2. "Arab Unity", New York, 195S, p. 61*
: " v ;; 1 3  ;; ^
the Hbdjaz, and his continuous rivalry with, the! Hashemite s 
established- under British protection in Trans-Jordan and Iraq’,, / 
brought obvious, new problems to the theorists of,pan-Arab 
nationalism./ The. activities;of the nationalists: in most parts1 
of. the Arab world were directed primarily^/towards winning*. ’ *•/;//:• 
the individual freedom of each separate political entity. /Pan- - 
Arab, nationalist movements which did nianage .to establish them- 
selves in this period, as for example the "League of National Z 
Action"(,!usbah al^amal al-qauml )-in-Byria and Lebanon did/ 
not achieve any. great degx^ee of support. It must have seemed : 
obvious, that, until the occupying powers could be persuaded to 
remove themselves, a greater Arab:union was a dream which could ?
not possibly be fulfilled. It is not.surprising, therefore, j
that as Nusalbah has remarked!, "the bitter disillusionment A  i
which followed World War One and the failure of the'Allies- to /
honour their pledges to the Arabs impressed a stamp of pes­
simism, negativism and cynicism bn the movement. The liter-, 
ature of Arab nationalism from. this, time is a bitter monotony, ;
distinguished.more by what it opposes than what it proposes."
The conferences held by the Arab government and other Influent- 
ial Arab,organisations^* in the late thirties and early ,
1. Bee biographical riotes concerning fAli Na.sir al-DXn,p2&above..
2., Op. eit *,: p. 55-6. ■
3*'-e.f. the Bludads&n Conference of 1937 called by the Arab :
Committee,for the Defence of Palestine.
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forties were primarily intended to achieve a common Arab 
position in face of the dangers posed by the Jews in Palestine. . 
The Arab League too, formed eventually in 194*5, was largely 
motivated by the common desire of the Arab countries to achieve . 
the■formation of a bloc which would be able to unite ltd- 
efforts against the Zionist danger.3** The Arab defeat in the 
Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and the establishment of the state 
of Israel afterfthe withdrawal of th^British mandate over - 
Palestine came as a bitter shock to the Arabs, the effects 
of which are, deeply reflected in Arab nationalist works of the 
period., :The nationalist movements in each part of the Arab 
world had, with the, exception of North Africa .and Aden, grad-- , : 
ually won complete, independence for their countries; the Arab: 
world remained, nevertheless, still far from unified and Israel 
grew in numbers and strength from day to day. Although a deep . 
and widespread, realisation that further Zionist expansion was 
a possibility which could only be defeated by joint Arab effort,, 
coupled with a deslx^e for revenge, did give added impetus to 
the pan-Arab nationalist movement the difficulties in the way 
of Arab union seemed so great that the pessimism reflected in.' A  
Arab nationalist works of this period is not surprising.
The pessimism and negativism which pervade Arabic^ political:
■ „ <2t
1* See Ohapter\ Four, ppJ3^above, ,
i
literature from the mid-thirties to the mid-fifties of this 
century contrast remarkably with the optimism which is seen 
to be an essential feature of the most recent works In support 
of pan-Arab nationalism. The adoption by the Egyptian govern*-* 
ment, after the Army coup d retat of 1952, of a policy of 
official support for pan-Arab unity, the emergence of the 
Egyptian leader, Jamal (Abd al-Nasin as a personality command­
ing enough to be the figurehead of Ar&b nationalism to which 
all the Arab,masses could show allegiance, as well as the 
spectacular Arab ndefeats*1 of “imperialist" policies in 
recent years have.all had profound influence in giving many
Arab nationalists greater confidence and hope in the future.
\
This confidence, raised to even greater heights by the form­
ation of the United Arab Republic from Egypt and Syria in 
February, 1958, is vividly reflected in the great number of
books and articles written by Arabs In support of Arab nation-
1alism In the last three years. # It will be: extremely inter­
esting in the future to observe whether the continued rivalry 
between the U.A.R. and the post-revolutionary government of 
Iraq, coupled with the dissatisfaction with Egyptian
1* It is a fact that as many works In direct support of pan- 
Arab nationalism were published in the three years from 
1957 to 1959 as in the whole previous period of twenty 
years •
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policies reliably reported to be growing in Arab nationalist 
and particularly Bafthist circles in the Syrian Region, Leb­
anon and Jordan will cause a, diminution of this optimism and a 
reversion to the pessimism of the previous years. In the 
absence of further spectacular positive steps towards Arab 
unity, a reaction of this nature seems highly probable*
One important fact must constantly be borne in mind when 
one attempts.to consider Arab nationalism in general terms.
This is simply that there is no sharply defined Arab nation­
alist movement to which all Ai’abs who support the formation 
of a, united Arab state belong* The vast majority of politically 
conscious Arabs today say that they support Arab nationalism 
but,they differ greatly among themselves on ways and means of 
attaining the desired union and .what they expect to gain from ' 
it. The words 1Arab nationalism* (al~qaumiyah al-Arabiyah) 
and lArabism! (aj-urubah) have today an extraordinarily strong 
emotional appeal throughout the Arab world and'few Arabs 
indeed dare touse; these words in a way which implies criticism 
of what they stand for. Each Arab sees In Arab.nationalism 
■:what he most desires.- The pan-Islamic extremist uses the words-, 
as synonymous with. Islam; the member of the Christian or other 
religious minorities who support Arab nationalism In the Arab 
world sees in it a guarantee of equality of opportunity Inde­
pendent of religious/beliefs.
^ ■ n  r . . . .
There are, inf’fact, almost as many Arab nationalist 
“movements" as there are politically conscious Arabs. This 
work gives evidence of the diversity of opinion concerning 
the questions- of religion and state, the form.of the union 
and the differing attitudes which .Arab nationalist writers 
stress should be adopted towards both the Eastern communist 
and Western democratic worlds*
This study would.be far from'satisfactory without some 
special emphasis being .placed on two. organisations which have 
had and will have great influence In shaping and developing^ 
the ideology of contemporary.pan-Arab nationalism. The first ,? 
of these is the Arab Ba*th Socialist Party (baHh-reinaissance), j
which was largely influential in constructing the close union j
& ’f !
between Syria end Egypt in 1958. The Ba’th party was formed 
in 1940. in Syria by Michel *Aflaq,' a Christian schoolteacher 
The party is Arab nationalist by definition; its charter 
proclaims, in the first article, a belief in the existence of \ 
the Arab nation and the need to give this* nation political form., 
The party, which is left-wing socialist, revolutionary and . -
firmly secular in its ideology,. grew increasingly active and 
successful in the period from the end of the Second World 
War until the formation of the U.A .R* In x^ecent years it 
was attaining minority but important representation in the 
Syrian parliament. In 1952 the Ba’th party amalgamated with
18  ■ ■ ■
the 3'og iali st’ party of Akr am a 1- Hour a nT, and , i s * responsible 
to a large extent for the strong socialist element in present- 
day Arab nationalism. . As a progressive and revolutionary . 
party it had great attraction for young Arab intellectuals In 
Byria, Jordan and Lebanon. The party *s insistence on the need 
for complete equality of opportunity for members of the relig­
ious minorities in the affairs of state has been particularly ■ 
effective in attracting the support of the members of these 
communities.
The influence of the Ba’th party in the. _ formation-of the. 
United Arab Republic, which ‘Aflaq had advocated since 1956 
is clearly shown by the fact that both deputy leaders' of the 
party,.Akram al-Hourani and Balah al-Din al-Bitar were, until 
very recently, members of the Central Cabinet of the new state, 
despite the fact that in the last Syrian elections held before 
the union the Ba’th were a minority party. The recent resig­
nation ofIboth these Ministers from the government of the U.A.Rv 
must be taken, presumably, to show their.dissatisfaction with 
the conduct of the policies of the state which they helped to 
create. It seems likely that their resignation will be con- 
.sidered "a matter of great Importance by those Arabs who have 
supported. the -form of Arab nationalism long propagated by the 
Ba*th party.
The dissolution of the political parties in Byria after/ 
the formation of the United Arab Republic and the acceptance / 
by some Ba’thist leaders of important posts in the government / 
of the new state were apparently considered.hy some Arab 
nationalist intellectuals to leave- a void which could only 
be filled by the formation of a new and independent pan-Arab 
nationalist organisation* In the last years, therefore, an 
/Arab nationalist.organisation originally formed- some ten years 
ago, calling Itself the "Movement of Arab Nationalists" (harakah 
al-qaumilh al~ rarab) has gained increasing support in Lebanon,
Jordan and, more seeretly in the Syrian Region* The Movement
■ ' ' . . . / ■■,• ■' q .
Is organised .strictly as a secret society.; * membership Is y
closely restricted to individuals of proved ability, acceptable, 
character and unquestioned loyalty to. the cause of Arab nation­
alism* Its two founder members are Christian and the Christian ] 
element in it is strong. The Movement is based on principles 
very similar to those of the Ba’th party;, it Is revolutionary, 
socialist and demands a secular basis for the formation ..of the ; 
proposed United Arab .Btate, The Movement has a small but 
Influential and active membership and is organised into small,
. secret cells in the major towns of the Levant* . :
1. The existence, of the Movement and the general -details-which-'
1 give here concerning-its organisation are, of course, 
fairly widely known in Beirut•
The .Movement neither* approves nor disapproves officially 
of,the conduct of the policies of the United_Arab Republic, 
from which,. >am told, it refuses to accept financial aid.-. It 
,has the determined intention.to, remain independent of parties, 
participating. in .practical government of the Arab states;it 
■desires to influence: the policies, of these governments from- • <  
the,outside, in order to bring about the, sort of Arab nationalist 
union it considers most, suitable. The finances of the Move-*. 
Ament ...are maintained on; the basis of voluntary, contribution from 
members. Its funds: have;also .been used to set up businesses :- 
in various- Arsh towns which are run by party members and the 
profits frpm,.which. are returned to the movement*s central 
treasury. The Movement has so far published only one short 
series of pamphlets for. general release and these add nothing;, 
to the ideology of Arab nationalism. It has.recently started 
publication of anA&^abic periodical newspaper in Beirut 
; called J,ai~Hurriyahn * ‘The Movement apparently believes that •- 
the party system in Jugoslavia might prove a suitable model ■
:both:for its own. internal organisation and that of the 
desired UnitedAArab state. The.members are similarly, I am 1 
told, engaged in:formulating an economic policy applicable 
to the Arab union based on the Yugoslav economic system*
TREATMENT OIF THE SUBJECT' AMD THIS 6 OURCI2S OOHSULTEB
This study is an attempt to examine the contemporary 
Ideology of Pan^Arab nationalism, the supporters of which 
seeking.some form:of effective union between the Arab states 
at present divided. The sources I have consulted in detail 
begin with the conference called in Bludah in Syria by the 
Arab Committee for the Defence of Palestine in 1937 until the 
year 1959* The Arabic sources.examined are the work of 
authors who have stated that they believe in the existence, of 
the Arab nation and who appear to favour the creation of an
: - ' -i. ■
united. Arab state.;* In this study I have assumed that the 
words t,al-,urubah,, (Arabism) and f,al«qaumTyah al-farabXyaht!
(Arab nationalism) are.so nearly 'Synonymous as to make little 
difference.' . It might, however, be argued that the former 
implies a feeling of pride in the Arab culture and civilisation 
and not necessarily any belief In the need to form a pan- 
Arab state, with which belief the words Ual-qaumiyah al~ 
Iarabiyah1 seem today Inseparably connected. The difference 
isnevertheless, very slight, if It exists in practice at .all*
1. Under no circumstances should this work be assumed to
represent.the ideas of even a majority of Arab intellectuals 
who Interest:themselves In.the contemporary problems of the 
Arab world, of which the problem of unity is only one.;
22
We find, for example,, that batl * al-Hueari, Muhammad Wahbl,
Nicola Ziadeh and fAbd al-Latif Bhararah. have each written*
boohs, directly concerned with the problem of pan-Arab political' 
unity,, in the titles of which the word "al-^rubah1 appears. 
Wherever the word ’‘al^urubah1* has occurred in the Arabic-, 
text of the sources consulted for this study-1 have, for the 
:sake of any reader who may consider that the words do differ 
significantly in connotation, used the word “Arabism1 in 
English, Wherever the words nArab nationalism1!,occur in the 
quotations cited,, it may be understood that the words ,ral- 
qaumTyah al~Iarabiyahn were employed in the original Arabic. .'
X have not examined Arab nationalist sources in a strictly, 
chronological order; in the last decades- there does not seem 
to have been any great overall development in Arab nationalist 
ideology. The Second World War, the creation of the Jewish 
state of Israel in Palestine, the growing influence of 
communism in the Middle East and the adoption by Egypt in- 
recent years of an official policy in support- of Arab national’*? 
ism have all led to great changes in emphasis In the most 
recent Arab nationalist works. The basic alignments for. the 
existence of the Arab nation and the discussions of religious,
, social/and economic factors and the form of the proposed union, 
have, however, remained In principle.the same,
1 have avoided in this study giving preeminent consideration 
to the attitudes, and Ideas of any particular group or groups
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of Arab nationalist theorists, I have tried to give some 
idea of majority or minority opinions where I have thought 
justified but, with the exception of the Ba'thists and the 
sponsors of the policies of the United Arab Republic, each/work 
I have examined expresses the particular opinions of its , 
author, Individua.1 quotations from the work of any one 
Arab nationalist writer cannot, of'course, be understood 
to represent the opinions of all those Arabs who support the 
formation of an united Arab state.
I have restricted my study in general to an examination 
of Arab nationalist works published in the last two decades 
in book form; although I have quoted from some Arabic magazines 
an exhaustive study of them and of even a section of the j
Arabic press would have been too great a task to be undertaken. 1 
I have been restricted in my reading for this study only by !
the limitations^posed by what was known and accessible to 
me; any ommissions there may be are unconscious and unin­
tentional.
Since I have consciously examined the works I have read 
from the point of view of the interest, typicality ox^ origin­
ality of the ideas expressed in them, leather than fi^ om the 
popularity or importance of the author concerned, it is 
clearly necessary to indicate those sources which are most 
important and to say something of the position and reputation 
of their authors x^ithin Arab nationalism. 1 have not,
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unfortunately, been able to meet more than a minority of Arab 
nationalist writers personally and information concerning 
some of the others has been difficult to obtain. I understand, 
moreover, that some of the writers from whose works I have 
quoted have, in recent years, lost their, belief in and 
enthusiasm fox' pan&Arab nationalism.
An obvious observation must be made concerning the 
sources of this.study* It will be seen that the, vast majority 
of these sources are the work of Syrian, Lebanese, Jordhnian 
and Palestinian writers. This is particularly true of those 
works published before the end of 1956, by which time the 
Egyptian government had adopted,a distinct policy of support 
for the idea of Arab union. Pan-Arab nationalism seeks for 
the establishment of a state uniting effectively all the 
Arabic-speaking peoples who live in the land area between the 
Persian Gulf and the Atlantic Ocean, Where., one might just­
ifiably as^ are the books written in support of pan-Arab, 
nationalism by Iraquis, 3a!udis, Yemenis, Sudanese and the 
inhabitants; of the Arab North African States? While rAlal 
al-FasX, for" example, the Moroccan writer and member of the 
Istiqlal party, refers to the ”prolonged affinity” of North 
Africa to the Arab;world a^d 'frequently mentions Arab soli­
darity and ”arabism”, he significantly stresses that ”The
CV.'i
Maghrib, however, despite its acceptance of. Islam and its
religion and,Arabic as its language, has always felt pride 
in its own entity, seeking a proper place within the Arab 
world and refusing to be relegated to a position infcthe rear 
of the Arab convoy or far away from the centre of leader- 
ship.
The reasons for the apparent lack of works in direct 
support of close pan-Arab unity by writers from these regions 
must, no doubt, be sought in a combination of factors of 
which the difficult political situation of the last decades 
in the Arab world, the lack of printing presses, the high 
cost of book publication and the widespread illiteracy are 
several. The lack of Arab nationalist publications from these 
areas is, however, striking and it is abundantly clear that 
until very recently it has been the Arabs of Greater Syria who 
have been the most enthusiastic proponents of Arab unity.
There is little evidence so far of anything like comparable 
enthusiasm for the achievement of a close Arab union in the 
minds of the inhabitants of the other Arab countries.
Brief details concerning some contemporary Arab writers 
who have written books concerned with Arab nationalism are
1. 1 Independence Movements”, Michigan, 1954, p* 7* This
work, published by the American Council of Learned Studies, 
is a translation of the author*s work: ”al-harakat al- 
istiqlaliyah fi al-maghrib al~*arabi,” Cairo, 1948. .
26
1given: below in alphabetical order of precedence* *
*Abd al-Daim, Dr* ’Abd Allah; obtained hie PhD. in
Europe, A Syrian by origin, he is at present on the staff
of the Syrian University in Damascus. He has contributed to
Arabic magazines for some years on social and political
subjects. He is gaining considerable respect in the Arab
world as a leading writer on Arab nationalist affairs.
’Abd al^Nasir» Jamal; the first president of the United
Arab Republic and formerly president of Egypt. Led the Army
group of ’Free Officers’ which successfully carried out the
Egyptian Revolution of 1952. A Muslim from Upper Egypt, he
appears to have worked originally more for a specifically
Egyptian rather than Arab nationalist revival until the early
months of 1956* Since this time he has actively worked to
2spread the ideology of Arab nationalism. *
’Aflaq, Michel, the leader arid founder of' the Arab Ba’th 
party, which has beeh actively propagating Arab nationalism 
since its foundation in 194-0. A Christian writer, trained as 
a school teacher and educated largely in France, he has
1. The following biographical remarks are based on what 1 have 
been able to discover mainly by personal interview and 
enquiry. I apologise very sincerely for any misapprehension 
or omissions on my part.
2* See Chapter Nine, above.
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personally been largely responsible for giving the Arab 
nationalist movement its present strong revolutionary-socialist 
motif# He has long supported the idea of an effective Syrian- 
Egyptian union as a prelude to a complete Arab union* His 
published works consist mainly of speeches he has delivered 
at party meetings throughout his career*
al- fAlayilT. *Abd Allah; an early supporter of the ideo­
logy of Arab nationalism. He is a member of a well-known and 
respected Lebanese family; he is a devout Muslim and bears the 
title of Sheikh* • He appears to favour some form of Arab 
federation rather than complete union and has strong leftist 
beliefs. His work quoted, which was published in Beurut in 
1941, is one of the earliest exposes of the aims and theories 
of Arab, nationalism and is clearly and well expressed*
al-yAyadT* 1Ay adT a1 - 1Abd; an Egyptian Coptic writer who 
claims to have supported and been persecuted for his Arab 
nationalist beliefs for many years. A lawyer by profession, 
he is not well known in Arab nationalist circles, at least 
outside Egypt* His work Is an interesting plea for complete 
religious equality between,followers of all religions and sects 
within Arab nationalism*
al-Baquri, Ahmed Hassan; an Egyptian member of the Muslim 
Brothers before their dissolution, he was, for several years 
before his recent dismissal, Minister of Pious Foundations in
23
post-revolutionary Egypt* He was the leader of several imp­
ortant Egyptian missions to Communist China and to North 
Africa in 1954— 5♦ His work from which X have quoted, 
entitled fArablsm and Religion1 is mainly interesting in 
showing his own lack of distinction between the two* It is 
in general a merely emotional attack on Western Imperialism 
and on French, North African policy in particular*
Parwazah. Muhammad 'Izsah; a highly respected Palestinian 
Muslim author of a number of religious and historical works*
He has actively supported the idea of Arab unity since before 
the First World War. His work from which I have quotdd
was published in 1957 under the auspices of the Arab League.
/
It is an historical expose of Imperialist policies in the Arab
world and stresses the need for unity to gain complete and
lasting freedom. He shows clearly that he sees a special
1.
place for Islam In the proposed Arab union. He Is one of the
few Arab writers who have attempted to solve the difficult
problem of formulating a suitable constitution for the pan- 
2 *
Arab state.
Faria. Nabih Amin; a Professor on the staff of the Amer­
ican University of Beirut, he Is a Muslim of Lebanese origin 
who now enjoys American nationality. He has written several
1. See Chapter Five, above, pp. \<\<q
2. See Chapter Four, above, pp. tV
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books on Arab unity but is not now oomsldered to support the 
idea of a completely unified Arab state*
Baikal. Dr* Yusuf*; qualified for the degree of Ph.D. at 
the Sorbonne. He was Mayor of JJkffa for a period during the 
British mandate and was the first representative ibf Palestine 
in the Arab League; he has held important posts in the govern­
ment of Jordan. His short book "nahwa al-wahdah al-*arabTyah"
-s * —
("Towards Arab Unity"), published in 194*3, stressed Egypt*s 
place in the Arab world and proposed an Arab federation as a 
first step to complete union.
al-Hajj, fAziz; a little-known Iraqi left-wing supporter 
of communism. He is not considered by some Arab nationalists 
I have met to be a true supporter of Arab nationalism, although 
he claims to be one in his book.
al-Hajj * Kamal Yusuf; Obtained the degree of M.A. at the 
American University of Beirut and his Ph.D. at the Sorbonne.
He is a Lebanese Maronite Christian who Is not considered to 
favour,a complete Arab union*
Hannah* Dr. George; a Lebanese Greek Orthodox Christian 
by birth, but an agnostic and, Marxist by belief, he was educated 
at the American University of Beirut and the Sorbonne and is 
a practising Doctor of Medicine. He suffers from insomnia and 
spends the night writing on a variety of subjects. He has 
written some thirty books on medicine, fiction and politics and 
has travelled widely in both West and East Ejirope. He does not
at present consider that an Arab union will be formed in the 
forseeable future and has recently openly condemned the 
policies of the United Arab Republic, His works are stimulating' 
and controversial but are not, in my opinion, written with very 
great care for accuracy and reasoned judgement#
Husain# Muhammad Tawfia; a Muslim Iraai who worked for*'r’ ■ 1 ■ *
some time on the teaching staff of the American University in 
Beirut* An extreme lefg-wing socialist he hay perhaps have 
been largely responsible for the book he published, entitled 
the “Orescent in Crisis11, under joint authorship with NabTh 
Amin Paris* It is a very badly oversimplified examination of 
the aims of Arab unity and obstacles presumably imposed from 
outside which stand in its way* It consists, in the large part* 
of a series of emotional attacks on Western policies in the 
Arab world#
al-Husaini* Musa; was an early propagandist of Arab nations
o .
alism and was secretary to a conference of Arab students in 
Europe held in Brussels in 1938* He was accused of complicity 
in the assassination of King *Abd Allah of Jordan and was 
executed# The book he edited is an interesting expose of the 
generally accepted aims and principles of Arab nationalism* 
al~Husarl* Abu Khaldun Sati; was born in 1880 in S a n ^ W
c u
in Yemen# His father was an Ottoman Empire government official 
originally from Aleppo. Al-HusarT was educated in Constant*i «>
tinople, learned French and Greek and decided on a teaching
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career* He spent some ten years as a science teacher in the 
Balkan countries, where he was very impressed by the anti- 
Ottoman nationalist feeling of the local population. He took 
part in the Arab Revolt of 1916 and was made Minister of 
Education in the provisional Arab government set up in Dam­
ascus under Faisal in 1919» He held important posts in the 
Ministry of Education in Iraq from 1921 to 1941 until his 
banishment for complicity in the revolt of Rashid 'All* He 
was responsible for the complete reorganisation of the educat­
ional system in Syria from 1944-47* He has since held many 
important posts in the fields of culture and learning in 
both Egypt and Syria; from 1953 to 1957 he was director of 
the Cultural Department of the Arab League. He is the author 
of a wide collection of books; his works on Arab nationalism 
are considered classics. He has conducted lengthy word- 
battles against the Syrian Nationalist party of Antun Sa'adah 
and against other opponents of Arab nationalism and is con­
sidered to have played a great part in gaining acceptance for 
the movement^ philosophy* He is firmly convinced that a 
close form of Arab union is inevitable and that Israel will 
eventually cease to exist as a separate Jewish state.
Jumblat» ftemal; the hereditary leader of the Druze comm-
: : 0 ' j ' '
unity of the Lebanon, his forces were the main military 
opposition to the Lebanese Armed Forces in the disturbances
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of the summer of 1958* He appears to favour close Lebanese 
cooperation with the United Arab Republic but not close 
union wifch-.lt>.: His 'Work I have quoted is remarkable for the 
strength of the anti-Western feeling it expresses and for the 
violence with which he attacks both the character and political 
policies of ex-President Shaman*
Jum!ah , Dr. Ibrahim; A little known Egyptian teacher who 
supports the.Arab nationalist policies of the U.A.R. His 
book from which I have quoted is superficial and unoriginal 
and displays an extreme anti-Western bias*
al-Ma *luf. Raflq; a Christian Lebanese writer, he was 
educated in the French section of the American University of , ;: 
Beirut* He is the assistant editor of the moderate and res- 
pected newspaper .al*?Jaridah of Beirut* He is considered to . 
support the ..Idea- o f a  union of the Fertile Crescent rather 
than a full Arab union. His work quoted is an orderly \ 
examination of communist aims :and policies in the Arab world* 
Majdhub. Dr. Muhammad; obtained his Ph.D. in France. A 
Muslim Lebanese, he lives in Saida. He is a full supporter of 
the revolutionary socialist ideology of Arab nationalism 
and apparently fully approves of the policies of the United 
Arab Republic. His work from which I have quoted, which: is : ; 
clearly intended to have a ’popular* rather than intellectual
appeal, well©exemplifies the strong emotional basis of Arab 
nationalism*
. Maqsud, Dr. Clovis; a controversial and individualistic
q i
Lebanese Christian writer. He obtained his Ph.D. at Oxford 
and has travelled extensively in the Western world* He writes 
mainly on social and economic problems; a determined supporter 
of revolutionary socialism, he apparently considers the 
policies of the United Arab Republic appropriate to the circum* 
stances. I
Nasir al-pTn* fAlX; a Lebanese Druze and lifelong supporter!
o . !
of Arab nationalism. He has worked for Arab unity since before ;
the First World War and took part in the original congress
held In a Lebanese village which led to the formation of the
Uusbah al~*amal al-qauml11 (League of Nationalist Action) in
Damascus in 1933• Naxir al-Din was the founder and leader
of the League’s section formed In Beirut in 1936. He was
imprisoned frequently and for long periods under the French
Mandate and occupation. His work, first published in 1946,
/
is a reasoned and balanced expose of the basic ideology of 
Arab nationalism. A sincere and idealistic person, he 
apparently now considers that Lebanon is likely to remain 
outside any close Arab union ±n the forseeable future.
Nusaibah, HazlmZakl; a Muslim Jord&rSan writer who 
enjoys a responsible position in the present government of
Jordan* :i His! work was successfully
/ presented for thedegree. :o'ir>;-.IPii>3D* at the University of Prince­
ton;/it/is an histpricai ;and-;ideoi^ of Arab. '
;■ nationalism before its. complete adoption: by Egypt as official 
policy. "' "•"■"'©/ ■ ' V:'-'!. ; . : ■■/■//©
■ 'temimwli.\'Dr;v:-'WalTd-;; a young. Muslim Jordinlan Arab; nation^,; 
/ alist Writer^ ; His work from which I Lave quoted, which was 
first published in 1956 Is, in my opinion^/one of the best : 
in ;support of-Arab unity which has so far been written. He ©/'/:'©
: seems to haye a-sound appreciation pf the forces which led to 
;^ the creation of Israel and is hot content to merely blame the
1imperialists1 for the present situation. He shows a good
understahding of,the; difficulties in the way. of Arab union 
and, unlike many/Arab nationalist writers adopts a realistic ■ 
attitude towards ■ these problems. ? He ; Is one of the few. writers 
. who have attempted to suggest a detailed plan for the .form .
; of an Arab union. ; " 't;/ \ ■
/ Sa 1 a b , Dr. Hassail;i a Mus 1 im; Lebane s e who works with the 
. ' ■Ministry of Foreign Affairs In Beirut He; obtained his doc­
torate in political science at Georgetown./! is chairman /
/ / ;ofthq;Political Science Association In Lebanon* He supports 
:;a form of Arab!p&tipnallsm :Which seeks a form of Arab cooper- .; 
atloh Ahprt/bf c political union. /His ■ book which I
have read is a reasoned and conscious collection of studies .
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which attempt to deal with many problems of the contemporary 
Arab world*
8a*ld. Ahmed; a young Egyptian Muslim qualified as a 
lawyer. He is mainly responsible for the successful development 
of the Egyptian 'Voice of the Arabs' radio programme as a 
vehicle for Arab nationalist propaganda. His booh is an 
interesting example of the Egyptian attitude towards Arab 
unity, expressed on a deliberately 'popular' level*
iSaylgh, Dr. Pa'iz; a Palestinian Christian supporter of
<7 *-— •
Arab nationalism. He has worked strenuously and with some 
effect in countering Zionist propaganda in the United States.
His book from which I have quoted, one of several he has 
written on Arab nationalism, is an historical analysis of the 
movement towards Arab unity* His work lays particular emphasis 
on the assumed Inevitability of complete Arab union and is 
remarkable for its optimistic tone.
Shararah. 'Abd al-Latif; a Lebanese Muslim civil servant.— ■■■m u  '""I"1" e
An apparently pro-Egyptian supporter of Arab nationalism his 
works are not, in my opinion, marked by any depth or origin­
ality of thought.
Zlyadah. Hicola; a Professor at the American University 
of Beirut, he is Christian and came originally from Palestine* 
He does not now, apparently, consider a full Arab nationalist
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union either likely or desirable.
Zurayq, Dr* Constantine; is a Distinguished Professor 
of History at the American University of Beirut and also its 
Vice-President. He has enjoyed an extremely active and 
successful career. He obtained his M.A. at Chicago and his 
Ph.D* at Princeton* He has held important Syrian diplomatic 
posts abroad and at the United Nations. From 194-9 to 1952 
he held the position of Rector of the 'Syrian University* He 
is the author of many articles and several works in book form 
on the history of the Arabs and the contemporary problems of 
the Arab world* His work “al-wa'y al-qaumi”, (’’National 
Consciousness” ) which was first published in 1939» has had 
great influence in stimulating Arab pride and determination 
to bring about annational revival. Both his work and his 
personality command the unanimous respect of the Western 
academic and Arab nationalist worlds alike. A Syrian 
Christian, Zurayq is representative today of a minority group 
of 'moderate' Arabxmationalist writers. His recent work seems 
to stress the need for speedy yet gradual rather than rev­
olutionary progress towards the development of the Arab world 
and the achievement of Arab unity*
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CHAPTER ONE'S
TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF' ARAB NATIONALISM
• The "-word's;- are-generally used in the ^English 4
. ■. laiijguagej’4 ^  denoted in Arabic by the: *
wordete**#^ al'-^araiblyah1’ • A study of the nature of
on which it is based and 
through which it finds expression must clearly begin with an 
examination of . what isr conveyed in English-by the words 
Nationalism11 and “Arab11 • ’
,V.i v ^The,concept^ of Nationalism ^s to be too complex-to - * 
v permit ;its “definition to; be made in a few concise words* The 
;8horter Oxford dictionary, for example, merely defines it as 
J^yption. to; dne^s ination; a policy of national independence•11 / 
: This, definition clearly ;takes no account of the important
act:\thSLt;'t&e • nation-state to which the individual feels dev^  ^
o^ be an officially or widely accepted reality,
,Nut: Something -to which the .nationalist aspires and for the 
. •realisation of which he feels he must strive. A number of
,lw The Oxford Dictionary of 1908 refers to nationalism under- 
; / the/heading/■.-!*:Theology,1:as: uThe doctrine that certain
^nations (as contrasted with individuals) are the object . 
of.divine electioni11:, ; The: same work quotes Fraser *S'
/N;:^ ’ ma^ziixie saying : u,^Rationalism is another word for 
: v:: egotism.1 - * '  ^ ,
recent studies have been made by Western observers interested 
in gaining a true appreciation"-, of the elements and factox^s
which constitute■ nationalism--and their findings are very -
1 - j
pertinent to the present study; Boyd C. Shafer, * for example, *
discusses the-difficulty of reading a good definition of ‘
nationalism and concludes that "by. nationalism today may be .
meant: • -
love of'a common soil, race, language. or historical 
culture. 1, >
■ 2) *■ A desire for political independence, security and 
prestige of the nation. • ■ '
3)* A mystical devotion to a vague, sometimes even super­
natural social- organism, which, known-as the nation or Volk, 
is more than the sum of its parts*
The, dogma, that the individual -lives exclusively for 
the nation. with the oorollary that, the nation’ is an end in
: r. " /'//;
5 _);*::xT.he:.;dpgina that/ the nation(i£e/Yn f ^  own) is
or should, be: dominant if not supreme among/other'/hations and 
should take agressive action to this end*",* ; v
The rsame author suggests, hypothetical no
1* See also the works of .Hans Kohny of which the most recent 
.is 11 Nationalism" , New York,. 1955v.^ o
"Nationalism,, Myth and Heality":.New ybrk> 1955, P* 6 *
claim for ."infallibility or finality" the.following factors
an^Ndndftlons-r'usually present in nationalism: ,a certain
de fined (often. vaguely} unit of t err it dry (whether po s s es s ed
or/coveted); ^ soinh/cbmmdh/ cultural; characteristics: such a s .
language /(or wi&elyundefstN s ) customs, manners;
some common dominant social (as dhristian) .and-^  economic (as
caplfaiist/bh recNily^/cbmnvuMsh)..:institutions ; a common
/ihhbpendent: or soyereigh^py^^ (the type dp^ not : matter )■/ /
or .the desire for one; .a belief in a common history, invented
p r - real ,:and.:I n  common origin; ;a> Ipveland; esteem for fellow ;
hationais; a dbvbtipn .to the entity/balled the nation; a common:
^ridb/ih^ t h e / a c h i e y e m q h t s ^ s o r r o w  at its
/itrSgediesj/^'a' disregard for -or^hostility to other groups
"ep^cially;^ i f ’ these prevent or seem to: threaten the seperate
nation1a^;bxlstence:">; a hope that the nation will have a-great' .
and glorious future# * He -concludes his analysis stating that
"at prosent/by/t^ denoted that sentiment unifying /
/a;/groupof -people who' have a- real- or- imagined common historical i
/experience a n d . c o m m o n  aspiration to live together as- a
2
separate group in the future."
In the most recently published-examination of the theories 
/of/?hatlgmlism> the study by Elie Kedourle, we find that' similar
stressed. His work opens with the words : "Nation*- 
/ N ^  iriyerted'-in Europe. nt;;/the ^
:* 1 1 9 ^  bbntury. It pretends’to; supply/ a /criteria det~ : *
1 ermination of the unity of the population proper'to enjoy a
:/■ / :/SoVfrpment.e x c l u s i v e l y / i t s / o w n , / f o r o f
powpr; in' the -state and f dr . the/right organisation of a society |
of s t a t e s . I t  will, I thinkp'be clear from my study of Arab j
, nationalist literature that-the majority of elements and factors :
these-writers have mentioned are, to a greater or lesser degreer 
present in Arab nationalism.
There have been comparatively few attempts by non-Arab 
writers to arrive at a definition of nationalism applied to the ^
Arab movement seeking greaterumeasure of Arab unity and coop­
eration* One of these;is; that>:0f: H.H., Davison,' who is of the ; 
opinion: "For want of a better termi we describe as modern 
nationalism an exaggerated consciousness of organic unity and 
uniqueness based on common cultural traits and the concept of a 
././; .,;?/.iterritdrIally delii^taBlq/state.1,2' Arab pA^lonaiists themselves
. V. . ■/ 1 *, ^Nationalism11, iondc^//i96C^ be
observed, stresses the purely politlbhibaspects. of nation- 
.;/; - // / / / ‘alismV .: The study is an examination of Natiohalist phi 1- 
;//'i/•' /■' / ’ bsqp early Igfh/century, .Explained;with
//, / /' •: .referbhceNp: the/phi^
; ■/ which t ook place throughout the peri od *
?/ ' / ^ v ^ ' M i d d l e / m ^ ^  p* 327.
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///5'Wouid*' ndkdbubt, questich /theY/WprcL Ngxaggeratedl 
. : justifiably ask fc>r a n b x p t a ^ /; the meaning;/bf the l&Bt 
. 5 1 three/words*/falter/-Z'^/i^dUoury'. ,tbo;; to
//dp|roh6h?-to/nationalism/ in the /Mlddlevfe : "The
Middle East received/nationalism in isoldfibny without/lifeer- 
.; alism,:; democracyN1#,/th^:.to aims ; this has, been the
main reason why nationalism/there, to this very day-has taken 
so muchUaohe;:frequenflyY,fheyform of chauvinism,, of emotional 
,aggression and of oppositionito everything foreign rather 
than that of genuine p a t r i o t i s m . * He goes onyindeed, to - 
• make even more outspoken criticism: "This nationalism is 
distinguished'by the ovex^-estimation of onefs own nation and 
the denigration of others, an ambivalent appraisal :of the 
destiny of one*s nation'based on a feeling of Inferiority, and 
a general texidencyt^b^ -‘with..one1 s own’
' 1 ‘ " m2nation to the evil-doing of vothers . •
A number of Western observers have stressed the obvious 
need to make a distinction; between:"moderate" Arab nationalism 
and extremist pan-Arab mtlonaiismv-1 The former seeks' for 
. gradual development, if necessary within the/presbnt internal: 
boundaxfes of the Arab states lac/£ exist; the latter,
1. "Communism and Natibhblism In the Middlei East". London, 
-1957, 2nd'edition, p. 7 *
2. Ibid., p. 8 .'
described by Gibb as "an ignorant, intolerant, explosive force" 
eeekS/Yretbiuti .progress-; within1Ya / p ato^^
should be formed as ;soonvas- possible, . disregarding the 
present internal political boundaries of the Arab'world.
Qpincy' Wright, a n 5 Airier 1 can Writer /mah^s this distinction 
clearly: "Pan-Arabism is a more extremist,Yradical-effort to 
unite all the Arab worldinta. A/.single^ statd ,:Yas ' inythe time 
of YtheYbmmayad//and /Abba.eid Caliphates, whereasAr ab nation­
alism mereiyYseeks YtoYdeVelppYthe; ArNNersbnalityYln the states 
which exist. We would associate Pan-Arabism with Nasir and 
his movement, but ArabNationalism existsYin a 11 the states 
from-Morocco to1 the borders/of -Iran.' :It isY a more moderate 
type,'recognising the independence, of the various Arab states, 
some of which are/: actively/ opposed; to vPan-Arabism as a 
political movement."2 * The/distinction is a very .important
one; the* Arab writers whosebwbrks‘v..sireYex^ ihed.:Yin;:.this study .
do not all, b y  any means, favour the: revolutionaryYahd; ;
extremest Pan-Arabism•^ *
1. H.A.R. G-ibb, "The Future• for Arab Unity*1;* •;’in-"TbeYiJear 
Y:: Y East-:/ Problems',and d?rdspebbs!NYf.WYY Irelandy bd.Y Chicago, / Y; 
1942, p. 93. t o
;2. Article, in/"Middle East Rbbbhi?Y i959> : ed.. W.YSands . d'Middle 
East Institute, Washington, 1959> P* 8.
3 • S e e  remarks cone biding Ythe sources for- this^ study, 
Introduction pp^iNfcove.
44
Some Arab /nationalist Y tiieprisis Nave//thbmselves ; attempted/d/ 
Nq;'defIneY:tbe/ general,:Concept o f  nationallsm;v they reach 
YebkdiuA.;£bns/Ntffll i have
quoted^NlNbugB;^,'tLbY tdnb of/ttoirYrgmar^ not , of course,
In itbhafe tn^eriyihg\ elerdeht of/disapprp sm
which I think one can detect1 in the works of the latter. ^ * As 
the Arab writers are, writing I n , support of an idea they wi sh 
to see fulfilled* : theydifference in attitude is-, not surprising.
Dr. George/Hannah, a Lebanese Marxist of Christian origin, . 
considers: s i m p l y : P 9rhapbYvaguely,/bhat/dial^ : "con­
sists of those firm,; ^ mutually shared.qualitiesMih a specific 
human family to which is given the name He goes
■ on .to amplify his understanding ofv/nationallsm: "Nationalism■ is 
• a. social contract in a people (sha1 b )' whlch has a common 
language, territory, history, destiny, material economic inter­
ests and spiritual culture.. In this contract - there must exist
,1. See, for example, A.J. Toynbee!s discussion of the struggle ’ 
forpowerbetween ' Liberalism: and Communism and their 
-relationship with nationalism! "imbecoming a nationalist 
the Liberal had, in fact, inadvertently^;i^hcypcadlc 
. b e c o m e Y f  e 11 ow travelier/^lh/hlsyCpimmhi^ , since
NatIdnailsifyYln unison wii'hN/bmmuni'sm./and- in contrast - to 
■Liberalism, was a worship of Collective Man and the only 
substantial Ydiffereto of the
cult of .Leviathan, was bhat Communism was a worship of the 
collective huiianNeartd^ 9 whereas
Nationalism was a worship of it in fragments chipped off to 
constitute- parochial states."."A Study of History," Oxford,
- 1954, Vol. IX p_. 621.
2 . aldqatm^ Meaning; of Arab
' Nationalism1■■) Beirut, 1957y/p* ■- 21,. / ■ Y p/.Y:/ / /
all these: bases together."**** 
f v.'/YYl:YyYY;,Y’-The'fstr6ng/.emobIpnal coutent;:;pf \rabionaliBm/£s; stressed \
Nyy Y I'/'In*‘tlae p/llp.Wing/bttempted definition: "Nationalism is , vfund- 
/ yv- l amentally*'t^ >4*0 elings/wHick the
individual towards his- nation (umraah) and draws the interest 
; YY y YY/qf the /nation towards its sons. These mutually ^ shared feelings \ 
:■■";:'*/••/ fgrbwYwith ‘time'-and- -.get stronger with training."^*
/ . . /  Another/well respected Syrian nationalist theorist defines '
i-yyy r/Ytbe/forcfbih:^;;qbpaure/philosophical terminology: "The essence 
Y'Yy/'p-N*b£/national! B&Yisi Ythe/binding ^ link, be.twe en the/ emotional
longing in its bases and intellectual analysis and scientific* 
y/^Ystudy-YoryYIn other words, between/dialectic-and emotion."^* 
y / N  a'distinction between what he: considers
YY:/false-natibnalisms, and true nationalisms. Conscious, perhaps, 
of the criticisms made by Western writers of nationalist 
theory of the 19th'Century*: he ..claims : flThe /;19th century wqs c%;>y 
not, in fact, the age of nationalist freedoms; on the contrary, 
it was an age of exclusive, aggressive fanatical- nationalist 
cliques. The time has passed when-some nations desired sup- 
:,Y/reinacy ini;:aggression- aid believed in their -superiority and in
1. Ibid., p. 30.
yYyY n ("About Arab Nationalism" )
; Y /YllYYi^hd al-totif Bhararah. Beirut, 1957* p# 38.
;Y / ■y /;;y3. :/dlqnJb-Yalyqaumlyahal- ‘arai^abt" ^  Nation­
alism" ) Dr. ‘Abdullah ‘Abd al~Daim..Beirut 1959, p. 56. ,
the purity of /'their/racial origins and considered; .tHat ’ thisY ; t;/ 
racial/ purity g a v q , M  to: subjeqt to it the /peoples/ :-
-'" / of theYearthY-'^N BrY *Abdal'Da* imYbimilarly Ystrongly' dls^-YYyY;' 
/ agrees. wlth/thb/opNiqh/1 hat- there are certain common fact ore 
y to ' aid; nationalisms;, witfe^ of which nd nationalism can he
. : o.ons idered complete.2 "Denigrators o f nationa1.1 sm,11 he / / 
/ w r i t e s " seekto confuse.the truth. They :falsely dhim that 
//Y/ the elements,/vNi ch/make Y u P t Y p q r b N u I a r ' nationalism :are the 
//same in every ti^e and place a nd t hat quit e , t He or et i c a 1 y 
h  discusslont h  permissl’bie concerning the; general haset tavail 
Y . nationalisms; They thus consider that it is/Justifiable t o a s k  
whether these- has©s arp common land, language,■/religion,/ bidbd> 
history,|/desire or. other that thebe-.-/ /From this■ ;t|iey b 6utobhe= - 
- way toexpose/ the7 weakness /in any one of these .factors tfor/wdl 
‘ always find bbat/in pome nationalisms some of these condltipris// 
are nbt: tulfilled c o m p l e t e l y I f  this Isyso, these■ .factors; do/1 
' .not exist/as/bpdeis;’bf/that, n a t i o n a l ! s m . " ,Hef g e e s o n  tb/Ask : / 
rhetorically, whether/Arab nationalism must necessarily ;folloh/y 
Y Frehch/ahd; German/nationalisms;/he pointt put; that Russian :;
: 5 communism is /in/fact a form/of nationalism-; suitable to the
1. Ibid., p.
2;*. c*fyjH&hnah's/remark quoted;this, chapter above p. "In 
this- contract/ there/must exist all these bases together *,f;
3. ;ideitiV;^ ■ • Y ‘. ' ;; /
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Russians* So, he maintains, is Arab nationalism the product 
of the special conditions of the Arabs: "Nationalist phil­
osophy is a philosophy which rises up from the reality of the 
people and its living existence.»*Arab nationalism has no bases 
other than those of its own reality and it has merely to study 
well this reality and deduce its attributes and get to know 
its form so that it may lay down its bases and principles,**
Other writers are conscious of a fear and distrust which 
the word •nationalism* brings to the mind of some people: "it 
excites panic sometimes in the hearts of the hesitant and the 
wavering, who are not aware - or do not wish to be aware - of 
the true meaning and what is really to be understood by nat­
ionalism,"2* Dr. Majdhub goes on to deny any conflict between 
nationalism and humanity. He says that those responsible for 
this widespread misconception are Western critics who have made 
the mistake of forming opinions in their studies based on 
European events alone in a specific period of history, and that 
these opinions need not be valid for other countries and other 
times. He agrees that these writers were right to condemn 
Western nationalisms but wrong in applying this condemnation 
to all nationalisms. True nationalism, he says, has only good
1. Ibid., p, 57*
2 , Dr* Muhammad Majdhub, 1 a 1-jumhurTyah al-’arabTyah a 1-mutta 
HIddK*n ("The United Arab Republic." ) Beirut, 1958, P* 4-5*
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qualitiess “True nationalism is humanistic before all else; 
by it is meant giving freedom of action to the capabilities 
of the people, the discovery of their particular genius and 
the fulfilment of their desire for a free, dignified life in 
urging them forward to take part in building a worthy civil- 
isation useful to the world.*1 *
One Arab writer dislikes to use the accepted Arabic 
word for nationalism, 1 qaumTyah11, on the grounds that it has 
particular connotations of geographic and racial sectarianism. 
He prefers to use the word “watanTyah1 (from 'watan1, roughly 
!homelandl) which is usually translated by “patriotism11. “The 
reason for this,1 he writes, “is that the word nationalism has 
been spoilt by many blemishes in recent times, so that it has 
special meanings with different people...for example (it is 
confused) with the words 'racial superiority1 - which means 
the belief in the existence of a 'pure race* within mankind 
and also with a conception that nationalism is an end in itself 
which must be maintained and glorified and sanctified***we 
do nt>t believe in the existence of any racial superiority 
within the human race.1 *
The definition of the word 'Arab1 has for long been the
1* Ibid., p. 45*
2* Dr. WalTd QamhawXs "al-nakbah wa al-blna li ba*th a1-watan 
al-'arabl.1 (“Disaster and Reconstruction Towards the 
Renaissance of the Arab Homeland11) Beirut, 1956, p. 376/7*
subject of much discussion and some disagreement. The basic
meaning of the word has been Variously explained; the general
concensus of opinion reached seems to be that it originally
*1
had the meaning of ‘nomad1, from a root ‘araba* to wander. *
A present-day Coptic writer, however, maintains, on the auth- 
ority of ”scholars of the ancient Iraqi and Semitic languages” 
that the: word had in Assyrian a connotation simply of direction 
and that it had a similar meaning to *gharbr or West, The 
word originally was applied by the Assyrians to those people 
who lived to their West in the Arabian peninsula. The word
2
‘arab1 meant, he therefore considers, ‘people of the west,1 
A completely satisfactory definition of the people of ■ 
widely differing racial origins who today consider themselves 
to be Arab seems quite impossible, Arab nationalist writers 
are acutely aware of the need for a definition. Dr. Yusuf 
Haikal, for example, wrote: ”ln my opinion anyone whose national 
language is Arabic and who thinks in it and expresses his 
thoughts by using it and wrho records by means of it his scien­
tific or literary observations, this person is an Arab, even 
if his father and mother should be of a different people.
1. See Bernard Lewis: nThe Arabs in History,” p.V5,
2. *AyadT al-*Abd al!Ayadi: "a1~maslhiyah wa al-qaumiyah al« 
Jarabiyah.”(”Christianity.and Arab Nationalism”) Cairo, 
1958, p. 42. _
3* ”nahwa al-wahdah al-1 arabiyah,1 ("Towards Arab Unity”) 
Cairo, 1943,sp* 19*
The same writer goes on to specifically deny that Arab blood 
gives its possessor the right to call himself an Arab:: "An 
Arab is not one whose blood is purely Arab; on the contrary,
(he is an Arab) whose national language in Arabic, who enjoys 
its literature and appreciates its culture. We see many 
whose parents were purely Arab who have been born and educated 
In foreign countries and whose national language has become 
that of those countries and whose culture has become that of 
those countries; their knowledge of the Arabic language has 
ceased to exist or is merely that of s. foreigner to it. They 
have become, in this case, citizens of the country in which they 
were brought up, and whose national language and culture they 
have adopted. These people are not Arabs, even if the blood 
flowing in their veins be pure Arab blood, although their return 
to the Arab fold is to be hoped if they strive to fulfil the 
necessary conditions to being an Arab."^*
The Arab Socialist Ba*th party, an essentially and fund­
amentally nationalist party, includes its own definition of 
the meaning of Arab in the partyfs charter. Article 10 
states: "An Arab Is he whose language is Arabic, who lives or 
was born in Arab lands and who believes that he belongs to the
1* Ibid., p, 19.
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1 .Arab nation/1 * Similarly, in Article 11 it specifically
excludes from the Arab nation; "anyone who supports or
belongs to a group opposed to the Arabs and everyone who has
migrated to the Arab homeland with a colonialist intention." •'
Western orientalists, too, have.^failed to reach any
wholly satisfactory definition of what are the attributes or
qualifications necessary to being an Arab. The only commonly
agreed factors seem to be an ability to speak Arabic and a
3 •desire to be considered as an Arab* * The emphasis on the 
Arabic language in each of these definitions is very pro­
nounced; Arab nationalist writers are almost unanimous in con­
sidering that the common classical Arabic language is the most 
important factor uniting Arabs into one nation. They disclaim
the significance of the dialectical differences which exist in
4.
many regions of the Arab world*
1. Quoted injSati1 al-Hu^rT's "al-'urubah baina du'atilm wa 
m a faridiha." ("Arabism between its Opponents and Proponents") 
Beirut^ 3rd. edition 1957* P* 156*
2. Ibid.
3. See Lewis, Op* cit., Introduction and Chapter One.
4* T.E. Lawrence's criticism of the bases of Arab patriotism 
is not without interest in this respect; "Moslems whose 
mother tongue was Arabic looked upon themseQyes for that 
reason as a chosen people. Their heritage of the Qur'an 
and classical literature held the Arabic-speaking peoples 
together. Patriotism, ordinarily of race or soil, was 
warped to a language." "The Seven Pillars of Wisdom",
London, 1935 edition, p* 336. See also chapter entitled 
"National Self-Determination" in Ledourie, Op. cit., in 
which the author examines the importance given to unity 
and purity of language as a factor in European national­
isms •
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Apart from these words 'Arab^ and 'nationalism1, there
are several other words used frequently in contemporary Arabic
political literature, the meanings of which are not entirely
and precisely delineated from one another. Consequently, and
due also to a lack in English of words to express the exact
significance of these Arabic words precisely, even when this
significance has been discovered, these words are difficult if
not impossible, to translate by one corresponding word in
English. Of these woMs are the frequently used "ummah,"
"watan" and "sha'bn*
That there is a lack of complete agreement among Arabs
concerning the exact meaning of these words is shown by an
examination of some of the definitions reached by the political
theorists who use them. Dr. Baikal states, for example,:"The
'bha'b' ('people1) differs from the 'ummah* ('nation1); the
first is formed by the language and its culture. If to these
two factors are added the factors of historical heritage,
shared interests and the desire to form a political union, then
from the 'ska'b* an 'ummah* is formed, which will be firmly
bound together and will remain unaffected by those political
disturbances which disrupt those nations ('umam') consisting
— 1of various peoples ('shu'ub1) *
1* Dp* cit., p. 20.
Sati al-Husari states, again attempting to define the
t & o
word 'ummah1; "The ummah forms a free, united state ('dawlah1) 
and the borders of the homeland ('watan*) are denoted by the 
boundaries of the existing state which joins together the whole
*1
ummah in its entirety beneath one flag.I,-L*
A somewhat more precise and comprehensible definition 
o{£ these words is given by 'Abd al-LatTf Shararah in one of 
his works: "The 'watan* (homeland) is that land and climate 
in which a group of people live. The word 'sha'b* denotes 
that group of people who live in one land, who have common 
historical origins and who are subjected, generally, to one 
political system. The state (dawlah) is the political entity 
which a given sha'b establishes in a given homeland (watan) 
and it takes its name usually from the political system and 
from the name of the homeland in which it exists as, for 
example, the 'Lebanese Republic' and the 'Kingdom of Iraq* 
and the 'Emirate of Kuwait'* As for 'ummah*, it has a
1, "difa* 'an al-'urubah" ("Defence of Arabism.") Beirut,
2nd edition 1957* P* 5* ~The distinction today between 
the words 'sha'b* and 'ummah* is becoming increasingly 
fine. The-two words are frequently used as synomyous.
The essential idea inherent in the use of the word 'ummah* 
in the Qur'an does not seem present in its present usage: 
"The passages in the Qur'an which the word "ummah" occurs 
in are so varied that its meaning cannot be rigidly 
defined. This much, however, seems to be certain, that 
it always refers to ethnical, linguistic or religious 
bodies of people who are the objects of the divine plan 
of salvation." Encyclopaedia of Islam, 19th Edition,p. 1015*
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broader meanixig than state (dawlah) and a fuller meaning
than 1 sh&b1 (people) and is more comprehensive in its desig-
- «  
nation than 'watan* (homeland)*" *
A very detailed and specific meaning is given to the 
word 'ummah* by Dr. Ibrahim Jum'ah. He states; "An 'ummah*
Is*in the ifrodern definition of the word, a group of people 
inhabiting one piece of land, among whom, as time has passed, 
historical ties have been made complete. It has a shared 
spiritual existence from which its thoughts and feelings have 
emerged. A unity of struggle, of aims and of attitudes has 
bound together the individuals within it." * He goes on to say 
that from this definition it is clear that differences of 
religion, form of government and blcbod relationships are of 
no account in the existence of a nation. He maintains: "The 
government is not one of the pillars of the nation, since the 
state is a political entity and the nation is a natural one."
It is interesting to see how these definitions of what con­
stitutes an 'uinmah' seem deliberately formulated to be 
appropriate to the assumed Arab nation. The interest of 
Arab nationalist theorists in defining these words, especially
1* Op. cit., p* 15*
2* "al-qaumTyah al-'arabiyah. ("Arab Nationalism".) Gairo 
1959* 2nd. edition, p* 25.
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the word 'ummah', stems, of course, primarily from a desire 
to establish the existence of an ummah which includes within 
itself all the Arab peoples* This premise once established, 
they can justifiably denigrate the present political boundaries 
between the Arab countries and argue for the need for a 
political entity the size and shape of which is relevant and 
appropriate to the land mass occupied by the people who make 
up this one 1 ummah*#
From these definitions it is clear that the word 1watan1 
refers to that land formation which is occupfed by that group 
of people refered to both as the 'sha!b ! and the 'ummah*; for 
want of a more precis© word.-, I will translate it whenever it 
occurs by the English word 'homeland1* The word 1sha1b , the 
meaning of which is, I think, close to that of the Oerman word 
'Volk1, I shall arbitrarily translate by the simple English 
'people*. The word 'ummah', in spite of its breadth of mean­
ing and very strong emotional flavour which is quite absent 
from the English, I will translate by the word 'nation*.
Modern Arabic literature contains, of course, many 
examinations of the basic aims of the specifically Arab nation­
alist movement itself. These are interesting in the differing 
emphases which are placed on the various aspects both of the 
purpose of the movement and of its bases. One of the earliest 
indications of the definite aims of Arab nationalists is that
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given by the Congress of Arab Students held in Brussels in 
1938 and attended by 30 Arab students who were studying in 
Europe at the time. The majority of these students were 
Syrians, with a lesser number of Iraqis and only two Egyptians. 
The first resolution on which the congress reportedly agreed 
took the form of the following creed: "l am an Arab and believe 
that the Arab nation is one and that it is its sacred right 
that it should possess complete sovereignty in dealing with 
its own affairs. Its guardian nationalism will urge it 
forward to free the Arab homeland and unite it together in all 
its parts and to the formation of political, economic and social 
systems more just and suitable than the systems at present 
existing within it. It will aim at the raising of the standard 
of living and increasing the good, both material and spiritual, 
of the people. It desires to take part in worl^or the good 
of the human race and it will strive to fulfil this by con­
tinuous effort on the basis of national organisation. I sweat 
to G*od that I will strive to the best of my ability in the
path of this, putting the national interest above every other
1.
consideration.1 * This exposition of nationalist aims contains 
all the basic; dogma of the movement even today. The same 
congress defined Arab nationalism as: "The feelings of the
1. "kitab al-mu1 tamatr." ("Book of the Congress,") edited by 
Musa al-Husaini. Beirut, 1939* P* 1*u
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need for freedom and union found between the inhabitants of
the Arab countries, based on unity of homeland, language,
culture, history and the feelings of common interest."
In the same work, the purpose of which was fundamentally
propagandist, seeking the support of all Arabs for the move-
ment, care is taken to make clear that Arab nationalism was
not sectarian or partisan in nature, but was of appeal to all
Arabs, on the broadest definition, and even to non-Arab
minority groups: "Arab nationalist philosophy is a patriotic
philosophy, and respects the freedom of separate racial and
regional groups and honours the right of free worship. It
similarly respects the rights of the individual as, for
example, freedom of opinion, of work, and of assembly, so long
as these do not conflict with the public interest. Arab
nationalist philosophy cannot possibly be in conflict with the
interests of racial or religious minorities ; on the contrary
It seeks to place all sincere citizens on a basis of equality
2 #
in rights and obligations."
Many Arab nationalist theorists are of the opinion that a 
unity of feeling is the most essential element in Arab nat­
ionalism and in nationalism in general. Nicola Ziyadeh, for 
example, states: "The basis of nationalism is the unity of 
feelings between the individuals in a nation." He goes on
1. Ibid., p. 13.
2. Ibid., p. 14.
3* "al-*urubah fI mizan al-qaumlyah." ("Arabism in the Scales 
of Nationalism.") Beirut, 1950#, p. 62*
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later: ’’Nationalism has feelings as its basis and root* The 
nation is the result of these feelings. It is the result of 
the feelings of the individuals and their belief in its 
existence,”^* Dr. Fa*iz Ba^igh expresses this same belief:
1 Arab nationalism, then, is the spontaneous expression of a 
natural longing for universally cherished values, within the 
pecularities of a concrete national context and in response 
to specific historical experiences and challenges. Its 
substance is universally human; its specific form, the timing 
of its actions, and the pattern of its evolution are peculiar 
to the Arab situation and relative to the conditions of Arab 
existence. *
Ahmed Sa'Xd considers that this unity of feelings has 
indeed been reached completely: “The Arab peoples In all 
parts of the Arab homeland, from the furthest East where Iraq 
is, to the Far West, to the waters of the Atlantic, have 
joined together in their belief in it* (Arab nationalism)
In the same way, the hopes of the Arab millions for freedom, 
unity, strength, security and prosperity are centred in it I 
These have joined together about it the means for agreement 
on their general bases for the first time in the history of 
the Arab peoples and their leaders.
1. Ibid., p. 66.
2. “Arab Unity”. New Yorh, 1958, p* 7*
3. “al-qaumiyah al~rarabTyah —  thaurah wa bina.”(“Arab 
Nationalism, Revolution and Reconstruction”).-Cairo, 1959, 
p. 105 *
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Similarly, President Nasir, in his address in February
1958, announcing the formation of the United Arab Republic,
said? "Today, Arab nationalism having been an appeal and
1 •emotional feelings has become an actual reality.” ‘ Dr*
Jum*ah, too, expresses complete conviction and confidence
in the existence of this Arab nation! "it has gained its new,
living existence from the interaction of events and the
mutuality of interests and the unity of history...it is a
complete nation, having all those qualities and factors which
exist in indigenous nations, both material and organic as well
as spiritual. The truth (of the existence-^ of the Arab nation
o
is something which will not accept argument.1 * Another 
writer echoes this sentiment, saying that since the days when 
Imperialism was at its strongest, many people have examined 
this question of the existence of an Arab nation and have: 
"concru&ed in the affirmative, relying on the certainty of the 
existence of the necessary factors for this nationalism* These 
factors, the ties of the past, present and future, constitute 
by the firmness of their connection, a true unity in which no 
doubt is possible*”^* Dr. *Abdullah (Abd ul«Da*im is also of 
the opinion that Arab nationalism does now exist as a fact; he
1* Quoted by Muhammad Ma.jdhub; "al-jumhuriyah al‘arabTyah al~ 
muttahidah."*("The U.A.R*") Beirut, 1958, p. 5*
2. Op. cit., p* 25.
3* Muhammad WahbT: "al~urubah wa al-insanTyah" ("Arabism and 
Humanity.”) Beirut, 1958, p. 51.
maintains strongly that it is a natural phenomenon and not
something artificially imspiredji "It is living reality which
is the basis for Arab nationalism,the belief present in the
mind of every Arab and the truth articulate in every one of
the fields of Arab life. It is this living, ardent reality
of which nationalist philosophy has made clear the various
elements and bases. It would be quite false and extremely
misleading to claim that the idea of Arab nationalism is a
created thing and a construction, the parts of which were 
1*
fabricated.”
Michel !Aflaq, the leader of the Arab Socialist B a Hh
party, considers that some of the ideas of Arab nationalism are
now accepted as existent fact, but emphasises that these are
not the whole factors in the ideology of the movement: "Some
ideas which were new five years ago concerning the bases of
Arab nationalism and Arab Unity, have become widely accepted
and obvious and have entered into the consciousness of the
people from one extreme of the Arab homeland to the other.
These thoughts are merely, however, separate sides and
aspects of modern Arab nationalist ideology; it is impossible
to separate these from the whole unit by means of which these
(t2.
parts would become organically bound.
1. Op. cit., p. 56.
2. "ma'rakah al-masir al-wahid." ("The Battle of the One 
Destiny") Beirut, 1958, p. 98*
6i
That the living unity of sentiment and feeling claimed to 
exist by these writers is not, however, so complete as to be 
entirely satisfactory is a thought with which they would all 
probably agree. Dr. Hasan Sa!b concludes, indeed, that the 
prewent-day Arab world is in greater disunity than ever before. 
He points to the great ideological battles progressing in all 
parts of the world, saying that Moscow, Pekin, Belgrade, Wash- 
infeton, London, Paris, Home and New Delhi each claim to have 
found the answer to man*s further development. He goes on:
“and Cairo, Baghdad, Mecca, Beirut and Tunis are each of thorn 
claiming that, in the special field of Arab affairs, they have 
the answer to Arab needs, both for concept and destiny***The 
Arab capitals rival one another, on a different level, in the 
same way that the other capitals of the world struggle with 
one another. The general meets the special, the external
W  u VUcd \a<AVV«
meets the internal in the Arab ideological battle,raises itself
to a human level, both intentional and unintentional. Thus it
returns to the violence of the Arab ideological struggle of
the Ummayad, 1Abbasid, Fatimid and Muwahid periods. It
reaches, In this way, a degree of violence and tension which 
modern Arab history has never before known.”
1. ”al-wa!y al-Iag*a,idi.” ("Ideological Consciousness” ) Beirut 
1959, P* 14. Dr* Ba*ab, it will be observed, refers to a 
violent Arab ideological struggle existing throughout the 
period of the Arab Caliphate and Empire. Arab nationalist 
writers more normally refer to this period, somewhat 
incongrously, as one of unity; they frequently state their 
desire to reconstruct a pan-Arab union which will achieve 
once more this assumed unity. T^hree-abe-ve-^pp'rj
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Connected with the "belief that Arab nationalism is an 
existing feeling is the belief that its basic aim should be 
in bringing about a general renaissance of all aspects of Arab 
thought, literature and culture. We find Dr* Zurayq, for 
example, writing in 1939 5 nI mean by nationalism something 
greater and more comprehensive than politics* Politics is 
only a narrow one of its aspects and merely one of its many 
and varied colours. Nationalism embraces life in its broadest 
meanings and is directed towards all sections of the nation*
It aims not merely at gaining the freedom of the nation and 
the extension of its political power, but also at encouraging 
the growth of its spiritual strength and the raising of its 
social and intellectual levels and carrying it as far as 
possible along the path towards the ideal life.""*-*
Dr. Zurayq believed that this intellectual renaissance 
was a necessary prelude to a nationalism capable of achieving 
freedom: 1 No nationalist awakening, the aim of which was 
freedom, ever arose in the world unless an ideological ren­
aissance preceded it or necessitated it, and which paved the
2 •
way for it and clarified the factors and obstacles involved."
He goes on a little later: “There is no doubt that the first 
steps at least are the duty of the nation*s thinkers and
1. nal-wa,y al-qaunii." ("National Consciousness.") Beirut,
1939, P. 62. . _
2. Ibid., p. 6.
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leaders of opinion. It is from them and not from men in 
executive positions in the centre of the field of events, 
that this sort of thinking is to be sought*" *
Arab nationalist writers express their conviction that 
the Arab nation has a part of great distinction and importance 
to play in the future development of the world. Definitions 
of nationalism show clearly that pride in the nation is one of 
its strongest elements; that Arab nationalist theorists whould, 
therefore, encourage and seek to intensify this pride is 
understandable. They frequently stress and at times exaggerate 
Arab intellectual and other achievements, in the past and 
Imply that the creation of a unified Arab state will allow 
Arab genius to play once again a great part in the shaping of 
history. Dr. Zurayq expresses this hope and belief clearly 
in his work published in 1939* The Arabs1 contribution will 
be one of interpretation and synthesis between the East and 
the West: "it would not, perhaps be untrue to say that the 
mission of the Arab nation will be in the future similar 
to what it was in the past. The Arabs In the centuries gone 
by were able to digest and assimilate with their active minds 
and thirsting spirits the civilisations of the Greeks, the 
Homans, the Persians and the Indians and pass them on to the 
world as a rich and splendid synthesised whole. This work will,
1* Ibid., p. 7.
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too, be the Arabs1 mission in the coming ages; they will
assimilate the knowledge of the West and join to it all the
reactions it has caused from various sources in both the West
and the East, making of them all a new whole which will serve
as a guide to life to come and which the Arabs can present
to the world as they presented their glorious civilisation 
1.
in the past."
Some contemporary Arab nationalist writers do not 
hesitate to distort and deny the facts of history in their 
efforts to emphasise the achievements of the Arabs in the 
days of the Arab Empire. Thus we find, for example, with 
regard to the Muslim conquests of the 7th century A.D. :
"The truth is that the Arabs did much more harm to themselves 
than to the peoples whose countries they conquered, since 
their general policy was, and still is, based on spiritual 
values more than it depended on power and the law. Nobility, 
honour, security and obligation(dain) —  these are all- 
important basic elements in the life of the Arab and he could 
not support life if it were empty of these conceptions. On 
the other hand, we find that the policy of other nations is 
based on hypocrisy and money and espionage and force and 
armed weapons in supporting their position and bringing 
pressure to bear on others. The Arabs were the first to put 
humanistic tendencies into practice in politics. Similarly,
1« Ibid., pp. 40 - 41,
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they were the first to nourish true democratlcpprinciples; 
they spread them abroad without falseness and deception. They 
were the first to personify their ethical principles in a
"I
living way in their heroes, leaders and politicians."-1*
The same author, in a later work, considers inevitable 
that, due to the geographical position of the Arabs In the 
centre of the world, they will have a great effect on the 
world as a whole. "The position of the Arab countries in 
North Africa and West Asia, that is, In the centre of the 
civilised world, makes them the lasting medbing point of world 
activity and so it is impossible to separate them from the 
world...This means that the Arabs, whether they like it or not 
have a mission in their own life and the life of others which 
theyi-.must fulfill. Their geographic position dictates this 
to them; it means, too, that it is their mission( Ts|adiyak! ) 
to deliver the world from colonialism and to free its 
conscience from the crisis which (the creation of) Israel 
has caused it."^#
This conception of the Arabs1 ’freedom mission* as the 
protectors and champions of small and oppressed nations is 
reiterated frequently in recent Arab nationalist works. We
1* *Abd ul-LatTf Shararah "ruh al-’urubah" ("Spirit of Arabism 
Saida, Lebanon, 1947? p* 71*
2. "fl al-qaumiyah al~1urabTyah." p. 8.
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find, for example, that the Egyptian Dr, Ibrahim Jum’ah 
states: "There is no doubt that It is Arab nationalism which
is the strength which has forced the large nations to respect 
the rights of the small nations (shu1ub) to life, freedom 
and self determination,"
It is, I think, clear that Arab nationalists believe, 
or at least maintain, that Arab nationalism is a vital, living 
force in the Arab countries at the present time. It is 
based, in general terms, on a claimed feeling of unity and one­
ness binding together all Arabs, no matter what their racial 
origins or their religious beliefs* This unity is explained 
by a supposed unity of language, geographic position, history 
and material interests. The positive aims of this force are 
the winning of freedom for the Arab territories subjected to 
foreign rule, the uniting of all Arab lands into some form 
of political and economic entity and the progression forward 
of this hation thus formed to occupj a position of importance 
in the world, and the raising of the living standard of the 
Arab peoples themselves.
Remarks made and definitions given by Western observers 
concerning nationalism reflect their distrust and dislike of it.
1. Op* cit., p. 268* This emphasis on the "freedom mission" of 
the Arabs is particularly remarkable in.Arab nationalist 
literature since the publication in 195^ of Jamal fAbd 
al-Hasir*s "Philosophy of the Revolution,"
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In remarkable and complete contrast, Arab writers see the hope 
for their continued freedom and future progress assured for 
them only if they can encourage nationalism and constitute 
an effective union between the various parts of the Arab 
nation, which they assume to exist, Arab nationalist theorists9 
by their denials of the criticisms usually levelled by 
Western observers against nationalism show that they are fully 
conscious of its inherent dangers. They assert, however, 
that Arab nationalism is devoid of elements which are open 
to the criticisms usually $ade. They stress the necessity 
to retain freedom of speech, of worship and of political 
liberty and claim that Arab nationalism will ensure all these.
It will, however, appear clearly from this study that there 
is some discrepancy between definitions of Arab nationalism 
given by those Arabs who write in support of it and the Arab 
nationalism which appears from the political works they have 
themselves written.
CHAPTER WO:
FREEDOM AND UNITY FOR PROGRESS.
The aims of Arab nationalism
It is of interest, having attempted to demonstrate that Arab 
Nationalist writers seek for the basic aims of freedom, unity 
and progress, to examine in greater detail what they write 
about each of these aims, their respective importance and how 
they can be achieved.
Since the roots of Arab nationalism took form at a time 
when the majority of the Arab countries were under forms of 
direct foreign rule, it is not surprising that the first aim 
of the movement should have been the achievement of freedom
\ __ i
from this foreign rule. Dr. Fayiz Sayigh points out this
obvious fact in his recent work: 1 As it came into its own,
the Arab national movement was animated by three kindred urges,
for emancipation from foreign domination, for socio-economic
development and for political unification. The corresponding
ideas of independence, progress and unity became the principle
components of the total concept of Arab nationalism." *
That ’freedom for freedomfs sake* alone was not the only
aim of Arab nationalism from its comparatively early days
is seen from the exposition of nationalist aims quoted from
2
the book of the Arab Students* Congress. * We find Dr. 
Constantine Zurayq, similarly writing in 1939* that: "The aim
1. Op. cit. p. 5*
2. See chapter one, page Gb.
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of the nationalist awakening is the raising of the living 
standards of Arab life in all its aspects. It does not confine 
itself to the attainment of external freedom and political 
independence; on the contrary, it aims at something much 
further^from internal restrictions, at achieving for them all 
a greater share of happiness and enjoyment, towards the fulfil­
ment of their lives both physically, intellectually and spirit­
ually*”1*
Michel *Aflaq, too, denies outright that Arab nationalism 
is simply and merely the result of the Arabs* struggle for 
independence, but rather a new philosophy: “Arab unity is a 
philosophy and a Standard1. Arab unity is not the result or 
end product of the Arab peoples* struggle for freedom and 
socialism; on the contrary, it is a new philosophy which must 
associate itself with and must guide this struggle.” *
Despite this emphasis on the wider progressive aims in the 
ideology of Arab nationalism, there is still to be found, even 
today, an attitude among some theorists of Arab nationalism that 
freedom is the main goal and the end in itself. Two very recent 
nationalist writers make this clear. We find, for example,
1. ”al-wa*^al-qauml.” p. 101.
2. "Ma1rakah al-masir al-wahid.” p. 21.
Ci o
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that the Egyptian Dr. Jum*ak writes: "The Arabs are today fight*- 
ing with one will the colonialists both in the South of the 
Arabian peninsula and in North Afriaa, They are fighting the 
new forms of colonialism expressed in treaties, pacts and aid. 
They see no distinction between the English, the French or the 
Americans, nor between the Baghdad Pact and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation. They gaze at all of these with aversion 
and hatred and see in all this one enemy which must be overcome 
and destroyed and that their countries must be purified from 
its evils and dangers. These are the Arabs* aims, both the 
short and the long term. Their slogan for achieving these 
aims is a single,,powerful ones "Arab Nationalism!" It is 
extremely interesting to see how N.A.T.O., as well as the 
Baghdad Pact, which did, it is true, hav© one Arab country as a 
member, is reviled as a major enemy which must be destroyed.
In making these remarks, Dr. Jum1ah Is not, as might be thought, 
criticising Arab nationalist writers for the blindness of their 
anti-Western feeling; on the contrary he is praising the Arabs 
for their singleness of purpose.
Similarly we find Dr. *Abd ul-j^ a’im visualising unity 
primarily as the only means of freeing the Arab world from
1, Op* cit. p. 74-/5.
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imperialist exploitation: "The Arabs have become aware of their 
destiny and have deduced from it the meaning of their struggle* 
They have realised that unity is their first path to freedom* 
They understand that imperialism can only be opposed by a 
united Arab struggle and that It Is fancy for any one of the 
Arab regions to imagine that it is capable of achieving its 
complete unblemished independence encircled by imperialists 
plotting against it in the other regions." #
It is interesting to see that one Jordanian Arab national­
ist writer condemns the attitude apparent In the last two 
passages; he criticizes strongly the anti-imperialist element 
in Arab nationalist writings. "We are, " he writes, "the 
nation which talks the most about its nationalism and thinks 
most about politics and yet we are, in fact, the poorest nation 
in both of them. This is because we consider nationalism to 
consist of hatred for the world and the people on It and we 
consider politics to be a term meaning to intrmgue against 
foreigners and to hurl insults at them. Every one of us is 
sure that the criterion of nationalism is in (its) strength 
in fighting imperialism." * An examination of most contemp­
orary Arab nationalist works forces one to consider tla't these
1. Op* cit. pp. 83.
2. Dr. Walld QamhawT, op. cit. p. 492.
6
6remarks are by no means unjustified.
The great majority of Arab nationalist writers consider
the establishment of Israel in the Arab world to be an
indisputable proof of the desire of the "imperialists" to
1prevent the growth and progress of the Arab nation. There 
is great emphasis in contemporary Arabic political works on the 
need to form an effective union of the Arab states in order 
that the Arabs may find the strength to defeat the aims of 
Zionism, They consider that Zionism desires not merely the 
permanent establishment of Israel, but also its expansion 
beyond its present boundaries into the Arab world. The con­
viction of the need for unity to defeat Zionism, so clearly
2 .
expressed in the Bludan conference of 1937? ’ is reiterated 
in the press, magazine articles s,nd radio broadcasts throughout 
the entire Arab world today and not merely in those works which 
specifically propagate the ideas of Arab nationalism. In the 
introduction to the report of this Conference, Amin al-Rihani, 
the well-known Syrian socialist writer, gave his opinion that 
the first problem of the Arab nation was to ensure "the sal­
vation of Palestine from Zionism and the Zionists and its 
freedom from the clutch of the imperialists• •  The Conference
1* See Chapter Six, ppl^above,
2. See t&oto in  ^Introduction, p.H above.
3* "al~mu1tamar al-!arabl al-qauml fi Bludan." ("The Arab
national Conference in Bludan")ed, Fu’ad Khalil Mufarij, 
Damascus, 1937* Introduction, pp. "A" and "B".
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reached general agreement on the principle that the fate of 
the Palestinians alone. As al-Rihahi points out; "Even if 
the Palestinians were to accept partition, the Arabs would not 
agree. Partition would destroy their historic, patriotic 
(watanl) and geographic rights and would break the Anglo-Arab
V
1,
agreements which were reached during the World War."
The creation of Israel has indeed, in the eyes of 
contemporary Arab nationalist writers, led in fact to the 
complete denial of the rights of the Arabs. They consider 
that their cause is absolutely righteous and they insist on 
the need to unite to fight Zionism. Dr. Zurayq, writing in 
19^8, stressed that Zionism can only be defeated in the long 
run if an efficient pan-Arab government is set up: "What, then," 
he asks, "are the attributes of this Arab organisation which 
must be achieved? The first of these is federation or, in 
other words, the Arabs must organise themselves into a federal 
government in which their foreign, econimic and defence pol- 
icies should be unified." *
Apart, however, from an obvious agreement among themselves 
concerning the basic injustices of the present situation and 
frequent reiteration that the Arab refugees from Palestine
1. Ibid., p. "B".
2. "ma*na al~na,kbah"« ("The Meaning of the Disaster.^) Beirut, 
1948, p. 47* This work was translated into English and re­
published in Beirut in 1959•
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must be permitted, to return to their original homes if they
wish, Arab nationalist writers do not offer detailed and
practical plans which might lead to the solution of these
problems. Similarly, they do not recommend directly military
conquest of Israel and the complete expulsion of the Jews
from Israel, They seem consciously to avoid the problems of
how Zionism and Israel are to be defeated and merely affirm
their belief that the Arabs must unite in order to do so*
Michel *Aflaq, the extremely influential Ba’thist leader,
directly states, indeed, that the Arabs do not seek the efface-
ment of Israel: "The Arabs do not today desire the liquidation
of Israel; they will not, however, agree that the usurpation
can be converted, by the peace which America desires, into a
legal position."-1-* While some Arab nationalist writers would,
no doubt, dispute the first assertion in this sentence, they
seem absolutely unanimous in agreeing that they must never
2
acknowledge Israeli legal existence. *
Although the overriding emphasis in contemporary Arab 
nationalist literature is so strongly on the need to form a 
pan^Arab union for the purpose of fighting "imperialism" and
1. "ma!rakah al-maslr al-wahid", p. 128.
2, Sir John G-lubb*s remark concerning the Arab attitude before 
the Arab-Israeli war of 194-8 seems to be equally applicable 
to their present attrkfcude; "The Western Arabs-the Egyptians, 
Palestinians and Syrians - have that logical mentality which 
deals only in purely intellectual conceptions. Such people 
are incapable of compromise. To them it was unjust that the 
Jews should forcibly invade and conquer their country - and 
that was the end of it." "A Soldier with the Arabs," London 
1957, p. 151.
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Zionism effectively, unity is seen also as a positive means 
which Will lead to greater prosperity and progress in the Arab 
world. As Dr. Hassan Sa*b, the Lebanese writer points out!
& c
"The Arab ideological awakening is today revealed in the move­
ment for the return of unity to the Arab being expressed in the
Arab nationalist movement. This movement was described on the 
- 1.
22nd. of jShubat as a social philosophy and that it aimed at 
the fulfilment of the three revolutions social, political and 
scientific in which the Arabs lag behind. The purpose of these 
revolutions is that there should rise up from them the ,!demo­
cratic, socialist and co-operative society" which will achieve
p
for the Arabs justice, freedom and happiness. *"
Some Arab nationalist writers have at times stressed that 
these positive aims need far greater study before they can be 
fully attained in the Arab world. Michel !Aflaq, for example, 
writing in an article published in 1947, stressed that, in his 
opinion, the early Arab nationalist movement had no positive 
elements in its philosophy and that these have developed later! 
"The nationalist movement, in its philosophy and in the minds 
of its leaders and in its obvious aims and visible methods,
1. In a speech delivered by President Nasir.
2. Op. eit., p. 26.
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contained only negative elements and no pre-occupation in the 
construction of a positive life. The people, however, who grew 
up with the movement and responded to its call did not restrict 
themselves within the hounds of its (stated) aims and were not 
restrained by the infertility and barrenness of its ideology* 
These people, on the contrary, in their struggle against the 
foreign imperialists strove to fulfil a positive thing: the 
creation of a renaissant, progressive Arab society, inspired 
by the idealist principles of justice, equality and freedom."**** 
He goes on to say that it is the duty of the Ba’th party to 
point out the right from the wrong and to supply the positive 
content to Arab nationalism: "We are sure that the core of the 
people is sound and capable of positive, creative work, when 
we have pointed out the nonsense directed towards it. It Is 
our duty to make this known and to address the people so that 
they may understand the right from the wrong. Those who have 
followed the progress of the Arab Ba*th Party, In Its philosophy 
at least, and the publications issued by it, will have observed 
since the movement*s beginning our great concern to make the 
Ba*th the forward, positive step which much come after the 
negative one."2*
1* Quoted in op. cit. p. 12/13.
2. Op. cit. p. 14.
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It Is interesting to see that Dr. Zurayq pointed out 
both the lack of and the need for an ideological content to 
Arab nationalism (twelve) years before this in his book 
published in 1939* In his “National (Awakening11 he complains 
that a recent special edition of the Egyptian magazine 11 Al- 
tiilal” entitled “The Arabs and Islam” which had the obvious 
aim of propaganding for Arab unity, showed a serious lack of 
ideology in the nationalist movements “One notices immediately 
the confusion of the nationalist philosophy in which the leader 
of thought amongst us dabble. There is no clear distinction 
made between the “Arab nation1 and the “Arab countries’* or 
between “arabism", “the East” and “Islam”* There is within It 
no deep understanding of the nationalist awakening nor any 
organised programme concerning the means of encouraging and 
enlivening It.” * He goes on to stress the need for a precise 
study of the factors involved In nationalism and that there 
should be not merely a play on the feelings: “I do not mean 
by that to denigrate the value of emotion and sentiment in the 
national struggle, but I do not consider them capable of 
reaching the end which we desire unless we achieve wide
1. ”al-Hilal“ special editioh of 1939* (’’The Arabs and Islam
in the New Age”.)
2. Op. cit. p. 10.
comprehension and precise understanding (of nationalism).113-•
Arab unity, as well as being seen as a necessity for 
the achievement of freedom and progress, is also seen an an 
economic and a military necessity; all these aims are, of 
course, mutually dependent on one another* Dr. Yusuf Haikal, 
for instance, writing in 194*3, points to the trade barriers 
between the Arab countries and maintains that if these were 
abolished, Egyptian cotton and sugar would find ready markets 
in the Middle East in the place of American sugar and Indian 
cotton. He concludes: "Arab unity would make a strong economic 
unit of the Arab countries, which would be able to stand firm 
in the face of economic instability and financial crises."2 * He 
goes on to point out the military necessity for unity; he points 
to the World War then in progress and its basis of territorial 
disputes expressed by military engagements over spheres of 
influence in the Arab states: "The Arab states were, and still
are, the scene of foreign disputes and the field of battle 
of those desiring power over them. It is obvious that no area 
can stand up against them alone and that no region can achieve
-Z
freedom or retain it." Muhammad Darwasah too, writing more
1. Op. cit. p. 26. Arab nationalism is today criticised by some 
Arabs on the same grounds. Bee Ghapter Nine alcbve.
2. Op. cit. P. 42.
3* Op. cit. p. 42.
s o
recently, stresses the military necessity for the Arabs to 
unite and gives much the same basic reason. He comments on the 
strategic and economic importance of the Middle East to the 
Western Powers, to the decline of British and French influence 
and to the stated desire of the United States of America to 
fill the * power vacuum* so created to prevent it being filled 
by communist powers. He maintains that the Arabs must 
themselves fill the vacuum and show their ability to do this
*1
by effecting a real union politically. *
That an immediate union or a union in the near future is 
not the best way of achieving an economic regeneration of the
Arab world is, however, the opinion of one self-styled Arab
* — , o
nationalist writer. 'Amir1 Abdullah, * an Iraqi;, insists that
the purpose of unity is to further the interests of each region
of the Arab world and strengthen the whole entity by the 
individual strength of each part. The full union should 
only come, he considers, after this has been accomplished.^*
He goes on to explain, with particular reference to Iraq: "if 
there should be any Arab country capable of playing an import­
ant part in the Arab freedom movement and which is capable
of facilitating its movement towards emancipation, freedom
 _ oA * V-O <3>\a t k o .Lv
1. Muhammad 'Izzah Sarwazah, "al-arafaiyah." ('Arab Unity")
Cairo 1958. p. 101. x
2. This writer must not be confused with the Amir *Abdullah, 
the late ICing of Jordan.
3. Op. cit. pp. 21-30.
and progress itself, then this country must he given full 
freedom of action (to bring this about). The form of its 
connection with any other Arab country must be shaped on 
the basis of consideration of this fact. In this, as we have 
explained, there is great and fundamental advantage not to 
the country alone, but to the Arab nation as a whole.'1 *
Dr. Hicola Ziadeh, on the other hand, is more typical of 
Arab nationalist writers in assuming a geographical unity 
embracing all the Arab countries. He examines the economic 
potent! a lilies of this unit as a whole, ignoring the political 
divisions: "This stretch of land has rich and important eco­
nomic resources of some diversity. It has metals; iron and, 
copper are found in the Atlas mountains; it has oil in Iraq 
and the Arabian peninsula; it has salts distributed in the Dead 
Sea and other places. Its plant resources include the principal 
cereals, cotton, olives and fruits - all these resources exist 
in their different varieties."2*
Walid QamhawT, theorizing from the same basic premise 
considers that the Arab countries should be united completely 
in an economic free trade area with no customs barriers between 
them and with the right of work for all Arabs anywhere within
1. Op. cit., p. 35.
2. Ibid., p. 7*3/4
SI
the unit thus formed: 1 It is not possible that Lebanon or
Bahrein or even Fgypt be considered as regions with their own 
lockable doors to seal them from the other (Arab) countries*
For this reason, every citizen must have the right to go 
and work and live in all regions of the homeland. Trade co­
operation within the homeland must be absolutely free from 
restrictions; it must be considered as one economic unit."
The same writer goes on to carry this conception of the econ­
omies of the Arab countries to its logical conclusion: nAs 
for fair distribution, this means first of all, the distribution 
of the resources of the Arab homeland between all its regions* 
Qatar shall not have its oil as its very own or Mor^occo 
its phosphates or Libya its poverty. On the contrary, every­
thing that each region contains shall be shared between the 
other regions, each taking for its own use only what it needs..* 
this is because the resources of the homeland belong to all 
the homeland, no matter what its original source or
1. Op. cit., p. 452.
111.owners.
Arab nationalist writers express great concern at the 
comparative economic backwardness of the Arab countries* They 
seem, in the majority, to blame this backwardness on the 
imperialists1 and they see the cure in greater industrialization 
within the United Arab State. Ahmad Said is typical of manyQ
Arab nationalist writers in considering the deplorable lack 
of industries in the Middle East to be the result of a 
deliberate plan on the part of the Western Powers to leave the 
area as a market for its industrial products. Industrial­
isation should, in his opinion, be brought about by the use 
of local capital. It Is interesting to notice the emphasis he 
puts on the reasons for this industrialisation* It must be 
brought about in the first case for the sake of independence 
and only secondly for the sake of greater prosperity: "The 
creation of industry in the Arab homeland shall be achieved,
1. Ibid., p* 453« The very considerable difficulties which 
would have to be overcome in bringing about a complete 
economic reorganisation of the entire Arab world from 
the "Persian G-ulf to the Atlantic" as Arab nationalist 
suggest are perhaps indicated by the fact that Egypt 
and Syria, combined officially in the United Arab Republic, 
still today employ different currencies. Syrian opposition 
to effective integration of the economies of the two 
regions is said to be very strong.
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as a principal means of increasing production, by the use of 
local capital which the state holds or which private Arab 
investors lend; this new industry will prove of great help 
in the Arab struggle, a struggle first for the sake of inde­
pendence and second to provide a more comfortable life for the 
people. The creation of local industry will break foreign
monopolies or put an end to their excessive profits which come
1.
between the people and its prosperityI,f
Dr. Majdhub, too, blames the imperialists for setting the 
present political boundaries between the Arab countries and 
encouraging them to develop their trade at the expense of one 
another: MInstead of the parts of the Arab homeland helping 
one another economically, and each of them offering to the 
other what it needs from its basic resources and manufactured 
goods, these regions, under imperialist pressure and serving 
the interests of the feudal classes, work in co-operation 
with the foreigners and deprive the rest of their Arab 
relatives of the fruits of their land.11^ *
The obvious example that Arab nationalist theorists quote 
to substantiate this thesis is the Arab oil industry; Dr. 
Jumfaks comment is typical. The countries of the free world 
consider, he says, that as the largest known deposits of oil
1* Op. cit., p. 294
2. Op* cit., p. 9*-
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are found in the Middle East, that their future is very closely
connected with that of the area. This means then: “That 
the future of this *free world* demands the necessity of
destroying the economy of the Arab world to cause dissention
within it. The race for Arab oil brings in its train a race
for influence in the Arab homeland and the conversion of the
strategic oil centres into strategic military bases for the
1use of the imperialists°
That the Arab nationalist movement has now reached a 
stage in its development when some positive ideas are being 
formulated, even if in a vague form, is undeniable. There is 
considerable emphasis placed on the positive principle of 
social reform. There is a widespread conviction among Arab 
nationalist writers that there is a very serious lack of fair­
ness and proportion in the distribution of wealth within the
Arab countries and, of course, they base their call for
2reform on this conviction. Large landowners * and capitalists, 
usually referred to en groupe, are the chief target, apart 
from the imperialists, of Arab nationalist propaganda. Many
1. Op. cit., p. 222. This quotation shows clearly a strange 
and widespread tehdency apparent in Arab nationalist liter­
ature to mix up and confuse what seems to be nonsense with 
what has obvious truth in it. Many quotations which indi­
cate this tendency will, no doubt, be noticed in this study.
2. The land reform carried out by the Revolutionary government 
in Egypt and the restriction of private land-ownership to
a maximum of approximately 200 acres is frequently referred 
to with praise in the most recent Arab nationalist works.
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writers, indeed, see a close connection between these two 
enemies; it is considered that the Reactionaries and the 
feudalists1 are in league with the imperialists and that as 
soon as the latter is destroyed so must the former, too be 
destroyed. Whether, however, this conviction is completely 
genuine as it is expressed and is based on careful study of 
economics or whether Arab nationalists, in their desire 
to achieve greater support than the Communists, feel forced to 
use the same terminology, one cannot tell. The belief expressed 
in the unfairness of distribution of the wealth or the Arab 
world and the conviction that social and material equality can 
and will be achieved within the proposed political union form, 
nevertheless, one of the most important claims of Arab nation­
alist writers.
Dr. George Hannah, for example, states in this respect: 
“Arab society or Arab societies, if you wish, live in a setting 
which has nothing of social or economic justice in it. The 
national income of the Arab countries is not merely not distrib­
uted justly between its people, on the contrary it is true to 
say that it is a treasury in which the plundering hands of a 
small section of them play. This section is called the 1 special 
upper class* and consists of Kings, px^inces, governors and 
merchant traders and those who live off them.*1 ^
1. Op. cit., p. 63.
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An outright condemnation of the ’reactionaries1 as
the instruments of the imperialists is found in Dr. Ibrahim
Jum'ak’s work: 1 Reactionaries are the breach through which
imperialists exert influence on the Arab ranks; reactionaries
are, as is well known,, the helpers of imperialism, their
agents and the mounts on which they ride.11^ * He goes on:
"The reactionaries have demonstrated that they are the biggest
support of the imperialists; it has become clear to the Arab
that they are the first and foremost internal enemies of Arab
nationalism. Their destruction and the removal of their power
is a first aim in the Arab struggle against the external 
!,2enemy.
jfhe leader of the Arab Socialist Ba’th party, in spite of 
the obvious use by these writers of the usual terminology of 
class warfare, denies any element of class struggle for its 
own sake within the ideology of Arab nationalism, although he 
himself seems to view the situation in the Arab countries as 
basically one of a conflict of classes. "The emphasis," he 
writes, "in the Ba’th movement on the struggle of the oppressed 
Arab masses does not stem from any philosophy based on a belief
1* Op. cit. p. 214.
2. Ibid., p. 215.
in ’classes1. On the contrary it means that we believe that
this section represents, as a result of the oppression and
persecution it has undergone, the pure essence of the nation as
a whole, just as there is within it most of the strengths and
capabilities of the nation. Our socialism is, in this sense,
the means of reviving our nation and the door through which
1.
the Arab nation will once again enter into history."
Despite what he says here, however, the same writer goes 
on to simplify recent Arab history and the present situation 
specifically into the simple terms of a class conflict: "At 
the end of the Second World War, the Arabs emerged with the 
feudal classes holding firmly on to power in all their regions 
and being their representatives in their struggle and nation­
alist aims. Today this class stands in one rank and the whole 
Arab nation stands in one other rank. Ten :years ago this 
class used to monopolise nationalism and to deny to those who 
used to criticise them that they had any connection at all with 
the homeland. Today, however, this class has no other option 
but to oppose the homeland and its freedom and its nationalism 
and stand with the foreign imperialists and Israel publicly and
1* Article written in 1955 &nd quoted in "Ma’rakah al-vnasTr
al-wahid.", p. 29.&
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openly in one rank, desiring to maintain its special and wicked 
interests.
The conviction that social and economic progress is one 
of the basic aims of the Arab nationalist movement is frequently 
expressed through a belief in and acceptance of what is called 
in Arabic "al-ishtirakTyah", a word usually translated by the 
English word Socialism1* The vague connotation of the word 
socialism in English is that it refers to a system in which all 
citizens will enjoy social security and equality of opportunity 
which will enable them to achieve a standard of living approp­
riate to their ability and efforts within a planned economy 
with a large measure of state control. These are the general 
bases but not the full understanding of the word in Arabic to 
which it is applied as a translation. A minority of contemp­
orary writers do not use the word at all in their expositions of 
the aims and means to bring about the progress they desire to
1. Article written in Nov. 1956 and quoted in Op. cit., p. 114* 
Oomments of this type account for a considerable proportion 
of the content of some of the latest Arab nationalist works 
which are intended to have a “popular" appeal. This is 
particularly true of the works of some contemporary Egyptian 
Arab nationalists. See, for example, the works consulted in 
this study under the authorship of Ahnmd Sm’Id, Ibrahim 
Jam1ah and the speeches of Jamal *Abd al-Nasir.
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see achieved by the movement; this is perhapH from a desire not 
to alienate those sections of Arab society who, like their 
counterparts in other societies, fear that their own interests 
would suffer by the acceptance of socialist dogmas. However, 
the word socialism has unquestionably now become connected with 
the movement as a whole, despite the fact that some writers 
deny this. The Coptic Arab nationalist writer ‘AyadI al-*Abd 
al-’Ayadl, for example, considers that the movement has no 
formalised political theory as its basis. "Arab nationalism", 
he writes, "does not bind itself to any social political or 
religious beliefs. It prefers neither socialism nor communism 
nor fascism nor democracy." * This rather remarkable statement 
would, I think, be strongly opposed by the apparent majority 
of Arab nationalist theorists, who do clearly see an "ideal" 
socialism as the desired solution for the internal problems of 
the proposed unified Arab state.
In spite of the generally accepted connotations of the
word 1ishtIrak!yah* in Arabic, corresponding approximately to 
the widely understood meaning of the word ’socialism* in
English, there are some Arab nationalist writers who use the 
Arabic word where the English word ’communism* would be better 
understood. We find that Dr. George Hannah writes, for example: 
"The world finds itself before two competing currents: the
1* *AyadI ul-*Abd ul-*AyadI: Op* cit., p. 22.
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socialist and the capitalist. The socialist current is led and 
guided hy the Soviet Union and the second by the United States 
of America, The first draws in its train a faith and a phil­
osophy and the se&ond a formidable stock of its treasured
1 *
profits from the war." TJiis same author writes in general 
terms on the disadvantages of the capitalist and monopolist 
economic systems in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and 
concludes that the system which will give social justice and a
good living standard to all, without the disadvantages of 
absolute governmental control over the sources of income of 
the people would be socialism. Such a system would, he writes, 
create no spirit of envy and hatred for other nationalisms; it 
would be, moreover, a system in which the people "would not 
live on the credit of other nations• " It seems clear however,
from his memarks quoted above, that this author means communism
3
when he uses the word usually translated by socialism*
1* Op* cit*, p* 118* Such comments would be laughable if they 
did not reveal such a tragically ridiculous anti-Western 
bias. The author is a well-educated, widely-travelled 
practising Lebanese Doctor of Medicine of Christian origin*
2* Ibid*, p. 33 r 41.
3. This lack of distinction between the words "socialism" and 
"communism" is, of course, also apparent in their use as 
synonyms in the Communist world. The initials U.S.S.R. In- 
English stand for the equivalent in Russian of the "Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics."
Some Arab nationalists have attempted definitions of the 
word socialism and its meaning for them. It is interesting to 
notice how their definitions are much broader and more comp­
rehensive than one would expect from an examination of a term 
denoting basically a politico-economic system. Dr Muhammad 
Majdhub, for instance, gives a definition of socialism which 
seems designed to include all aspects of contemporary Arab 
life, "Socialism," he writes, "is not, then, a mere economic 
philosophy. It is also an ethical, political, educational, 
scientific and historical philosophy. Socialism, like life 
itself, includes all shades of creeds and emotions and thoughts 
and feelings. Just as life comprises all that is material 
and all that is abstract so does socialism similarly comprise
every element colour and form which affects, either directly
1.or indirectly, the progress of society."
Michel *Aflaq, an Arab nationalist writer who has 
campaigned for socialism in the Arab world since the mid­
thirties, poses the question of what is the connection between 
Arab unity and socialism and whether socialism is or is not an 
essential part of the Arab struggle. He replies: "The Arab 
problem must be considered as one indivisible whole and be 
solved on this basis?. ..The philosophy of the Ba*th party with
1. Op. cit., p. 99/100.
regard to our national problem is that it is all one problem 
and that the on3_y way to solve it is by achieving an Arab 
revolution, a revolution in the deep meaning, not restricted 
to the political, but including thought and spirit and social 
education and economic institutions. I say that, bearing in 
mind our comprehensive view of the Arab problem, we do not 
consider that we can possibly separate Arab unity from social-
In a similar way Dr. Clovis Maqsud defines socialism in the 
context of the Arab world and concludes that socialism is an 
integral part of nationalisms "Socialism is, then, as we 
understand it, the conscious nationalist will active not only 
in the two movements seeking unity and freedom only, but det­
ermined to raise the level of the struggle and make it one in 
which the Arab masses take part...It is not possible for any 
stage of the battle to be achieved If these masses themselves 
are not conscious and do not understand all the aims which the 
movement seeks to achieve. Socialism is then, in the Arab 
nftion, at the very heart of the nationalist movement. This 
is because nationalism in the Arab lands is the force seeking 
the return of rights which the imperialists negated and aiming 
to build a unity which will be the heralding of our human
1. From lecture delivered in 1956, quoted Op., cit., p. 34.
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existence and the primary precondition for this existence.'* *
The rather unusual connotation of the word socialism for Dr. 
Maqsud is shown clearly a little later in the same work. He 
apparently sees socialism as a means to gain freedom and unity 
rather than the desired system to he achieved as a result of 
freedom and unity! "Arab socialism is...without doubt the 
biggest guarantee of the fulfilment of our desires for unity 
and complete freedom."2*
The emphasis shown in this quotation on the part to be 
played by the masses in the nationalist movement makes it of 
interest, I think, to bear in mind what Michel fAflaq 
described as a tendency in nationalist philosophy to adopt 
policies merely to attract popular support: "in this there is 
a great danger for the future of our nationalist movement. The 
distinction is basic between considering socialism as a thing 
in which we deeply believe, because it deals with basic and 
primary needs in our nation and between our considering it as a 
means of withdrawing criticism and as something to be used to 
prevent our being called 'feudalists1 or reactionaries, so that 
the communist movement should not succeed and take our support­
ers away from us."^# The same writer himself, however, stresses
1. "Nahwa al-ishtirakiyah al-arabiyah." ("Towards Arab Social- 
-ism.") Beirut, 1957* P* 54.
2* Ibid., p. 76.
3* Op. cit., p. 16.
the economic plight of the people not, apparently, so much 
out of compassion at their condition as in despair at their 
ability in such a condition to achieve unity: "It is not
governments, nor foreign states, nor politicians, nor phil­
osophers who will achieve unity, but the people alone. It is 
the masses of the people who can bring about this vital aim.
How is it possible for the people to move themselves to bear 
this heavy burden whilst they are giving way under these 
political, social and economic conditions?n^‘
In one of his earliest speeches, indeed, Michel *Aflaq 
expresses his attitude towards socialism even more clearly; he 
states that he is not motivated in his desire for Arab social­
ism by personal feelings of pity and distress at the deplor1- 
able poverty of some Arabs. He is conscious only of the 
wastage involved in what he considers to be the misuse or lack 
of development of the potentialities of Arab society. He 
stresses that living standards in the Arab world must be raised
in order to help the Arab nation fulfil its role in the
community of nations: "I have never at any time looked upon 
socialism as a means merely of satisfying the hungry and 
clothing the naked. I am not concerned with the lot of the
starving man just because he is starving, but on account of
I. Op. cit., p. 37*
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his innate capabilities which his starvation prevents from 
appearing. I do not consider food to be a desired end (to be 
sought for him) but a means by which he can free himself from 
his animal needs and then be able to perform his duties as a 
human being.
Dr. Muhammad Majdhub sets out what he considers to be the 
basic aims of Arab socialist policy In his work in support of 
Arab nationalism: "1.) Pair distribution of Arab resources 
between all citizens and the consideration of the national 
income of the Arab nation as the property of the whole nation.
2.) Bquality among all citizens and the abolition of the idea 
that the few can exploit the efforts of the many. 3.) Limit­
ation of private fortunes in such a way as to guarantee 
correspondence between general economic activity and personal 
economic activity which will achieve the prosperity of the 
people and the principles of social equality. 4.) Participat­
ion of workers In the management of their factories, giving 
them fair wages and a share in profits as well as liinited 
working hours. 5*) National insurance and the security of
1. Prom an article written in 1936 and quoted in "fi sabXl 
al-Ba'th" ("in the Path of the Ba'th ) Beirut, 1959, P* 22. 
The concept held in the West that a belief in socialism 
should be motivated by basically humanistic rather than 
nationalist aims is apparently not accepted by 'Aflaq.
97
social services as a guarantee to all citizens against life*s 
misfortunes. 6.) Maintainance of the right to own property 
and the right of inheritance within the limits of the public 
good. 7*) Government supervision of foreign trade and of the 
implementation of a programme of industrialisation. 8.) The 
implementation of a law allowing the source of any possessions
*i
to be questioned." * This statement of policy is more 
explicit than any other exposition of socialist aims that I 
have read in Arab nationalist literature. It is, however, 
notably vague and emotional in the phraseology in which it is 
presented, especially in the first three articles. Dr. Majdhub 
does not venture .to suggest any concrete ways in which this 
ideal socialist policy can be accomplished; no doubt he would 
himself agree that any such programme is impracticable on 
simple economic grounds for any Arab country, with the possible
i
exception of the shiekdoms on the Persian Gulf, within the 
foreseeable future. It is particularly interesting to see that 
the writer proposes limitation of private fortunes, although 
he gives no idea at what level. This suggestion seems to be in 
conflict with Dr. Qamhawl's appreciation of human character.
The latter*s remark that: "There is no limitation to man's
1. Op. cit., p. 150.
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demands11, * made while discussing the same aspect of policy, 
seems- to deny the possibility of success of such a restriction.
From an examination of the attitudes of Arab nationalist 
theoreticians towards their basic aims of freedom, unity and 
progress, their relative importance in the ideology of the 
movement appears fairly clear. There is still a very great 
emphasis on the necessity to win freedom from domination and 
exploitation and that this can only be achieved through unity. 
This belief that freedom can only be won from the imperialists* 
and the Zionists and their assumed supporters the ’feudalists 
and reactionaries’ by the strength which unity would presumably 
give seems at the very base of the call to unity, at least at 
the popular level. The masses of the people, rather than the 
Arab governments or the ruling classes are seen by the majority 
of Arab nationalists to be the force which will eventually 
achieve the union. There is, consequently, in Arab nationalist 
literature an awareness that the movement will only succeed with 
popular support; the strengthening of the masses and the winning 
of their support are, the theorists write, to be achieved 
through the adoption of ’socialist* policies.
The third basic aim of Arab nationalism, the raising of 
living standards and the achievement of economic progress are,
1. Op. cit., p. 458.
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too, to be brought about by the adoption of some form of 
"socialism." Apart from a general, stated belief in the 
principles of justice and equality within socialism, Arab 
nationalist writings do not give the impression that the econ­
omic situation of the Arab countries has been given careful and 
1deep study * and that the conviction that the socialist system 
is appropriate to these countries stems from this study. There 
is, similarly, no evidence of carefully formulated plans to 
bring about the desired socialist society. The lack of treat­
ment of these complex subjects in what remains a purely 
theoretical all-Arab union is, of course, not surprising, but 
it is, I think, disappointing.
The insistence on the need for social reform and speedier 
economic development in the Arab world is rapidly gaining in 
strength both within the Arab nationalist movement and outside 
it. Up till now, however, the means of bringing about these 
desired aims has not been the subject of close analysis; Arab 
nationalist writings on the subject are, in my opinion, 
remarkable for a lack of depth, and for an astonishing optimism.
1. One of the few serious studies of the economy of the Arab 
world as a whole of recent years is that entitled: "al- 
iqtisad al-farabi— al-sukan wa al-Intaj" ("Arab Economy—  
Population and Resources") by Dr. Burhan al»DiJiani, the 
director of the permanent office of the "federation of 
Chambers of Trade, Industry and Agriculture in the Arab 
Countries". This work, the first of a proposed series, was 
published.by the Federation in Beirut in 1959.
One cannot but, I think, agree with Dr, Yusuf Sayigh in this 
respect who recently wrote: "If we were to ask the majority 
of Arab thinkers who attempt to deal with nationalist problems 
their opinion concerning the socio-economic content of Arab 
nationalism we would be met with a deep silence which would be 
broken only by an embarrassed mumbling, the source of which 
would be obvious."*^*
1. ual-thiqafah al-*arablyah,1 ("Arab Culture") 3rd Year, No 
-2., Summer 1959, p* 45.
CHAPTER THREE i
THE UNIFYING FACTORS IN THE ARAB WORLD
Arab nationalist theoreticians argue that a nation exists if 
certain common:factors bind, together its members v They maintain 
that such factors do indeed link all the Arabic-speaking/ ;/ 
peoples and that, therefore; the' Arab nation does in fact exist*
• .From this assumption they argue that the present internal 
, political.bouhdaries. of the/Arab, world are/illogical and should 7 
be abolished.' They cpnsider./that the , factors : which, unite the . /
.members of the Arab natioh are a c ommon language .and culture, /
, / territoryy7 historyj^nd; destiny';as; well As/tomdt Acononiic-; '/■
. interests *; A minority -are; of the opinion that;: the factors.of 7 
;. commonsrace ;and ’religion are important in the f ormation of .a , 
nation and that; they, too,.; exist in the Arab world.*. It is of. ;; 
7//./' interbs t. to examine/wl^t/^the/ proponent a/of. pan-Arab ^ nationalism 7 1 7 
have written concerning;these factors and their appropriateness 
/ as forees bindingtogether all Arahs*. ■' '■/:7/////7/7/ 77--'; 7 • 7 v7// 7/77
As we, have seen from the first , chapter in this study, .
.•• - Arab nationalist ^ writers" lay./very ; great emphasis; on the existence, 
of a comDion language, Arabic, in all parts of the Arab world. '-77 
/ 7 ■ > / They are, /in the; .majority, agreed that this is the soundest and / 
strongest factor in-determining their, hationaiisnib They con- 7 
. .sider, as is clear from the quotations I have given, * the-./7;://;/7-/
;1. Chapter ;0ne7/Above/pp>^^ , . ■-/ . /■■ ///y- / ■ :7 :.7 ' v 7"/,. - / -7
ability to speak, read -and .write Arabic as a natural lang- 
uage the main qualification and prerequisite to being an Arab * 
Arabic is seen not merely as an existing factor of. unity among 
Arabs , but as living and; moving forde.actively and contin­
uously creating a feeling of oneness. .*Abdullah al-1Alayili, 
a comparatively early- Arab national!st writer, theorizing. on 
the factors which are present in any nationalism, considered 
language of primary importance"it has a great effect on the . 
people1 s awareness of their unity. It is active at times of 
. both troubles land hope. In the same way, .by: means of it, the . 7. 7 
nation holds on to its past glories and through i t, too ,7 it 
c ohstfuc ts its social, political and cultural history, on which ’ 
its future generations can g a a e , D r  . George, Hannah makes 
the interesting observation that; the Arabic language was.the • 
first of the factors : active irt the ^ creation of-Arab nationalising 
although he does,himself lay emphasis on geographical unity \ 
which must, presumably, have been in existence before the Arab 
conquests. He explains, how these, conquests brought the spread 
of the Arabic language, throughout/the, Arab world,and coneludes: 
"It can be deduced from this that the language common to the . 
Arab group of people was in .existence before the formation of
1. 1 Abdullah a 1-1 Alayili : 1 dust ur a 1- *arab al-qaumi.fl ("The; ^
-National 0onstitution of the Arabs.") Beirut, 1941, p 88;.
■/vthe . Arab nationalJentity*// ;: It was, then, the first of the 7 /
/: factors in-: and a . special fe ature of Arab nationali sm.n 7 • This 
apparently means;that the Arab nation has been^in existence , . :
; only since; the Arab conquestsp other' Arab, nationalist writers,; .
. :';:.--.as/ however, We shall see ; in; the discussions of 7race7 and hisiofy.
7 : •; as factors in; the/ exi st ence 7; of the Arab hat ion,• cons i der
; . 7; ■; ethnic and hi s t or i cal t i e.s , to have:- been far'; e ar 1 ier f a c tor s * 7 7
/ 7.' 7 ; 7 7:7 77 . Despite this: generally accepted idea/ that the Arabic '- 77;; 7 ; /:\
7; language is the main; focal point about/which/all Arabs gather,; 7- 
; ./• v V;:V- ■••'■ some * writers' - do ./seem t o d o o h s i d e r / ^ / I m p o r t a n c e  /than/the/; 7 
. other factors constituting a, .nationalism. /*Aziz al-Haj j, for, ’ 
example, places the language factor third ih77importance after ;. 
unity of hi story; and t e r r i t o r y nThis; one nat Lon posse sses 7/. /'";V  
all the hational characteristics of a; single /nation,' for it 7. 7 
7/- Consists o f a di s t i nc t: gr oup of .people formed: hi st orically,
.-/ living on a common territory (de spite arfificial boundaries)
and speaking a common language;n^# 7 .Similarly :we find that Aimed:
: , Sa;f id Considers 7lahguage/of primary.; importance 7;with7: what he ,■,/.
/ calls unity "of origin and race" but:on an equal basis with7it.:
He clearly considers, however* that it is; a more important /-///,; 
/■:S factor than unity.. of hi story, customs, territory . and feelings;//
. ;which he lists ,in this order /of respective importance.^*
; 1. Op. cit ./^ p. 47/50. Y//:/ . / • 'p. / / :_ " 77/7/; ■/■■' //;-:;;/7-‘7;’•;
. 2. Ual-q8.umiyah al-^rabiya/wa-lMiimoqratiyah";. ("Arab Nation- • 
ahsm and Democracy.n ) / Beirut,. 1958, pi 61. //;///7 ;
7 ; Op. OX'b .p- p.7;-ipE77-7 7^ ;//,.,. ' ;,.a.///7/-;: / / /  7 i-.' ^  V/7:/7; '
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Nicola* Ziadeh:examines Arab nationalism after an analysis 
of We s t-European nationalisms*\■ He finds, that just as the 19th 
century was the' time when nationalisms developed: and grew - 
strong,so was it a time'when philosophers began examining the 
factors constituting these, phenomena.-^Theiy.^discbyered, he 
write s, that the various factors which are. c onsidered to be of -
importance in the exftst&nce of a nation are: "geographic 
unity, economic factors, the state (the form of government) 
racial origins , religion, history and language." Ziadeh 
disagrees with this appraisal, and makes his’ own analysis of the 
influence of these factors in the existing countries of* Western 
‘Europe and finds that this influence is not strong. He con­
cludes that the main,factor in nationalism-ris "the unity of.
p *
: feeling among the individuals of a nation;." * He carries this.
thought further a little later: ."What is the nation? What is
: • k V--. j . i . > > : 1 „ / .
/nationalism? Nationalism is basically and fundamentally feel-
ings. The nation is the result of these feelings* It is the
result of the feelings of the individuals and their belief in .
mI*its existence. This does seem to be the very heart of the 
matter; it may well be significant that Arab nationalists do 
not- give greater prominence to- this ultimately important v-
1. Op. cit., p. 56*
2. Ibid., p. 62*
3. Op. cit., p..66.
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factor* Dr* Ibrahim '-'Jum'ahitpd^ ' stresses; unity/ offeelings and 1 
leaves language completely out of consideration in his remarks ; j 
on the factors which prove theij^bsbh^;; bxisiience, of 
nation. He writes: "This unif iedljArab^ nation; which 
achieved its new, living existence^,:from> the . interaction; ofi 
, events and the exchange of interests;,: the ;,uhity; o^  ^
culture and unity of feelings and attitudes, this natioii ;is 
/complete Iniltseif/' Itv possessed /i^osb attributes and-^factors, 
both material .and- spiritual, which every ihdigenous nation 
/possesses ♦"**** * , /
The importance of the language factor in.Arab nationalism, 
both as a primary basis of the, movement .and as a /necessary'f•/}; 
vehicle for the exchange of feelings!'^l:ch'-:ba;^ 
greater unity, is strongly appreciated by VfaiTd Qamhawl. He 
is also keenly aware of the deflcieneles\^’n^ii^ 
of unity among,all Arabs. He points ..with great .emphasis and 
emotion to the language differences:;:bb;twfehvt^
of the Arab world and the apparent for the/ Importance!;
r of - these differences: and the/ n^diforftheir removal* ; . "One ; caU 
scarcely contain oneself", he writes, : "when one finis/the, 
Algerian Arab Blench in intellect ,/;^
the Egyptian barely knows anything about the; history and 
conditions of the rest of the/ Homeland^ 1 Ohei^
. 1* Op. cit., p. 2 2 5•
bihe: Iraqi; haq c onsIdered' his: Arabic language ;a,n empty vbsSe-ijr f 
' which heihas diad;., t o, fill wlthbdivers e: Tur kish,, Kurdish,/Persian, 
band ; even . Engli sh; words."v *• b He mentions; Syria; and Yemen.too, : .
.;ahd; criticises various -aspects of their differences witlr. the^'^ .^: v 
;'Arab W or Id; a nd v c one lu de s : ;.b" Ea Ch o f :• the s e r e g I ons; ha s itaV b . 
bbwn localbdialect- dlff ering Icqmpleieiyifrp^- the other/d 
i'and from; the Arabic-: language-. adblibls/tai^ht; and' w r i t t e n ^ ! * / 1 
i.V; ■ The// denidjv- of - ay^languageVmnity hAsb^been and i d one bi; • 
f the main bases for opposition to; •Arab :na 11onalisit bamo ng. those; 1 
bAhqbs ; whbb; support; the c onti nued exi s t enc e the - s oyer eigh •
/ Arab countries as separate entities. b Sati f..al-Hudari . • b
bexamines thi s .opppsition in :one; pf his works. .He. quotes^
. Lebanese newspaper "al- fAmai"::;/;(he giveby^ sayiiig ip/
In broad terms that. the boun.daries . of each dialect are the. •
. same as those, of each Arab state.. : In particular, with bbf' Ab 
/;regardito;; Iraq •; and.' Syria, theiuew c laimlngy •
: that: " the/dialect bis not a -transitory accidenta 1 happening, 
but a witness of a mentality and of racia 1 origin and. of a 
r;separate.;.historica 1 and.geographicai entityV" The newspapbr: / /: 
b goes, on to bpoiht out that ' the differences in dialect existed bb 
: bbbfbre .thebByhes^ and are not strictly bound • .,/bb
by tbe.b t errit orlal llmi t s . agre ed there in;.. This, shows; it 
c ont iiiue s, that di fferenc e sb in .language point t o the. different :
b^ dV-;jQpV;/bit.V;.- p* 463* b .:.-b;bib;bb;- -;hb vbbb:-f b b b / y ■ h '
- 2. T b i d b  > b b- ' bb-'-f', J :*---;b^- 'bb i/fb.- b : ;J b:
origins and History of the people apeaking 'them and that as the 
present lDpuhdaries;:ibetwedn. theb toab*. 0ountries cprrespb^:tb ; b > 
dialedtl.cal ■ language differenees, these bouhdaries* are just • 
Sati 1 a 1-Husari ans wers this critic!sm, • in my opinion not with 
great; e.ffeet ,//by^ .ppiht'ingb to-.:th®- Kingdom of Jordan and . asking yb 
rhetor I c ally whether its; boundaries correspond with those of a
p a r t i c u l a r ! • ^ V y , y ' b  y 1 . .,byhhbb:!/b'!b({bvb,:,j
% bDrIb^amhawi;' considers /thatia Standardisation of teaching 
methods:^ thrdugHoutthe; Arab::worMbwpuld be ■ one; of the best and 
purest'}waysbioCunif^ya^ ranks* : He Suggests
that ; the Arabic /language itself is one of the most * obvious 
fields--forbp^ necessary reform: "The Arabic, language
must be set free from all the restrictions encompassing it and 
Wei ghing; it/downvy/There is. nothing sacred about it ^'.-neither 
its grammar, its form, its /spelling, its letters or its sounds * 
Heading and writing'must be made easier so that everyone will 
be able to read and write without difficulty or distress; they 
will t ^ ^  from ^ the; rndny-^  wide spread : colloquial
dialects^ and Will gatl^r together; &  the• un-lf ied. classical
/Arabic language *.M 2 * The/ writer lb- last'^'>emarkAbCbnc;ef ning the
Ti "al-1 urubah baina du * atihay%abma'farigiha* "Ar^bismbBetween
b I As = i^o pprfen^ ^ a ^d Opponent s‘>* 5:■ 3rdbedi^ 
bb :PP*b'54-56Ab'/:dt':'Iev of course, true ; thatb theydialectical 
■ / v ' - '  diifererice.s'.' between the ,inhabitants of Jordan and 'Syria are 
b.s, y slight:;;; the differences betweenbthe. .spbkehblanguafeesb of,
/‘b.if orbie^ample, they people s :;of Iraq^y Moroce o 'and Jordan;
b: are , however , verybconsiderable Jb A h - ■ v;.b ih-bybAbbb -by b by/^  yb; 
2* Op* cit>;bbP>Vb'4T5.'i’ It is yinterdsting; to. observebthatb^mhawE.
. refers to the existence o f  "manywidespread c olloquial 
b ; bthe bmd lorityb of Arabbriatldtialist b . b ;
■ ywrIters dt not ,;.- of; c our s e : meht ion " them ' at baIitb.b/;,;/ by f. ’bb;A- y:
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means of bringing reform seem to ine somewhat unrealistic. In . 
spite of hi s.denial. of the sacredness of any aspect of the 
Arabic language he sajrs that it must be‘revised at the expense 
of the living dialects, although there are many words in every*- 
day use common to all or most of the Arabic dialects. It would 
seem to be more practicable to adopt into the written language 
those words now used throughout the Arab world which do not 
occur in'the classical Arabic,
The majority of Arab nations/list writers simply assert 
the importance of the common language as' a main factor unifying 
all Arabs without .giving; any Idealof the undeniable fadt that
Arabs uneducated in the classical language from- different parts 
of the Arab world would be almost unable to-communicate with 
one another., The degree of illiteracy is so high in the Arab 
countriesr of course, that it is a small .proportion Indeed who 
are able to understand the serious items on the. radio and to- 
read the newspapers. Nevertheless, throughout history states 
have been formed although no common language;bound together the
* ‘ > * l -Vi -nJ/. .- -  * : w . . . . . . . ■’
inhabitants .of their various parts. -There is no doubt that 
the fact that- a proportion of the Arabs, those who are literate 
,are:able .to communicate with one another through the classical 
language Is a strong factor in the argument for the existence 
of an Arab nation. It is; too, a factor which will grow in 
strength and importance; as standards of education improve and 
.literacy becomes!more widespread*-
There has similarly, been,.considerable discuss ion.: among ' 
Arab nationalist theorists on the importance of geography as a | 
factor unifying all Arabs and::-ar- • Arab/nation
can be built» Dr. Zurayq, as far as T am aware, has: not con­
sidered unity of territory an important basis in the formation 
of a nationalism.' Ahmed Ba*id apparently considers that it 
ranks fourth in importance-after the factors of race and : 
language, history and customs. i'AzTz al-HajJ' considers that/ ■ 
geographical unity is-vsecpndv in importance sifter the factor 
of unity of historical, connection. George Hannah considers
• V- „ '--V- • ' V  ' »* ■ • * <' ^ - •- ■■■« r "<w- a  ‘ . - .* ..
that after the most important.factor,■common language, the sec­
ond most imp or t ant factor! s 1 i f e on a common territory for a . 1 
long time: nA unified-nation cannot be constructed unless a
hu&an family has/coexisted:on-a/stretch of land for a long
period and unless:, - during;;this :time, some of this family have
1 •
interacted with others of.- it*1- *
Nicola Ziadeh seeBisvto: be arguing- for the existence of a „
/unil1!ed-" ge ograpblc al/entiby' inn which the. Arab; pe ople s live, but 
p he-\diyides, - upv thb/^&b ^ ^ r t w b  distinct: p^rt s : "The 
Eastern part qf- thibpdrea beg^
and ends with/6gypt1 s; Western, desert/ ;The/¥estern part begins 
at Barqah and^endspin Morocco / / The/Westerh debert- is,. then, the 
dividing area :hetWeen the Eastern andvWestern:parts. If we
take the Eastern portion, JWe;/find the similarity,, between its ! :
various parts very .great aMzits geographical boundaries. very i
./clear. The; Iraqiplain and the plains of Syria and the plain = / 
'/,.• of^ishe; Nile;-valley are the re suit .of similar geographic a.nd
//'•/’I .geological.;factors." ^ * He. then examines the Western part of  ^: ’
■ . his diyi si on and finds- thatpit- is a unit formed by similar 
pv;chains of, mountain/ranges with valleys between^them/ ahdz that 
,the soil in the, valleys is of a .uniform type. After making • -/’■
/this,' deliberate division, hp goes straight on in the next 
.paragraph to, assume a geographical unity including all the : p
Arab; world: "We sep; from this that the Arab worId is a geo-
:. graphicalsunit with clearly delineated boundaries which are //•/
, Z-*bhe mountains^ and the Mediterranean Sea, the great African ;.
• . clesterjs,'; the Arhb. pcean;.nhd,/the Persian Gulf .- Its common ,;
. factors are clear, its climate is, uniform. . Its climate is ; ;'
that of the Mediterranean, with the exception. of some areas': 
v which branch offin one direction or .another' - as.for example :
the Arabi an de s er t s or the heights o f Lebanon' or. the At la s '.,//
m o u n t a i n s - D e s p i t e  the apparent contradiction, the writer //,•.
, goes on t o /argue that, Oh/ihe.basis of this gepgraphical' / . :
unity, . the Ar»ab' wbr Id as a whole • has an economy which is self- 
complementary and self-suff lei ent«'/ / / ,/,;
' 1* Op. ‘ cit., p. :/lr; . / Z‘ Z v ■ -■///; '■• ■'. /■ . : / ' '
2./Op. cit., p. / 7 3 '>pr>‘. Ziadeh! s argument seems unconvinc ing . ’
 ^- V /' • in the. extrerne. ■/: / ;lbZ-V;/■.'/ '• bl:-/-
. •; . /; • Muhammad l i z zah Darwazali, too,y seesthe lands where; Arabic ;
. is spoken, in all theiry diversity' as a geographic unit* Their 
i.hdi vidua 1 differ enc e s. are such, he considers,' that they, make; 
up together a complete unit: -"The regions of.this/great Arab 
homeland are. varied, as we have /explained,. in climate and :z.;;-' 
yinatiirrey^ just as they are varied in their potentialities. Whdiyy/
; is lacking in one region .is found in the other. It may be said, 
then, that s ome. ;part s- r c ompiement the other and form a natura 1 
geographic: and economic unit."%, This argumentthat'- the very... .
. yz diversity' of the natural And economic factors of the Arab ‘world :;.
. Z - is. ..such that all together they make a, unit, is. frequently fopnd 
v;/Vin ’Arabzm works^*; z/ : ; ... ./Zyi-.v
; Zv ': . Dr #/ibrah^ beseems /alone - ^
,z ; philosophers in considering unity of territory .a most; important y 
factor and: base. active towards the . formati on ,of the proposed
Z , '1 '. C'it.., P* 15 • . • V; ; ; '• ' v:;A / /Z / ; /■
2 • c. f ♦, Arthtir ilills1. comment concerning the economic /
. z. Z potential of the Middle East : . "There are local; idealists ;.
. / , zZy/ ; who f or see. an ec onomic development on the. scale, of that. • ■ • • y
Z;'' ih' We star nzEuhopez ;6r North; AmericayZbUt, though it is • yz
■ Z ■ -;tr ueZzthab•,little ,su , prospecting have been
done, and that morb miiiera3Z resources may/exist than are : ;.Z
^//.//hOWA^ is a significant , paucity ..of natural Z
z z. v Z;,. resources."; ;;Pagey £31-of .a/speciai:Ghapter.z contributed 
; Z Z .. V; ,:to "A. Shorty1 Hi story ^bf; tlie . Midd 1 e ;Ea st" by George ICirkj
nev/Zrevised edition of 1957, London, Z z . ; /
• >■:■> -/;
■ Arab state. He ,wites : . "The common natural, geographical .
factor is one of the strongest and firmest of the bases in the/
: creation of Arab unity and the clearest.to;understand. This ,/
’■ ; isZbecause itZ is-the factor Which has^becomeZflpm/;wiih^
;Z: ; unaffected by the ;pbliiicaL .changes which have taken place
. /•; in the ; are a ♦ *  7.7 7/7/Z ./biZ:// Z' 7; : _.Z 7.777.7" : , Z / Z77;Z
f 777,;/. ■ ■ •:gati *: al-Husarl;, in contrast to; these writers , denies 77 7; Z 
/ 7 /outright thatrgebgraphy and. natural re source s are 'of any great;
: / importance ; as .‘bas'es^ ihi .hationblismZ . In his criticism. of. the .7: /.
,Z ;.■■7/Z' Syrian ZNatibna list/Party ^Zcbntention/thdt there is a geo- /\Z 
7 . graphical and natural unity y b e t ween Iraq, and Greater' Syria, .
/Z / he denies bp'thZthq/exlstb^ s eparat e ha tura 1.. ' /// 7
/entity and the importance of geography in the f orma t i oho of a 
state;. He concludes : "I can thus say;without hesitation
that those who claim a na t iona 1 ist unity between Iraq/and. 7/7. :■
Z /:v : Syria should not yne s tr 1 ct theinselves to c onsidepati bn.Z of the 
-/ importance of. tebri tory . in the Zf ormation. of nationalisms j'Zbut^ /
: must yc onsider : thb factors of language and history, unless/ they
v wish/to rebel; against ;the/ demands of reason; and logic arid / // Z 7: 
. . ./att empt torec one I  le the irrec onci lable . n  ^  #  Having committed 
'7/y himself to a st and deny ing the impor tanc e of /geography" and /Z.7. Z 
: natur a i t  err it or y as a ..factor in nationalism, Al-Husarj / ■ Z Z 7
b. op. cit.v p. 42. 7 z ; ////77;: ••••;/. ;. -7 ■ 777 ' . 7 > z .
: 2 . "difa1 1 an ;a 1-!urubah" • Z (uDef ence of '- Ar abism.u ) Beirut ,
; .-/./ Z2nd..-edition,:/i957».;.P* .43>;Z 7 - 777.7:7 --i/v Z- ;
: ■ z goes onto, a t.temptt a \pr b ve hi s: the si stern, European y z.
history. He Z d i s ^ Zlength the : Dutch naval, superiorityy .: /Z< 
. V;'-- - over the British in the: 16 th century despite Hollaiid * s lack 
y/, of ship-building resources . and 'cbnciudes 1: Zu 1 am sure t h a t . /• 
■y. y these truths, siaff ice , to showy the .great error which those- / ...
•writer's/fall' into who exaggerate./the .effect of nature ;on man- 
z Z kind/and claim that natural. surroundings' is. one of the. most : ,
■: . important .factors Zwhich: guidb'/the, affairs ..'.of.'-meni";^ V7ltz^
' perhaps unfortunate that Al-Husari restricted his' historical . - 
y  ;Z’ y examination to :ihe, 16th cdntury; if he. had' examined the 7 
7 development of the situafibn whi ch he c onsiders in the 17th 
Z /, y /' century , he wpUldy have: 'observed/ that /.Britain Z
in the’ masteryyof ythp seas,yp;brhaps asy::a/re3uitZbf: Britain’s yz 
z\ better, ship-building; res our sea, .combined, of course, with'
Z / Z; other factors;. A littley later in the same: v/ork, ' Sati 1 al-r . zj 
y Husari again turns his attention to British and/French history^
;: y; to. prove his same /content ion.He examines British history and Z 
:• the growth of British/trade ahd influence and attributes: this Z- 
mainiy to the existence of an effective centralised government•
/ vy.. He contrasts with 'this france *s comparative •'lack;;.of power /• zzZ 
; which he attributes to the; lack of an effective ' centrali sed;
: government, denying:a,ny influence of geographical factors.2* y .•
; 1 •' ;.;0p* Cf t . ,. ■•pi, ..60.#'" • -. ■;■'/• -■. > ‘ /.<
- y/. y.y';,v'■ Z 2.y ibid. , p. ;do/Sf'7 y7 yzzy-;/z// .z^/zy-yy/y;■ i, ■/;/'Z;z'^ 7/70/"-yS'7yz7^Zy:/yZ77;^ • y:y;y/
It seems extraordinary that he does not "-agree:-; that;\the^-fact'-of-Z 
' Britain*s more effectively centralised government was- due, 
in part at least, to obvious geographical factors.
Arab nationalist writers achieve their- greatest degree 
of unanimity in their discussions concerning the/existence 
/ - and relative; importance of the .various factors which constitute 
\ a nationalism; in. tlieir.consideration that unity; pf/History 
is of very, great importance • They. do not generally define" 
exactly what they mean''"Toy7this unity of historyit; is referred 
to variously as a "unity of struggle"-and.as a "unity of 
/Z destiny"l7Z; ftazim Nusalbeh p M n l ^  historical
heritage; .is.- the :second,:most 'importantZbap after unity of
language^::of • ;Arah natibnhlism. He obs erveb^y however, that 
the . hiatof y‘:of^-theZArabh-cb withihdt 7pef ibds of the
-bitterest strife amongZAhabs' themselves.■-/The .Zqueptipp bf ■ the; 
existence or nori-existence of. a commonZHietortqab/heritage ;
all depends he^  writes//on; the way the facts are' -presented:
"The truth is-that historical tradttl^ contrib­
uting to integration provided it is. presented in the ^ig3?t 
way* That is to say, -it is -not so much a questioh of ■
/ creating the present in the image of the past * ; as it is the
' n
; re-creation of the past in the image of the present." • He 
considers that.what he calls,"this mental debauchery"
1. "The Ideas of Arab Nationalism" *, /New York>- 1956, p* 79*
.' ,‘- c laiming,, to/he hi s t ory rather: than poll tical : propaganda" i s ;
.■ ^ -v^'Z^fbrgiyable when one considers' .the. sincerity^ who’ 77 : /77'"
• lhduige in it/ and :the enormous difficulties in presenting v ;
 ^, /historicai truth.-•Z "When/the; theorists of nationalism, there- 
/ " 7 fore, place .historical .traditloh; as the- second factor most / Z : ; / 
/ important in nationalism,^ they envisage a selective present-, 
atIon thoroughly cleansed of disruptive' o v e r t o n e s . /
, , Arab nationalist writings do. indeed; adopt-this attitude, Z 
/ in the majority, towards the presentation of the history of Z 
• the Arab world. / They ignore the periods of.obvious strife /
Z / Tbe'tween cbhtending/politica 1/aqd/reilgi;ous groups and/ give 
. the impression that there, has. existed .a long historica 1 unity 
- among;":ali In 1943, /makes Zthe ;
. extremely doubtful claim, which he; does not attempt to 
. substantiate, that Iraq and Syria were/ArabZ lands before the /
. coming of Islams. "Iraq and Greater' Syria - divided at .-the 
7 present/ ;tim©7ihit'o JSyria;, /Lebanon*/ Palestine and Trans-lor dan/
. - were nothing if/not /Arab, countries before/Islam* ”‘Writing
Z; Z later oh the same page conebrning the Muslim invasiohs of • •//••
7 these lands, he states.: "Their./armies went out from the .
. 7 he art' of ibe7 Arabian; pent ^ Romans v :-v;
/> and the Persiahs/Zqad occupied - t^ey took back again Syria;.
. . and ;'I r a q . / /Zy/p---' 'V-p..;/ : -• v --7; ' / , 77 7; /. ’ " '/;7 •./ '7 / / ■/' /
1* Op ♦ ‘C I \ P >  30. / • //,. . ■ . /•- /.
-ZZ:/';/Zz27;:''0phZc;it7jv;pvzl6;.z':/,.7 /.v//Zzt7../Z;Z/ZZ///, 77Z7;/: vv/.Z;,; /'zZ7Zz,7/;/Zzz.'/Z/'7:
/ Z/Z/'Z -3-*y. XToi^.;/ZyzZy^Z7 ' ,ZZ;7A -/ZZ; 7 -^Za7Zz7/^-:;7/Z;/7y77^"Z^ z:71Z. A.^ /-ty/Z'Z/Zz7:7;T./'7Z:7\;7;,v77;-77
/ The Egyptian writer, Dr. Ibrahim ah stresses ah 7 ;|
7 7-'> ■. age^1 ohgZ soIIdapity oif.. tlie peopies .of. the / Arab; 'hation againstZZ }
v y foreignZihvaders 7 from-the time of Alexander . the . Gr e a t up to 
//tZ/Zthe' present.d^y: n wouidZ pot; have been possible for us to
Z s uo c e edz agai i ns t ;the ;ba s e f ore i gner s i  f it/had not been f or t he.
/ Z-/ ZZuhity of our struggle. .>Thisz it was which/ enabled us to over- /
Y 7//:••;/ Z come/ the Macedonian danger, .and to stand/ up; against the Roman
tyrant ,/t o Zdefeat .the Mongol enemy. and t  b stand firm/in the - / ./.-:
7 face pf the /crusaders and the Turks/ and^the/modern,;¥estern /
. peoples. : ;/Our atr ength/ was always/in the etrehgth of the unity. / 
/7-df our :fight . // V/e overcame the enemy with/bhe , spirit which ,
: ;; / refused to, submit to the ;opposing p o w e r H e  /goes on in the //
pext sentence .to/make a claim.which, if it/is understood liter- 
- : 77 ally;/.is/Incredibly extravagant: "The def ensive army was at / 7
Z/7 .7y ■7/vaii times//^ one / unif I ed c ommarid;: s imi larly,
7/the . victory , i n  :it s ■ turn/was;/a. shared. victory. " /. Even if ''Pne///-/ 
77 7 can apprec late. Dr. Nusaibah1 s /pied/that one mustbear In mind 
://// 7; / V-ithp sincerity/ of the nationalist^^ whit eh and that hi s t or i c a 1/ , V- 
, // :/-/•^/,7/truthZ is /hard/tq tell and at times; bad for/-the nationalist
’• ;/ y , causey/it. is d^ ■ see how such unforgivably false bver. ;.
/ / 7'// Bimplifications and misa’ppreciatlons of •history serve any ./ 7'
■ / useful /pnrpose.2 #z ;-/y7- / /; 77-7' Z7i"‘: '.7' .777"// ;/ 7/7 /.
,// //-.Y7/iy.>;op7:^ ;7f/ 7/7 7 . 7 7 7 a - /'7:'/. '. . //7/7'77 ^ /YY/Pyz.
;2. See also Zthe quotations/ from/the official U .A .R.1'Yearbook 
for 1959*7 Chapter Five, pp A^fvabove. / / ././;7 7
7 : Ther e. ha s b een cpmparatively little ■ dis^
;natIona 1 ist :/wrliers ;o.onc er ning /the importance of race as a 
77' unify ing:. factor in Arab nati onaiism.;, /They, in the majority,/ .:
. .consider that race . is of .little importance In. comp^ in 7
particular with the^ unifying factors of language and historical 
Z; heritage. To substantiate their arguments they point to the 777 ; 
7/;/7 " example of American. natibnalism especiaily j .- which/Is undoubtedly; 
777 exi s t ent a I though t h ^  , forming the 'nat I on are from- many . :-/Z V
;..;7':.'7: separate/natibhal^-d'hi'.racial/origins.// Arab/na^ 
f/7 ;7;v7; ///^ehbr ally :;bpnsciqueh proying/strbngzra ■ 7
:;7 V / / / • .  7 7  connections/amohg/.all/.thoseewho7 livb in tbat/area.between the 7 / 7  
7 Persian •Gulf arid the Atlantic', ..the/ciaimed/bbundarieAZpf/thbyZZz 
Arab nation, and seem to prefer, therefore,- to 1 gnore the sub- Z7 
77 y.. ■; ject a 1 together.■//■■‘Ah/their./dbfinitibhs-ofZArab::ShpW;77;th con-
'7z7; 7'.i 7-/;-bider Any o^Z'^hp/; speaks. Arabic/and7 c o n s i d e r b e  /aniy.'/' 
7"ZZ7 Arab as an Arabz in /uhdibputeb/ f.act, .no iiiatterZ:w his racial /77.y 
. origins • ****
Despite this general avoidanbebpfZdnfe^
7.1. c.f. /General Sir: John, Glubb, "A: Soldier/#It^
/ 7London l957>7 reality is/hbt a countrybut/
/:.7//Z. a; subqb^ihent .Zi/^heZ.Yemenis^.a differpht^frCm/;tbeZ/Leb— Z/Y,
. . 7 7^/Zanesb,v/or. the^TPa^Attnianbyfrom the inhabitants of 'Oman as
are the :Scandinavians from the Greeks .r pebhaps; more; dif-Y/y/b- 
ferent.1 If orie extends the 7fibid/hf^7ehquiry7tp7cbver -..the • -.:
7 7 whole; area of/ihe./'Arab legs peaking/7 W or id,/f f bm/ the'"Per dianA/yZ 
zyy- 7; /Gulf tpytheZAtlantlc ,-n theZdiffehehbbs7betqeeh/they ihhabT- ;77 7/7
It ant s' of each region.- ar e s een t o be Zeyen greater
/- ■ 7'7:vi racial fbctor in/nationalist and in Arab nationalism , ;
Z.z/7..lnz particular.,1 s ome . wri ter s. do at tempt to ; argue'/the existence of •
77; Z V. ■; a; ra c ialystrai n i hher ent In/AII the/Arabic speaking• peoples,- ’ , . .j
/; ; 7Abdullah^ al-^Ai^iii/ coiisidprs that/in; thqsb7cpun^
7"" 77. & recentzmtlonaiismzhaszibeenZfostered, he. quotes America/ !
7 Belgium and Great Britain as example s */' the rac e.fuc t or/has.be eh ;
■ 7-VZf ound importarxtv. he maintains, that. in bach of /these cases .7 ///
the strongest racial factor prevalent has been encouraged and , 
emphasised/ and that the particular national!sms have beenZ . 
built around this;factor. With regard to the Arabs he says 
7 In conclusion: "Racial connection was"and still remains a
factor which makes;the nation aware of.Its unity. We in the 
■ Arab homeland join together a number of secondary strains ih 
one race7 Since the strongest strain in our society is the Arab • 
77 strain,/ we.pnust^Ztherefore;,make it a, basis of nationalism and z 
. . emphasise It'alone." •-/-/ . / 7/y/ 77' . '7 7"" -• > Yy7 . y/•
17 7 : Sa 11 *' al-Husari examines this question in defence.of Arab
hatIonalism agai'nst an attack made on'it on racial: grounds. by 
; "7 the; Lebanese newspaper ' "ai-IAmal" .// The; newspaper asks whether , •/
• ' Arabs are: mereiy ail those pebple, who speak Arabi c, With nothing 
ZZ •, else taken Into: consideration^ It points in suec.esAful■ cohtrast ;
> t o. the German Federati on, which i t . c onsider s 1 s based s olidly . /
' 7 7 on . common racial origins . Al-HusarT ansv^ ers ; this by "denying Z 
• , . the. yalue : of a; di stInc t ion betwe en the importance of the . . , /=:-7;
1.' Op. ' c i t.■ p • ■ 93* . ^
racial and. language factors and asserts that no national pol- . 
itical entity is in fact founded on strictly racial grounds.
He denies the, racial unity of,the Germans, French, Russians or 
Turks and accepts that Arabs similarly, have little unity of - 
race.. He demands that the Arabs be judged merely on the same 
grounds as other national groups and concludes: "Arab nation- - 
ality is a great.river' to. which tributary streams have joined 
from time to;time", • but that the Individual racial differences 
are lost In the flow of the river. In an earlier work Al— 
Husari denies very strongly the .necessity of unity. of blood 
and race in a nationalism! "We can say with all assurance 
and conviction that unity of origin and blood in any nation is 
merely'imaginary.-theory which has taken1possession of peoples 
minds and intellects and Is quite unsubstantiatedby;any -proof 
■Muhammad Darwazah clearly„considers unity of racial 
origin to be* of some importance ,in* the''formation of a nation.
,He. claims, and points as proof to the common Semitic basis to - 
the languages of the area of the proposed Arab state, that the 
inhabitants of -the present :Arab: world came from the Arabian 
peninsxxla in waves of emmigration., He considers in particular 
that the1 inhabitants of Ancient Egypt were of Arab origin:
. 1.. "Al-lurubah.." Op. cit., p. 58/9*
2. "muhadarat f i ~ nushu1 al-fikrah al-qaumiyah." ("Lectures on 
the7,Emergence of Nationalist Philosophy ) Cairo, 1951, p; 20.
"Ancient history has hot , given us specific names for the great . •. j 
Arab waves of emigration;which flowed. over to the" Nile valley , v ; 
before Islam in the way that history has given us names for 7- . :
the migrations to Iraq and Syria., For. this, reason a vacuum I
has been created'in people*3 minds, since the earliest times 
concerning Egypt Vs. connection'1 with. Arabism and the Arabian 
peninsula.. .The cause of this lack of knowledge is to be'found : Zj 
in tlie nature of the recording:, of Egyptian history ,7 which 7 , Z.
, followed the course of enumerating the names. of families or , .•
.g0vernmehts. This;,(i a'ck of historical evidence) does not, by 7: v 
itself ref ute whit we c ontend. - namely, that; the , ma j brity ‘of/.;/
; the : inhabitant s . of. Anc lent Egypt and e spe cially • thos e ,who7/ 
created their kingdoms and/iambi^;civilisatioh/areZfr.om/the/Arab/; 
; race, 'just as much as are the inhabitants, of Iraq and S y r i a . 7/ 
,He goes; on to quote', a /number: of archaeological, and linguistic 7/ 
author!ties who agree with this -view. ;The thesis he suggests - 
,is that the. Ancient Egyptians were either a )Semitic or b ) - 7/7 7-:
■: a white 'Aslan race (they may, he says, be; one and the same)
; who landed in Ethopia from the Arabian peninsula and worked 
7 .their “way;up the Nile River valley.; He quotes authorities ;
Who consider that the Ancient Egyptian language wab basically 
Semitic in vocabulary., It is : interesting to notice that .by,.: • 7
hi-Byinoluslon^ implication,
/jblie/AsSyrians and Sumerians within the/Arab race this writer ; 
goes much further than do the majority;of Arab nationalist 
theorists* This* attitude is-in marked-contrast to the majority 
who c ons id e r t h at i  t wae • t he : i slami c , c onque a t s and the s pr e ad 
of the-.Arabic. language : that : set-the’first-bases of Arab - 
-/nationalism. * -
I have read no Arabrnationalist work which attempts to 
argue for the inclusion - of the-Sudanese and -North African 
Berber: peoples within Arab,nationalism on racial grounds.
Clearly to prove or to argue wi th : any. sue cess that the proposed , 
uniti'dZZArab7natibh'^ extent-,;hasv.a firm racial basis ,
is impossible*, ;. The; official;attitude of the United Arab Repub­
lic to the Zqiiestion1 concerni'ng/whether / race; Is..A -factor in/. :: - 7 
Zhatiphaitsin.^ -is;Aimply; stated : in the nU *A ,Ra Yearbook , for 195SV" T' 
"RaceYand/^liSipn by /themselves^ constitute * a nationality 
■though/they ;;are counted among the factors .that^Zstrengtheu/bhe1.
1 It;; will ;be .very-interesting to.v observe in the future whether . 
Z^abZnatiohalist theorists lay greater stress on this claimed 
racial/factor or whether it does disappear completely from-the 
'ideology of the movement. So far it is impossible and too early 
to observe a trend.
. - The apparent majority of Arab nationalist writers accept 
;the:;,nec,ee sity for the existence of common* economic interests
, between all parts of the Arab homeland in the creation of the . . 
united Arab state. Dr. Zurayq considers “present and future 
interests” to be the fourth f actor after 'unity of language,; . 
customs and the 1 past struggle1 necessary in the formation.:
; of a state uniting all the ArabsV- On the other hand . ■ i:,Y.
Abdullah aI-1Alayili considers common interest second in : .
■■Vr - ■ ; importance . only to^/language ; Dr> QboFgo /Jfennah/places ;
economic interest: in the same ..relative position of importance . 
.;,/>■■- as does Dr. / Ziirayq; He maintainsthat eyehYthe^ greatest \
: • opponents, of Arab na t i onalisni. would - not deny ihi s;. c ommon mater*- •
/ : /yiai interest; among . all- the; Arab countries •: He writes. that;- : :
Arab oii would not be at its present price if ;it did not pass / 
by pipeline, from Arab countries through Arab countries, that .
' . ::' ^ the Lebanese health resorts and trarisit trade; wouldbe- of.';no:fe;’ 
importance 1 i d i vwere. not for .the rest of the Arab world. He/.;
' . '.vconeltides his extremely vague and stiperf ieial examination of ;./;Y .
: - the common material interests of;;the .Ara^ bysaying
-' ; . that' the manufactured goods produced in- them find their .market...
. . - in them t o o , . .The Egyptian Ahmad da1 id ignores the factor ;. 
/y:;-Y/y'; of common economic interest" altogether; in his formal, listing / 
of the factors oh which the, Arab nation will be built. , / ; ; ■
YY Y/,!• .nal-wa^y .al^qdumipi /2 3 i 'Y:/YY' . • Y .v/Y/•;; i "' . ■,/ ■ YYYyY}/- 
Op*, cit ., p* 91*  ^; y^YYY-YYY ‘ ;/'Y- ■ ■ v'■/ ' YY ' . . Y’Y;V^ Y
3. Op. Cit. , p. 5A* Y; ; ; . Y' Y . ;/ V,,-
Arab .nationalist writers are in general extremely unscien­
tific and unconvincing in the exposition of their arguments . :
/ for the existence of this very important factor of common ' 
economic interest.. .They/have not as yet attempted to explain 
in precise terms hovr the Arab world fits together as an
economic whole i they give, the/impression that they have: not• // 
studied/the-.subject to any depth at all. J* v It vseems, obvious . 
that the qdestion/is/h^ deciding in purely ■; ;/;'/
Y 'theoretical terms/whether;the proposed Arab nation.would be a / • 
viable; ec.onomic; unit. if it were f ormed. What i s int er e sting 
and vitally. important to examine is whether the individual 
Arab countries at present/ enjoying comparatively high stand- ;
.. ards of living/consider that itYwould;be -within their Interests 
to j oin in e/union with: their less, fortunate Arab neighbours. - 
/ I think that';the;/most bbVidus/: examplein^ thisYrespect; is:. the / ./
.- Persian Gulf.sheikhdoms ? Where the•per^capita income of the '/'
’ popuiation is,;;: o£/ the • highest i n . the( .world.■.-■ It seems clear . ; . :  
that df -their/pi 1- reyenpe/were/shared/in .a common Arab;treasury 
the individ\&l/ihterests of the Arabs in the.se areas would ;. /■/. 
; / suffer. . Arab nationalists , counter this ■ argument by saying 7 ;: 
that these.:, .areas are exp 1 oited by the ” feuda 1; claase.s and 
reactionaries.” and that the Arab; masses who live in"them ahedv/./ 
; as poor as the. .inhabitants; of /any. other, region of- the Arab ■-; Y / ■/
1 .See Chapter Two,: abovd,; p p • : Y
world. The downfall: of the.;”reactionaries” Yin Iraq as a: result: ; 
olYtHb/^my/reyplutiqn of. July^ ;Y1958» ah/Oyent which was; we 1-/ ; ;/ 
corned with Yjtthilation,by .Arab; nationalists ‘;.atdthe time does ' 
hot seemYfohave/brought; that country ariy/nearer: to a: full 
Arab union. One is tempted, to think, therefore, that.,theYY ' 
ec onomic as well as the emotional object ions, f o Arab uni t y
should not be/disregarded/pr mininiisediY Yy Y ;Yy ;YYY 
Y/YYY^Sati-Y/ajAHusari; is‘ inore'reailstiP than/theYmajority^ b 
Arab/hationalist writers in realising that: 'ihe/argument1 of , 
dphfiiciing;ecohomic ^ interests between the separate parts of 
the\Arab world;;isYah/important:bhe..; H e ;considers.y nevertheless, ; 
thdtYthiaYsitu^^wiIt/^probably /chdnge : ” £canomic. interests /Y; 
are neither so* obvious;Yhof/lasting as YtheyYdppear atYthe/first;-./) 
glancbY/Y/ThereYare both  ^immediate- and future ^ interests Y w h i c h  /. Y/ ; 
are frequently in/clear conflict. Y ThisYoqnflidt necessitates Y:Y/ 
the sacrif ice ,<o^  bhe in.;^ the; path-of the/ether. or ;the sacrifioe Y :
o i / p a r t ^ / o f b o t h Y ^ / / / / / / YYYy:yYy: ■. Y Y , ' ' / V Y y  r / Y  _ Y/.'■ Y Y 
Y . Y / / o f  Arab/hatiohalist theor ; considerYthat / 
religion is a unifying.;' factor ;in the Arab world and even aY • 
necessary -pne ; in t h e ^ f o r m a t i o n ^ h a t i o h Y Y  
hot,Y^tpyef'*/considerY religion, in this light;Y I Save/attempted 
to examiner .the extremely "difficult of the relationship
betweeh:fellgion?and Arah/natiohalism in a later chapter.^*/
1. nara wa ahadith^  ^fi alT(^undyah;al^*ardbiyah.u;^:;C and
/Opinions Ypn/J^ab- Naf iohali sit, ”) 3rd. editidh/Beirut 1959*p#7&
.2;^/;Be;eY:'Chapter ;:piyo’>bove.V:,. Bomb/Arab /Muslim theoristsYare ;Aeen 
to apparently consider Islam and Arab nationalism as different 
Y/;. wbrdqYrefprihg-.ib; the . same thing. /YYYr//;,YY///Y;;;V/=.-/ / \ ■;/;-/-Y?//
Y/'YYYy/.; ,YV Y The factors-actxye in t he/exist ence/of^ Y/Y
Y Y//; the creation of the Arab nation are*.• then, in the, opini on of
YYY. Arab nationalist writers' the; factors of unity of Ylangubge and YcY 
customs, histofy, geography*Y race and common i ntere s t s. 0learly
the most firmly established of these factors is that of the ; 
common Arabic language and customs which spread with theYMuBllm 
; Y ; conquests. This factor is one which will beY progressively 
, /Y/.; Y/ ieffePtivd'andYiiapbrtant^ time/goe s op * and Wi 11 provide the: Y
Y/ ; Y means/ of : expressing whatbyer unity of f eeling develops between .
: all Arabs;, just as it; will ormYtlip/meansYpf -e^
/ Y ; ' dissentions. A common hist ory embracing all the Arabs can ; , :;//■
Y YY-. Y--. , /only be accepted, in my opinion Y/af ter the/ most superficial of Y
: ; /; the history of the Middle East. That /the Arabs will themselves, ; 
./YY,; Y however, forget or Ignore the: periods of di s sens ion in, their Y/
' history and wi 11 stress and overempha.sise, as weYhave observed/ • 
they have a- tendency; to do , 'a /unity \ o.f ,l struggle” is something:, 
paie can. accept ;asYprQbabid. ; ; AnYaPpreciatioh;. of/thisYclaimbd. YY-, 
unity of .History/will therefore, no. doubt,/.beeome more gexierally 
Y/ .//■/ accepted and will, serve as an important means of creating a 1Y 
Y/Y feeling of unity. This \ia*, .of co\.irse, if one accepts as /Y /: YY / 
Y ‘Y unlikely that- parts of the Arab world will attempt; to create 
./.;/ / ; their own nationalisms on tenuous and largely imaginary racial 
Y Y / and historical: ground s.,/Yclaiming, nothing, more thaii a transit ory 
Y-- connection with their Arab neighbours^. .•//':/'. YY. . yY/;y;.YYyY/- Y/ Y
In that all the Arab countries are mutually connected by 
land or desert.,. the third factor of Arab nationalism that of a 
form of geographical unity, is obvious and undeniable. This is . 
a completely static factor, however;! there is a. far more 
obvious;geographical unity between Belgium, Luxemburg, Holland 
and Denmabk, ; for example, than: there- is be tween the various /Y Y 
parts of theArab world,/and yet there exists; as yet no political. 
union^ betweerr;'them* ; The/larid/Yarea where the Arabic language v 
is spoken is- cl early not an .area with e ommon climate and : 
similar Aaturk3Y/terradnYmark^ areas by obvious : /
and we 11-defined natural boundaries, but rather. a connected 
mass of such ge ographicYentities. Yv . :. ■ /./// Y.YY Y/;.- , ■ -Y Y-
/ ■/ ; The.fadtorYof unity of race is, as we have seen, one :
which is, generally. depr e'c a ted as unimportant in contemporary 
Arab: .hationdiisf idepdbgyl Y, ; 'Y Y;/YY/ Y;.;,:' \:-"Y / ..// Y . / Y:./ Y . /
The fifth factor usually; considered important as a 
unifying f oree in. Arab nationa lism, that,of unity of interests,. 
is not, in my opinion, very,s trong at the present time * . The , 
comparatively recently exploited oil wealth of Iraq and the 
Arabian peninsula has made these areas economically strong , 
in comparison in particular with; Egypt which; has a very large 
and growing population with a low staxidard; of: living, . As long 
as■this situation remains, that is, as long as oil;from these' 
areas lasts ;and finds a ready, market, I think that one cam ' /Y.
expect that they will not favour w i t ^
/:Y//gaft; ofYa/fully united-Arab state*
Y Y ; Y ; / Y  It is generally considered.,/  then,.YthiktYcbrtain, factors -  
;/ Y common'languageand-culture^/M territory and to a lesser
Y extent the ties of ;common:blopd/a^Yreligion are ;usually^Yto/bkY// 
/Y/ discerned ^ the. membersof any/ given nation* Y / /
Arab/mtioha^ writers ; c on Aider /that; i lie /existence, of these Yv /
/factors "InYt^ proves the existence bf the YAr.ab///;'V//
. ; nation; that-spmeof : t hes e/f abt ors :are iiideed strong in the / : /;Y
7 Y arba;. IsYYaMbn:^^ justifiably bk said that tHebe YY/Y
; YYfabtors:Yexist /more/strongly dirYbhe,Arab world than do those 
Y: which link together the ihhabitaxhis..-pf some estdbllshedYppl*-
, iticai natlbhal/ehtitieb whi eh. have /been formed ; in the .cpurse 
/ of history. , Thbse}viinksYhave /however ,Yexisted in/ the Arab 
; Y/worlds f o r / m k k r Y ^  prbseait-dayYlack of -political
unity Yin^ the; area may/therefore b e / c p r s i d ^ e ® ^ Y p a r t l y  ,v; 
/: , at/least, that, they are merely static factors;; . /• \ /;>/ YY - ; Y;YY
/// / Y /AltHbpsh one .may,: lYthihk*. dismiss 'as^unlikely/the /YY:///Y 
, v ; Y^pes sibilily Y pf/ .direct.mi li tary eohques tYby. ahy one ' Af al^/ata te Y YY" 
of all /the /othbfsT, ,:aY6bmmohly^^/experienced feeling'of: fear, ; ^ y ; / 
perhaps in the/f ut ur e motIvate the creation: of a. pan-Arab union*. 
/ //It .dsY/of/ophhspY/ true that many Arabs are c ompletely /united 
Yv/YYinA>arin^^^ 'as:; a common/ aggressivpv enemy and that great
efforts are made from two 'directions/to:? convince, the Arabs that
the;'Western Powers/arealsoshch.an enemy • . To the inhabitant S'- 
of /o'er tain Arab c ountri e s / however, f ar. removed in distance //, 
from Israe 1/and/to o filers -t o whi ch We stern n imper iali sin’1 has • •;/• 
not; proved to have been ; without';/mahy bene fit1 /such/fear s; must// 
seem; particularly'Unreal; and unjustifiedFear of communism ./,; ../ 
is ,Yon the other hand, / widely and 'strongly experienced through- . 
out the Arab w orId a t : the present time ,. . Some observers • / indeed, 
consider, that the Uni ted: Arab/ Re publi c .was : formed so hastily Y ; 
i n ’ 1958/as &he. re suit of Syrian fears of growing commuhist / 
dominatioh;in/the Yc6untr^y:Y f e  exampley that H • L.: / YY
Allen of the University of Virginia writesjYMRe sponsible Syrian • 
leaders,/ seeing their country dfifting towards Soviet control YY; 
as a result of economic, psychoIpgica1, military and •political / 
factors and: .ther activities of. theY ihdigenous Cornmunist party, Y :■/ 
chose/io unite: with lEgypi/ rathenY;fbah Y IPse/ their identity//:/ > y Y Y 
coiiiplefely;,,1# /; in ; spite: of;this: precedeht,/however, fear of Y//Y• / 
communism does hot seem likely to infliiencp any other Arab . Y/ 
c Ountr i e s •/to wards forming a c iose/ uni on with/ the. Uni ted Arab ;: / 
Republic.. ’ /Y.Y:/v.'// ••••'',-./; YY.^  Y Y/.Y Y Y  ////;;/ /‘YyY/yY: Y i y //;//,/-;./// YYyy' 
/ • - If, then, /neither military conquest nor/fear dolead/ toY '• 
the format ion of ah effective pan-Arab nnion, ^if seems most. : Y ;/Y
.1. .’’Middle ,Ea S t Re port * 1959 H ed Y/W^ Y8aMsY/;MlddIe: East' Inst- ‘ Y ■ 
Y iYitute, Washington, D • C .,. 1959Y. P* 7 83 Y YArhb; writers ^./of Yy7 
Y/Y course, tend to • stress that other and,.more positive Y ■ /:/Y
-•: ;■ YY.:fap£brs.Yl'id/:t6Yth.fe -'/'//:■- Y' Y/
7/7 YY- - .7 u n l ik e  l y  • t  h a t ,7 such/ a: u n i on w i 11 c orae / in fo -  b e in g  excep t a s / 'th e /7 7 7-;
Y ' Y‘ 7 result/of a: f deling shared by the' goyernniehts of 7all the Arab 
77/ / . : cpuhtriee; that7thelrY1hdlylduaYepdnqmios^^^ ;'■ 7,;
777 /thehebyv YShpfefbelings7 of ■/common; economic Interest 7 although 7;. 7 
7//v ,/;■■ assumed, /with such/c omri ct ipn.tb 7exist7by /Arab; naf Iona list/7V.: 7,7 - 7 
7 ;. . writers, seem- at -the7 present; t ime • h^ , widespread nor 7
realistic.
7- y;-7.: ,/7r 7 '■ ' Gr edit; stress /l:^  fhe/ W^stbrh and; .
Arab worlds today 7ph;khbthbf7possibility; 7fhlB/ks^hat/^ilful/,;.:’ 
7/ 77 77prop.agand.a7 may succeed in persuading the Arab ;.nmassesn to hate -7
77.7/'/7;/:77And';, seek the7destruc 1^1oh;bf 7t he i r.pr es ent:,forms of rule.;/ The 77/ 
Y 77;/'7;7: • regioiis newly liberated. .from/ the : Mc lutches of the/Zionist- 7’ ; 7 :
7 '' - Imperiaiist/reacts , to use the/cPmmph; Arab/7 " Y Y
/Y;7 77/ /nationalist: phraseo 1 ogy, wouId then, it 1 s argued, inevitably 7/77
7 7 /7 . 7 »ove: towards greater Arab unity; / The use of such .propaganda f or 
7/7 s everal ye ar s ^ however, has obviously not * so far at least,, led,•
7 / 7 to this/dPsired result, as the present situation in Iraq- and . 7
7 . ..Its s trained re latlons with the United Arab Re public se em t o / Y
7. 7 proVe • It, would seem foollsh7 to assume that, propaganda and 7 
. 7 .subversion alone;, . of however 7violent/Pr /cunning,, a nature, v/i 11 7
//./; ;/ ./ be; able to unite effectively, the entire Arab w or*Id from the 7 
Y/ : 7 Y”’'Gulf'YtoYthb,;Atlah-t 16’■ in the forseeable future. •/.'/ 7 ;Y
CHAPTER FOUR?:
the:form of t h e- union
An important, element in the ideology of Arab ■Nationalise isyby; t 
definition, a desire on the part of its advocates to bring . 
about a closer form of union'between the Arab countries than 
exists at present* That it is of great difficulty and,of 
doubtful value to attempt to.formulate the constitution of a 
state which remains only a theoretical possibility at the 
present time isiobvious* It is not surprising,, therefore, that 
comparatively few Arab nationalist writers have examined this 
question in any ..detail: in their writings. Those few writers 
who have, however, attempted"to define the'powers of the Pres- y 
ident of the proposed union and to. resolve the difficult, quest­
ion of the means and;form of the representation of the at 
present divided Arab states within the union. 'These proposed 
constitutions are surprising for their extreme diversity; no 
two Arab nationalist theoreticians ar»e joined in anything like 
unanimity over the' basic problems of the form of the united Arab 
state they advocate* It is interesting to examine the pro­
posals they make and the constitution of the United Arab 
Republic, a state which is considered by some contemporary v
Arab writers to be the first step towards the greater .pan-Arab 
union# ,
Arab Nationalist writers seem in the majority agreed that 
some form of federation (ittihad) must be the necessary prelude 
to the eventual and ideal complete union. They see this fed­
eration itselfhowever, as a close form of union in which 
centralised government is envisaged, with a unified military 
command, single diplomatic representation abroad and common 
economic policy and treasury. Dr# Yusuf Baikal, writing in 
19439 seems to have been the first Arab nationalist writer who 
me.de an attempt to deal with the problem of formulating a suit­
able' constitution for the proposed union. He pointed to a 
division in the Arab world between those countries, Sudan, 
Tripolitania, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, which were all 
at the time under direct rule by Yfestern Powers, and those 
countries ESgypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula which 
he considers did enjoy some degree of national sovereignty#^* 
Realising this and other difficulties in the way of a 
complete union between all parts of the Arab world, he 
concludes that the solution is to be found in some form of 
federation: “A federation is the best form of union for the
Arab countries■for each region would then remain in possession 
of its internal sovereignty, governing Itself and dir*ecting 
its affairs as it must and wishes. By federation, too, the 
strengths of these regions would be made one and they would
li "naftwa al-wahdah al-*arabiya|un Cairo, 1943, p* 79#
® c.
follow-a united foreign policy. They would thus become one. 
large state in their relations with other foreign states."^*
It is interesting to observe the emphasis in this comment 
placed on the need for union for the sake of a united Arab 
foreign, policy; it seems clear that this is in Baikalfs 
opinion the most important argument in favour of a federation 
of Arab states. This emphasis on the importance of external « 
affairs in comparison with internal affairs is typical of the 
writings of many Arab nationalists, especially in those works 
written before or soon after the Second World War* More recent 
works, while emphasising the need for a united Arab foreign r 
policy lay far greater emphasis than they did at that time on 
the assimied socio-economic advantages of union.
Dr* Baikal goes on to point out the main difficulty in the 
attainment of an effective Arab federation; there are, he 
writes realistically, kings and governments in the various 
parts of the Arab world who would be unwilling to give up their 
sovereignty in external affairs and "submit to a high, centra- 
ised authority."2* Dr. Baikal concludes in expressing his 
opinion that a satisfactory provisional solution to the 
difficulty would lie in the creation of an Arab confederation. 
Be suggests that the Arab governments set up a joint assoc­
iation to be called an "assembly of confederated Arab states,"
1. Ibid., p. 81.
2. Ibid.
and proposes his own simple yet interesting plan for the for­
mation of the Assembly of the confederation. He divides the 
Arab world somewhat arbitrarily into four natural units. The . . 
first would consist of Egypt and the Sudan, the second of 
greater Syria Including Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans­
jordan; the.third unit would consist of Iraq and the fourth the 
Arabian Peninsula. He proposes that each of these unities 
should be represented, by five delegates selected by the govern­
ments concerned. He goes on to suggest that a' permanent 
headquarters for the confederation be set up in one of the 
towns situated roughly in the centre of the Arab world. The 
President of the' assembly of the;: confederation should, in 
Haikal’s opinion, be elected each year and would have no 
executive power; each of the units comprising the confederation 
would take turns in supplying the President. The activities 
of the Assembly should, he writes, concern matters of education,, 
legislation, customs, defence and foreign.policy. Despite his 
argument quoted above concerning the need for unity to achieve 
common Arab foreign policy, he makes the apparently contra­
dictory comment: "As f©r foreign affairs and diplomatic rep­
resentation, these too should remain the concern of each of the 
confederated states alone, provided that these stastes do not 
contradict by their foreign policy the principal bases on which 
they have agreed within the. confederation*"^* The most
IV Ibid., p. 87.
obvious and extraordinary aspect of Haikal*s suggested plan 
■for confederation li&s in his assumption that each of the units 
he^  considers to exist would be agreed to accept equality of 
representation in the proposed assembly* That Egypt and the 
Sudan together would have been content to accept five repre­
sentatives in the assembly and an equal power to that of the
five proposed representatives of Iraq, for example, seems 
1.
unlikely*
At about the same time as Dr* Baikal was writing his work 
in support of Arab union, some of the governments of the Arab 
states were in fact taking the first steps which were to lead 
to the creation of the Arab League. This League was eventually 
formed in 194-5 the result of a chain of actions and events 
which are generally considered to have been given their 
stimulus by the statement made by the British Foreign Secretary, 
Antony Eden, in the House of Commons in May, 194-1; in this 
statement he expressed the support of the British government for 
some form of Arab union. The initiative was then taken by the 
Iraqi Prime Minister, HurT Pasha al-Sa *Td who, at the close of
1. While it is, of course, true that the Arab League is
constituted on the basis of equal representation between 
each Arab country, it may, I think, be assumed that 
Haikal envisaged that the confederation should have 
more effective executive power than the League enjoys.
1942 and in the beginning of 1943 prepared a collection of 
documents and/proposals relating to Arab unity and which 
laid particular emphasis on the problem of Palestine* These 
proposals, which he sent to the British Minister at Gairo, 
are known as the “Blue Book"*. The, basic, idea behind these 
proposals was that a fairly,effective union of Greater Syria 
and Iraq would .help defeat Zionist aims and ambitions in the 
Arab world and would provide a strong nucleus about which a 
fuller Arab union might eventually be constructed. Opposition 
to these proposals came from a number of sources on a variety: 
of grounds 'It,was felt, for . example, that such a union would 
in fact provide the Zionists already.firmly established in 
Palestine an opportunity to exert their influence over an 
even wider area. It was felt, moreover, that no union could:: 
be effective and valuable ..without, Egyptian participation,
which might: prove even more difficult to obtain in later
. i * '  - ■ . ’ ■
years*, Fear and jealousy on the part of some Syrians and.
Egyptians at the possibility of the acquisition by the
Hashimite Kings of Trans-dordan and Iraq of greater authority
and influence no doubt had their part to play as well* The \
1* c*f* Cecil A. Hourani : n,Thd Arab League in Perspective" 
Published by the Arab Office, Washihgton (no date) p* 4/5* 
Previously published in the M.E.J., Vol. I, No* 2,,
April,. 19.47V ’ : p ; :; . :
uncertainties concerning the Apolitical status of Iraq and the:: 
independence of Lebanon and: Byria were, too, probably : -V;
additional factors" which led ;tq the^s&lying of these.pro- V 
posals of the Iraqi statesman* ■
The next step in the creation of the Arab League was A-tv 
"taken by Mustafa Nahhas Pasha, the Prime .Minister of Egypt, 
who was urged by. Nuri al-Ba *id and . other Arab nationalists, : ; 
to invite. the various Arab governments to send representatives , 
to vOairo. to .discuss, the^v/possib^lity and desirability of calling-' 
a general Arab conference." *: The discussions which followed 
throughout 194-3 and the first half of 1944 encouraged Nahhas 
Pasha id call a conference of high representatives of the Arab; 
oountries j Including Palestine. The c onferees reached a wide . 
measure of agreement in their discussions at Alexandria and 
they formulated a document, known as the "Protocol of Alex- ' :
andria"awhidh set out the, points on which they agreed. The
' * "  ^ ' ■ *. ■ ■ . ' 
League of Arab states It proposed was to be formed from all
those independent Arab states which wished to join. It wq,s
to.have a ; general council which would meet regula.rly to. - ;
discuss problems of interest to all Arabs* Decisions of the f
IV Ibid., p* 6 * NuriT al-Ba*Xd,, It will be observed, is classed 
here by Hourani directly as an Arab nationalist; this, 
contrasts strongly with the view widely held by Arab; 
nationalists before his death,; which they celebrated , 
with great delight In July, 1958, that, he was a "stooge 
of the imperialists" and an opponent of Arab unity*
Council would not be obligatory on those Arab governments 
which did not wish to carry them out; the use of force to 
decide disputes between member states would in no circumstances 
be permitted. The Protocol!s first section contained the very 
important and direct clauses "in no case will the adoption 
of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the policy of 
the League or an independent member state be allowed." The 
Protocol laid special emphasis on the support of all the 
signatories for both the independence of Lebanon and the rights 
of the Arabs of Palestine.
Ffom the date when the Protocol of Alexandria was agreed 
until the date when the Arab League itself was created in March 
194-5, important governmental and constitutional changes took 
place in some of the Arab countries. Perhaps mainly as a 
result of this, the’Pact of the League differed considerably 
in spirit and tone from the Protocol. As Hourani points out! 
"Whereas the Protocol had envisaged a progressively increasing 
surrender of sovereignty, the Pact lays emphasis on its reten­
tion. For example, the prologue, after its statement "desirous 
of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which 
link the Arab states and anxious to support and strengthen t 
these ties," adds the phrase "upon a basis of respect for the 
independence and sovereignty of these states. "The Pact 
omits the clause of the Protocol which stated that "in no 
case will a state be permitted to pursue a foreign policy which
'could be detrimental to the policy of the League or to any of 
its member states., "it also omits Article 3 of the Protocol, 
looking 'toward a further degree of unity in the future, but
. specifies that states Wl’ll co-operate *with due regard to the .
organisation and circumstances of each state.f Finally,.the 
Pact specifically binds“each member state not to interfere in 
: the systems of government of the others, whereas the Protocol
had ho such; clausev:1^ * . 1
- Whatever the disappointments expressed by some Arab 
nationalists over.the final form of the Pact of the Arab p 
League, its establishment was seen by many Arabs to be a t 
positive' step towards ensuring .greater Arab cooperation“In the; 
future. The preamble of the League's Covenant lays considerable 
emphasis b n  the, widespread public demand f or closer cooperation ‘ 
between the Arab states : "in order to affirm the close
connections and: numerous ties which likk the Arab states, and 
being desirous of maintaining and establishing those connect­
ions on the foundations of respect for the Independence and 
sovereignty of those states, and in order to direct their 
efforts towards the general- good of the Arab states, the 
improvement of their circumstances, the security of their 
future, and the realisation of their hopes and aspirations,
;V ‘ and- in response to Arabkphblic; opinion ih al-l/parts'-'of'-the yl'y/ly 
;; ;Arab^.wprld>V;hatre agreed to-, ent^yihto,:,a: Covenant for this- ■
object* * ."This Covenant ied. to ;the . establishment of;th@ v:
y y  - Council of the 'Arab Ipague , on which each member state has one .
s; ; vote and which; is;'competed to mediate in disputes between / y y l
the setMember ; states^ and- advise ; the measures to be taken;. :y ;;i' 
against; aggrbs si bn directed towards any Arab country* . Unan^y- - y 
iitoUs decisions of theiCoimcil are; binding on all ;member statesp 
“ it was, agreed that majority decisions of.the Council should be p 
; binding; only on those states; which accepted them. The pact 
emphasises the sovereignty and ihdependence of each of its 
members ^ and the right.. of, any: member.: states to enter into, any 
closer agreements they 'may desire; ..The Council, under the\ 
presidency of,a representative of each member state in turn, ; 
meets ordinarily twice each year and in extraordinary session 
, where necessary. The pact left; membership of the League . :
op&n to any independent Arab state; any member .state may y ; .
1 ; .withdraw' Its membership after notice of one year, and any y
member state may.be expelled from the League.on the unanimous t 
decision of the other members. ■
: That the Arab League has not yet achieved that degree
of close cooperation in the affairs of the Arab countries
’ ' . 1. 
which .Arab nationalist writers desire, is obvious* * We-> find,;:
indbed, thatvery shortly after the ratification of the Pact,/
some writers began to express their disappointment with 7
various aspects of the charter of the. League. In 1945 itself,;.;
RafTq; Kamil al«Qitam complains at the lack of real power of
the^ League given by its Covenant.' , He writes r.^This Covenant v
did not: give the'League' the power ..which would enable it to
fulfil these national aims . 6n the contrary, it confined
itself to. iakihg/ofilt.an organisation in which nothing; more tt
than mere attempts could be made at specific times, by the : ,
.delegates of the states taking part in it , to strengthen -the
ties between their countries and to further the policies
:b f ;these countries. It is. clear that the Covenant has; not-
given the League the necessary power to carry out what it \
• ,,2 7 ' ... , „ ■ 
wishes. * He goes on to criticize the fact that the Covenant
;:did not . make clear the .way. in which the: delegates of the Arab .
1. c.f * \HIha Arab League, while . seemingly representative of 
Pan-Arab unity, iri reality based its strength on its /. 
'success in redirecting internal rivalries and bitterness 
outward against any foreign intrusion or intervention 
in Arabian affairs.*1, Carol A; Pis her and Fred Krinsky:
. ’’Middle: Past in Crisis. *• Syracuse, 1959, p* 20.
2,1 Al-w^ah^dah al-1 arabTyah wa: suriyah al-kubra". ” (’’Arab 
Unity and Greater Byria.” ) Damascus/ 1945* Page dal 
,of introduction. .,
r>‘df
countries in the Oouncil should he selected; thus, he writes, 
it is the governments of the countries concerned alone which
T_
choose whomever they wish to represent them* The distrust r 
of the Arab governments shown here is typical of the attitude 
of many Arab nationalist writers and several of them have 
criticised the League on similar grounds.
Having made his criticisms of the Arab League, al-Qitan 
puts forward his own plan for Arab unity. He considers that 
this can be achieved by the formation of an Arab Conference 
or assembly (muHamar) on which each Arab country would be 
represented by six delegates, whose term of office would last 
for four years.. He proposes that the parliament of each Arab 
country should elect its six representatives bearing in mind 
the individual, specialist qualifications of each applicant.
The chosen delegates need not necessarily be members of 
parliament and he stresses that the governments of the Arab 
countries should not exert any pressure in the selection of 
these delegates. The proposed assembly should have a president 
at its head elected by the delegates on a majority vote and he 
would have the authority to represent the assembly at govern­
mental level. The decisions of the assembly, which would 
concern itself mainly with disputes between the governments of 
the Arab countries, would be binding on all these governments.
1. Ibid.
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Each state participating in the assembly must agree to 
notify and obtain the agreement of the assembly before agreeing 
to any pact or alliance with a foreign power. He compares the 
supervisory power of the assembly with that of the Senate in 
the United States over the foreign policy of that countx^y. 
Al-Qitan proposes the creation of a unified Arab military 
command and an economic committee to work for the abolishment 
of customs tariffs. The assembly must, he writes, devote all 
its attention to the achievement of1 the complete freedom of 
all Arab countries and should permanently be situated in 
Damascus. *
By the year 1950, disappointment with the Arab League 
had become widespread in Arab nationalist circles and we find 
it criticised in very strong terms. Muhammad Hassan al-A^ami 
and (Abd al-Karim Muhammad write, while discussing the 
problems wlith which the League has been presented for solution: 
"The League is faced with problems other than these which are 
more dangerous to its existence than the problems it was
o
created to solve.” * These authors, while agreeing on'the 
need for the League and advising its extension to include
1. Ibid*, ,p • d — 9*
2. ”al-wahdah fi-al-sharq.” ("Unity in the East.” ) Beirut
1950, p. 122w - , . .
other Muslim and Asian countries, are strong in,their criticism 
of its actual effectiveness. They consider that the League : 
has fai led. to .'deal with' the. ■ problems presanted . to, it in the t. 
proper spirit and the fact that the resolutions adopted by the> 
Council have hot’in effect been implemented by the governments 
concerned hds led to friction between its members. They ;s 
■claim, further, . that the League hhs failed to face up to its, 
problems with, sincerity and hasv-employed, unsuitable methods; hi 
in • circumventing .theratb-.They; point, out, moreover, that the 
■League has failed to,deal effectively with the Palestine-1 ' 
'problem, neglected, economic and. social questions and- unwisely ; 
devoted all its attention to political disputes. *
Sat I 1 a 1 - Hus ar i is ‘s Imilarly critic al b f. the e f f e c 11 vene s sQ ' t, • , ■ ■ . . . , t ; . '■*. ; , ,„ ■ <
of /.the'League ,ih pne of his books first; published in ;1953«
He writes: "It must be observed.that the unity which this / ;
pact created between the governments participating in itis' 
weak,* if not, indeed, reallyfeeble. For, the Covenant gives • r 
ho executive authority to the Leaguefs Council and fails to- 
make the decisions of the Council binding on all." * ;
The writers of some of the,most recdnt Arab nationalist *
. works: and apparently in particular those who strongly support 
the policies of the United Arab Republic, seem convinced that
■ 1. Ibid., p. ; ■
2 . "al-^urubah baina du^atiha*It" p. 142.
the Arab League was a British inspiration and was imposed upon 
the Arabs with the deliberate intention of keeping them 
disunited. The Egyptian Ibrahim Jum!ah, for example, writes: 
"So that the Arabs would not achieve this unity, we saw the 
British particularly encourage the Arabs to form this instru­
ment... we saw them urge on the Arabs to form the League of 
Arab countries in 19^5 in the hope of creating a bloc out of 
the tribal, feudal and reactionary governments and elements
within an Arab organisation which Britain could exploit to
1. —
fulfil its own desires.1' * Similarly, Muhammad Majdhub refers
2 —
to the Arab League as a "British invention." * Ahmad Sa!id 
is even more specific. After noting the'statement of the 
British Foreign Secretary made on the 29th. of May, 1941, 
which implied that Britain would siapport and aid the formation 
of some form of Arab union, he writes: "Britain was able, and 
France with her, by meansoof their agents the leaders of some 
Arab countries, to Impose a charter for the League which made 
its Council impotent from taking any unanimous decision, as 
the Covenant demands, against the imperialist Powers by reason 
of th© presence of reactionary forces cooperating with th© 
imperialists at the head of the countries from the majority
1. Op. eit., p. 33.
2. Op. cit., p. 20.
1
of which, the Arab League Council was formed*1 * The attitude 
of mind demonstrated here is typical of popular1 Arab nation­
alist writers today; they seem content to blame all the diffi- 
culties of the Arab world on the so-called imperialist powers.
\v\ A cw\
Perhaps the most recent of attempts to formulate^a 
practical solution to the difficult problem of the constitutional 
form of the proposed Arab nationalist union are those of Muh­
ammad fIzzat. Darwazah and Walid Qamhawi. Dr. Darwazah in 
particular examines this question at length in his work 
published in 1956; he shows, too, that he is aware of the 
difficulties of finding a suitable formula for the proposed 
union and examines briefly the earlier attempts made to bring 
about this union. He points to the speech of Prime Minister 
Nazim. al-QudsT delivered before the Arab League in 1951 and
a
the enthusiasm with which this speech, calling for effective 
Arab federation mainly to meet the-threat of Zionl&m, was 
received by the Arab people, if not by the Arab political 
leaders. It failed, he writes, to inspire action because of
p
personal and dynastic rivalries. * The Mutual Defence Pact of 
1951, which established the principle that all Arabs would 
unite in mutual action in the case of aggression against any
1. Op. cit*, p. 50*
2, Op. cit., p. 153*
Arab state, was, in Darwazahfs opinion a failure because of a
complete lack of action on the part of the Arab governments
at times of obvious aggression. The statement made in 1954
by the Iraqi government calling for Arab union failed, in
Barwazah’s opinion, to inspire action chiefly because it was
1considered to be the work of the British. *
Dr. Darwazah goes on to write that the desired Ignited 
Arab state will not be achieved until an Arab state adopts 
Arab nationalism as official governmental policy. He suggests 
that .Syria and Egypt are best qualified to accomplish the 
task. * Having expressed his conviction that Arab nationalism 
would be likely to achieve great support in Egypt in the near 
future, Darwazah goes on to give his own opinion concerning 
the constitutional form and pwers of the proposed union. He 
considers that the union should be full and absolute in 
military, economic and diplomatic affairs and that currencies 
and communications should, as well as cultural and edxicational 
affairs, all be directed from central ministries. He proposes 
that one legal system should prevail over the whole area and 
that it should be supervised by one Ministry of Justice. All 
Arabs should enjoy the right to live and work in any Arab 
region without discrimination. Although, he writes, the union
1. Ibid., p. 143*
2. Ibid., p. 602.
should be effective in all these major affairs, Arabs w&ould 
retain local nationalities corresponding to the regions in 
which they at present live and would make use of these rights 
in local elections and other regional affairs* The union 
should, Darwazah considers, guarantee to all citizens free 
exercise of their special customs and form of worship, so long 
as this does not conflict with the national union and the 
Interests of the countries within this union.
Darwazah goes on to present a detailed plan for the actual 
organisation of the government of the proposed union. He 
suggests the formation of executive and legal assemblies and
the creation of a unified military command. The executive 
assembly should consist of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Finances, Defence, Communications, Culture, G-eneral Legislation, 
Nationality and Jabour. The president of this executive 
assembly should be the titular head of the union as well and 
should be elected for office of two. years duration. His 
duties would be restricted to the representation of the union 
abroad on official visits, the reception of foreign envoys and
dignitaries, the signing of alliances, agreements and laws and
1*the direction of sittings of the executive assembly* ‘Darwazah
1* Ibid*, p* 623/4, It is Interesting to observe the complete 
lack of the personal power of the president on which
Darwazah insists.
suggests that each of the regions of the union should take ; 
turns in supplying the president according to alphabetic . v; • 1 
precedence; he should be chosen by the legislative assembly vt'Xv' 
from three candidates proposed by the region concerned. The 
responsible ministers In the executive assembly should be- v'> 
elected by the legislatiye assembly from candidates put forward 
by each region for each ministerial postLegislation, political 
agreements and economic and military pacts should come within 
the jurisdiction of the executive /.-council. The effective 
power in the union proposed by Darwazah; would, it is clear, be 
held by the legislative assembly... The members of this assein-* : 
bly should be elected from; each region according to local / 
custom; each:region would provide one representative for every 
half million, or perhaps every quarter million of the total - : /
-population of the ‘region./:/ 4s; weli/as:; .this :’form;-of representation, 
of the people of the regions., each regional governmental cabinet-- 
should appoint one, member .of the legislative assembly for / ;, 
each one or perhaps two million of the population of the region. 
/This, assembly Bhould.have two sittings each year.of its four v 
year/ period .of office; Its decisions .should be reached by v.: 
majority vote where necessary/.except in the case of resolut-; 
•ions,declaring war or peace or resolutions from which economic■/ 
or .-military pacts might result;, the duration of which would; 
exceed five years. In this latter case, such resolutions will
be accepted -as officlalandlegs,! policy in the case of the 
affirmative vote of a two-thirds majority of the assemblyfs 
members.; War would be declared by the uni on of Arab s tate s 
in the ease of,.aggress!on against/any member region, provided 
that ;b/. resolution recommending declaration were passed
by the executive committee, and legislative, assembly* The 
legislative as:s emb.ly would have . the : power,/' to enact./ new legis 
lation; the president would have.the right merely to defer his 
signature/in case of his own objections, but would not be able 
to refuse .to/sign*. The legislative assembly would have the:/// 
authority to question the executive committee, of the president 
and ministers on any matter connected, with the affairs of the 
unified' Arab state. It would be. possible for the, legislative/; 
assembly /to'/call for and .enforce/the resignation of the . 
president or. the ministers of the executive committee in case 
of negl i gbhc © or mi sc ohdue t , •' pr ovided that a mot I on r e e ommend* 
ing such action were passed/by the legislative assembly by a 
majority of .tiiree-fifths of Its members, and provided that a/ /
“Court of Social Justice'/.agreed that the accusations of the
•/' ' ■ /" 1. / ' ■ . ‘ ' 
assembly were; justified.
1* In the case of accusations of treacherous conduct, or 
. negligence on the part ,of the president or :the: executive ■. 
comMitee which had caused, actual loss to the treasury / 
of the union, the. matter would have to be referred, Dar- 
/wazah suggest a, to what-he calls the "High Court of Crimes 
./against the State*tl
Dr..Darwazah examines with equal detail the formation 
of the High .Court of Justice, the members of which should be 
elected in the first instahce by the legislative assembly 
from candidates proposed; by each region of the union. Sleeted 
members of the Court, whose number should not: exceed, four,, 
could not be: dismissed and would .have power to question, in 
light of the constitution, any actions of the governmental 
assemblies, as well as jurisdiction in all disputes between 
member, regions, ©f the union. The Court would also have V  
power.to examine.a11 complaints by private citizens against* 
the administration, If the administration itself refused to / 
deal.with the complaint. '.Requests and recommendations of the 
Court would h a M  to be accepted, Darwazah writes, and its 
decisions carried out . If' any regional government should 
refuse to submit to the arbitration of the Court, the Court 
would be ;able nevertheless to deal with the matter in the 
absence of ./representatives of the government concerned. If 
any regional government should refuse to accept the findings 
of the/Court, the executive assembly would recommend to the 5 
legislative.assembly what it considered appropriate as a fine 
or punishment and would, have the power to recommend the use of 
force* This/would only apply In the case of a majority decis­
ion of three-fifths of the legislative assembly*
\ Dar.waz&h suggests; thatthe capital of the proposed union 
should be Cairo and states that each region would retain the 
right to continue its.present, form of government or alter it as 
it saw fit*/ He concludes his proposals by recommending that 
, all the members. of the Arab /league should take part In the : 
union and that any partial union between the Arab states such 
as he suggests would be better than the present disunity* , 
Darwazah proposes, in short, a union of the Arab states 
with, a centralised form of/governiiiexit in Cairo In which effect­
ive power would rest in the hands of a legislative assemblyjA 
representing both the governments and peoples of the separate 
regions on the basis of thb relative size of their populations* 
The presidency of this proposed union would be a purely cere­
monial office and the President’s term of office strictly \'- 
limited;rV; While• at first sight practicable: and“just, it'becoxnes 
clear on closer examination that this form of union had 
. obviou© disadvantages. The form of proportional representation 
Darwazah envisages would clearly give Egypt;effective rule 
over the other Arab countries. Egypt would have, for example, 
approximately fifteen representatives to every one from Leb- 
anon and would/haveffour times: as many votes in the legislative 
assembly as Iraq*' Thebe figures do not seem to reflect justly 
the respective power and importance of the Arab countries, and 
it seems very doubtful that such an arrangement would ever be
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acceptable to them all. Despite these obvious criticisms, 
Darwazah1s, plan seems the most detailed, and orddrly attempt 
1 have read within the body1 of contemporary Arab nationalist 
literature to formulate a constitution suitable for the 
proposed united Arab state “from the Gulf to the Atlantic.”
Walid Qamhawi, too, gives a fairly detailed plan for the 
actual form of the proposed Arab union in his work also pub­
lished in 1956; his proposals differ from those of Darwazah 
in several important respects. He states that the form and 
administration of the unified state should be organised on the 
basis of the separate geographic units into which he considers 
the Arab world may be divided. He considers that the union 
should be divided into four administrative regions, the first
to consi&t of North Africa including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Hve. J
and^second^the Nile valley of Egypt and Sudan. The third 
division shoiald comprise the Fertile Orescent and cbnsist of ’ 
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq and the fourth unit would 
comprise the Arabian peninsula. He suggests. ,that the local 
administration within these areas should be left in the hands 
of a “group of those governors present at this time who have 
demonstrated their sincerity to their peoples and the sincerity 
of their beliefs In Arab Nationalism."^ The union should, in 
Qamhawi{s opinion, have a presidential form of government with
1. Op. eit., p. 497.
its headquarters in Gair'o. This central authority should 
have extensive powers in directing the political, economic . 
and social as well as military affairs of the state. At- the 
same time, however, each region should be permitted to retain 
as much local authority as possible. The governing body 
itself should consist of two organisations, one executive and 
the other legislative, with a "supreme power" to coordinate, 
and balance these authorities. The legislative assembly ,
should consist of two halves —  one half1 elected by the nation 
as a whole. Each half million of the population of the state 
would be represented by one delegate. The other half of the 
delegates would be representatives, of the trade unions, to 
which- all workdrs would be obliged to join. Candidature 
for the legislative assembly would be open to all and all , 
citizens would haye - the -right to vote in the elections which 
would be held every five years. Qamhawi gives little idea of
■ ’ 'i
what he considers should be the means of election of the 
members of the executive assembly and writes merely that it 
should consist of. a cabinet of the ustial ministers. He gives 
no details of how he would recommend that the difficult problem 
of the, proportional representation, of the foiir regions of the' 
union would be resolved in the choice of the second half of, 
the delegates of' theVlegislative assembly. The vagueness .3 
,,and, obvious’Verbiage ..with whichrhe-discusses the formation;-
of the executive assembly are extraordinary s "The executive 
commit tee'-.'should be formed “'from a. ‘Cabinet of Ministers at 
the head of whom should be a man of singular ability# . It should 
consist; of the usual ministries with various,advisory commit- ' 
.tees*••Its: duties should be to serve the, nation and direct,its i 
affairs, to enact the laws,,,, organise and manage the, relation- . 
ships; between individuals, to.- work to raise the standards of 
all -citizens1’ physically*: intellectually 'and economically, to ; 
watch,'over their rights-^ o.f - (free,)^  thought and assembly and ; ■;
' - - - ' ** '■ 'f*" '.1 9mm * v
aid them to fulfil their various national dutuesi" • Qamhawi 
has nothing’further to write concerning the details of the ; ‘
formation or-I powers of {;the.proposed executive committee. . r 1 >*-• 
Qamhawi.goes on-’to discuss the formation of the "control-' 
ling :authority;1 ' (ai-sultah-f.-aindabi t.ah) which he proposes # > .It;. 
should, c&nsisf, he writes. ,.iof' twelve’ members, three directly, 
elected, in. each of his proposed four -administrative arid ‘geo- :
,graphical areas into which he divides the Arab world. These'- 
elections, should be held every; twelve years. The President;
.of- the proposed Arab, state should; be. chosen from this group . , 
and his term of office should be two years. The work of the . 
President and the ^controlling authority1 should consist, 
Qamhawi writes, "in representation of the being of the state,
the supervision of its binding links and, the balance within it*
:It-should also bave the duty of creating and organising; jud- 
Iciary;bodies.which would ensure justice to all." * :
Qamhaw’i rs. suggestions for the constitutional form of the 
desired Arab "state seem remarkable for their vagueness, imprac­
ticability and apparent illogicalities. According to these 
vsuggestions, the legislative assembly should be formed on the 
basis of proportional representation of the population of the 
Arab world;as. a whole — - each half million of the population 
of each region would elect one delegate.. This plan, essentially. 
similar*yto that of Dai’wazah, would clearly give a very large 
majority to the unitycomprising.the Nile valley of the $udah 
and ;H!gypt. The Controlling authority1 however, should in his 
: opinion be formed by. three delegates from each.region; the In- 
--consistency seems obvious.L ‘ vr£.' be.em.s-:.quite impossible at; the 
present time, and could not have seemed probable at the time 
when Qamhawi wrote his work, in 1956,/ that thexyegion consisting 
of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, for example, could agree 
on three suitable representatives to sit on this authority*
The proposals QamhawT makes to overcome the difficulties 
presented in the creation of a suitable constitutional form for 
the union seem.quite impracticable. By suggesting the four .
1 natural,, geographic * areas he seems to increase these. .
difficulties fourfold.
Perhaps the most recent examination of the form of 
government-most suitable for the proposed pan-Arab state is 
that written by Adib Qa*war. In a special edition of the Beirut . 
"Arab Culture" magazine;.published in . 1 9 5 9 * In the article, 
the magaziners editor.expounds his belief in the need fon 
gradua1 pr ogress't owards the desired Arab uni on, He examines .. 
the form of the Federal unions of the United States of America > 
and of the Soviet Union axid, concludes that, for farious reasons 
federal union is not■suitable for. the Arab world. He expresses 
his opinioil that a "unified decentra 11 sed state" ,(a 1-dawlah v 
al muwahhadah al-lamarkaziyah) would provide .an acceptable 
final, form':b f ;union and examines//the- system of government of 
the Uni ted/kingdom at .sbme length /and proposes” this system ..as 
a model. The/conclusions’which he draws from his examination 
are, perhaps worthy of quotation: "l) Since . complete Arab unity 
cannot be.;-attained all at once, we must aid any form of union* 
whe t her bi lat er al / (thi na %):/. ofo.therwi se, or the uni on o f. two. 
1. "al-thiqafah al-iarablyah". Third Tear, No. 2. Pages 17-271 
.... This magazine is..published by,the .Arab Cultural Club Of Z 
Beirut. The club is an important centre of Arab nation­
alist activities in;Lebanon, fhis edition of the magazine^
/ from which I have here quoted^was the second, of two 
devoted to discussions of Arab nationalism.
or more of the states of the homeland or the unification, of 
various.aspects of their life, All of these are steps we must; 
try on pur path towards complete Arab unity* 2) We must
benefit from the battles now,in progress between the ranks of ^
• 2# ,
the Arab leaders to discover truths, define responsabilities
and direct the consciousness of the masses in stich a way as to 
achieve the aims of Arab nationalism.. .We must plant firm the 
idea that unity and all the nations' aims can only be attained 
at the hand of the revolutionary-minded Arab nationalist van­
guard, revolutionaries in both action and methods. 3) The 
last inference .we can draw from this study is that we should 
make the creation of a united decentralised state the final aim 
for our proposed Arab, state
The most.remarkable aspect of this article, written so 
recently is that it makes no attempt at all to define the 
extent of the power of central and local governments within the 
proposed Arab state, the powers and election bf the Head of . 
State or any .of the other, difficult problems in the way of \ 
achieving such a union. His choice of the system of government 
of the United Kingdom as a model for the-form of the Arab state
1* No doubt the author refers to the rivalry between Pres.
Nasir and some of the other Arab rulers*
&  • . .• % - _* . -
2. ibia.
may betaken to show either the closeness of the union he 
envisages ,qr, its looseness ;; the matter hinges on the inter­
pretation of the word decentralised and to what extent one 
considers the .word applicable to the British governmental 
system*
The majority-of Arab nationalist writers, with the ; 
exception;of those I have, quoted in this chapter, have not 
attempted '‘in-their works to formulate detailed plans for the 
constitutional form of the proposed united Arab state which ■ 
would prove satisfactory to all the at present separated,
Arab s t a t e s S o m e  c ontemporary Arab writers, however, c ons ider 
the United Arab Republic as the foundation on which the 
desired united Arab state will be eventually built. These- 
writers recommend immediate adhesion of all the Arab countries .. 
to the Republic. The Lebanese- Muslim Muhammad Majdhub, for 
example, urges this step and insists' that a presidential form 
of republic, presumably of the type which exists in the United 
Arab Republic today, is the best form of government for the 
entire .Arab ’world. He claims that: "The United Arab Republic
does not ask the Kings’and Brinces to descent from their thrones 
The most,that is required of them is that they give up some, 
of their power and absolute authority. Absolute monarchies 
must transform themselves into constitutional monarchies 
similar to the. monarchy in Britain.
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In that the United. Arab‘Republic has since its creation 
in February 1958 claimed to be a partial fulfilment of the 
wishes of Arab nationalists for Arab union and is considered ; 
as such by some Arab writers, it -is of interest to examine 
the constitutional form of government exercised within it at 
the present time. The provisional constitution o'f the United 
Arab Republic -now. in force was first issued in March 1958,,
In an Introduction to this constitution given in the official 
"Yearbook of the U.A.R* for 1959 "issued by the Ministry of 
Information., it is stated that the "system of government of 
the U.A.R. must be looked at and understood in its context 
as a part and; continuation of other constitutional movements 
in'both regions of the Republic as well as the entire Arab 
world, in the 19th and 20th c e n t u r i e s I t  goes on to 
state that this provisional constitution is "an expression of 
the movements strongly rooted,in our civilisation in the Arab 
movement ahd the constitutional movement. The Arab movement. 
finds expression in the union between Hfeypt and Syria. The 
provisional constitution is a step forward in the constitutional 
movement in the Arab world, providing a system of government 
based on the, wishes of the electorate’ —  a system which is
" - ■ p
best suitedito their conditions, their life and thought." V
While one might agree with some of the inferences of this
-1.. Op. ‘ clbilp*’,47.
•2,. Ibid.,,,,: . . / •:
statement., it'seems clear from an examination of the provisional 
constitution, that the form of the authority within, thef state 
is remarkably different from, that .envisaged by Ahab' nation-;-- : 
alist .writers.;, who have theorised'on,the form of the United .
Arab State, the creation of which they have-recommended.;
tThe.provisional constitution of the UnitedAArab Republic; 
bound, together the previously independent states of Egypt and 
Syr I a i nt o i a ful 1 political, uni on. Power within the new 
state is held by the President, . who is the Executive authority.,,, 
by the-"Legislative .Assembly; and by the judiciary* * The powers 
of the President, are defined in. a manner which is reinarkably 
vague,. The const! tut I oh' lays. down that "the executive power 
,ds ■ vested in the President, of the . Republic and he exercises.
It in the manner; prescribed, by the c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s  
power is defined.as the power to appoint or dismiss Vice­
-presidents dr ministers, each of. whom "supervises the affairs 
of his department and executes the general policy drawn by. 
the President of, the Republic."2* The President "has the 
right to initiate, laws, to oppose and to promulgate them."^*
The President may oppose any law and refer it for reconsid­
eration to the .National Assembly within a prescribed time.
1* Provisional Constitution,. Article 44.
2 * Ibid., Art* 47.
3* Ibid., Art. 50. .■ .
If the draft law under consideration is then voted for a 
second tl&me by a majority of .two-thirds of the members of this 
Assembly, then, this draft ..law. becomes effective, even without 
the agreement of the President* No mention is made in the;y 
constitution concerning,such important matters as the election 
of the president, the length.of his term of office, his 
dismissal In case of inefficiency or corruption or the relat- ; 
ionship between him and his Vice-Presidents, and their powers* 
Similarly, there is no mention of the.Region from which the 
President of the .repiobli o'should pome*, ; This is, of course, r a /. 
matter which has been as we have seen, of great ’concern to the 
theorists of the Arab nationalism and they seem to be unanimous 
in considering that the President>of the .united Arab state 
should bd-choseh in turn from each region taking part in the 
. uni on * •' . •. . . '
The legislative powor of the United Arab Republic is said 
to be - vested!,.in. the National., Assembly; the .constitution states 
that the "number of the members of the/National Assembly and ., 
their choice are determined by Presidential Decree*". * Article 
14 states that "the National Assembly exercises control over, 
the acts of the Executive: in-the manner prescribed by, the . 
constitution." In fact the only article which restricts /the 
power of the President, who Is/the Executive authority,1s that
article which refers to new legislation indicated above^
Article 13 states that "at least half of the number of members 
must be members of the Syrian Ohamber of Deputies, and the . 
National Assembly of Egypt-." This presumably, means that the . 
other'half of the members/need not-be parliamentary delegates 
front either region; the constitution gives no mention of the 
medns of election of these other members, or the qualifications 
they,, should have. . It similarly ...does not specify either .the 
total number of these delegates nor what proportion of their 
total should come from either-region of the Republic*
Although the law is refeired to frequently throughout the: 
provisional constitution, details concerning the introduction 
of new. legislation or the revoking of old legislation are not 
given* The apparent lack of effective power of the National 
Assembly seems clearly indicated by Article 26, which states \ 
"The National Assembly.may express its wishes, and proposals . 
to the government regarding several questions." These 
Questions1 are not specified nor defined at all. The State*s 
General Budget must, according to Article 32, be' submitted _ 
to the National Assembly "for its examination, and appi^oval at: 
least three months before the end of the financial year. Each' 
section of the budget must, be voted separately.": The same
article goes on to state in the ne&t sentence, however, that 
"The National Assembly may not introduce any amendments to the
draft budget, except with the approval of the Government.’1 It 
is clearly seen from this that the National Assembly does not 
in fact have any absolute authority .over the finances of the 
state, that this authority is held by the government alone, 
the executive power of which is in turn in the hands of the 
President.
An examination of the constitutional plans proposed by 
the theorists of the Arab nationalist novement for the event­
ually united Azmt> state are remarkable for their vagueness, 
impracticability and diversity. That this Is so points, of 
course, to the difficult nature of the problems they have been 
attempting to solve. To achieve support for their argument, 
that an Arab union would be entirely to the good of all parts 
of the Arab world, they have attempted to devise plans which 
would guarantee to the government and people of each of the 
Arab countries some degree of internal independence. At the 
same time they have felt the need to insist that this wish for 
independence within the union must not be such as to compromise 
the effectiveness of the union itself./. Great stress is laid 
in each of these plans for the form of the'union on the need’ 
for just representation of each region within the governing,, 
bodies of the proposed state. .Arab nationalist theorists seem, 
moreover, unanimous in their writings in agreeing on the 
principle that the head of the State, the President, should
have very modest personal powers and that each region of the 
union should take turns-in supplying the candidate for this 
position..
The provisional constitution of the United Arab Republic 
is: seen, on- examination,, to be more in contrast than in agree- . 
ment with the apparently widely accepted constitutional theories 
of Arab nationalist writers. Effective power in the Republic 
clearly rests in the hands of the President. Indeed, one 
cannot but consider that the provisional constitution of the 
United Arab Republic seems to be one of the major obstacles 
■ in the way of an effective union of the Arab states. The local 
differences, prides and loyalties of the Inhabitants of the 
various regions of the Arab world seem clearly too strong to 
.■■allow their complete absorbtion into the Republic under this 
form of constitution. When, in the,future, the Provisional 
Constitution of the United Arab Republic is modified, as it 
surely must be, some form of fairly close union between 
some countries of the. Arab world may possibly come into being* 
Without such modification or the use of armed force by the 
U.A.R. to extend its domain, an,eventuality which can, I think, 
be discounted, such a union seems clearly unlikely in the 
forseeable future. One cannot but, I think, agree with A.II. 
Hourani who wrote : "Short of a Communist revolution in the Arab
lands, there does not seem any possibility of creating a
1supra-national State In the Middle East*1 *
1. "Minorities In the Arab World*". Oxford, 1947, P* 120.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
"ARAB NATIONALISM AND RELIGION.
The Arab world as it exists today has,- of course, been the 
birthplace of three of the major religions - Judaism, Christ­
ianity and Islam; consequently there has been, for many 
,centuries, within this area communities belonging to each of 
these three religion. The facts that Judaism is .basically 
opposed to each of'the others and that Christianity accepts' 
only some of the historical tradition of Judaism and considers - 
Islam as simply heretical, has led the communities belonging 
to these religions to maintain a close communal feeling at the 
expense;- of national feeling. The - creation of Israel and the 
absorption within It- of a large .proportion of the Jewish 
communlty from the rest of the Arab wor Id ha s he1pad to soIve - 
this problem in-one sense while, of course, creating far 
greater problems. There is, however, an important and fairly 
large minority of Christian Arabs in several of the Arab 
countries as well as smaller minorities who subscribe to 
various other faiths.’3'*1 Indeed, in one Arab country, the ~ ’
total number of Christians is officially considered to be
2greater than that of ^ thev-Muslims. further-?. complication
!• For a valuable study of this complex problem see:- A.M.
Hourani: "Minorities, in the Arab World", Oxford, 1947.
■ The conclusions the writer draws remain still valid today.
2. The constitution of Lebanon is based on a confessional 
system which assumes that the Christian section of the 
community is in a majority over the Muslim section. This /
■ - assumption is opfenly disputed in Lebanon today, particularly 
by the Muslims* • -
is of course added by the fact that the Muslims themselves 
are split into a number of sects the members of each of which 
look upon all other Muslims as at the best misguided and at the 
worst, infidels.
The Arab nationalist movement seeks to achieve a close 
form of union among all Arabs to achieve the aims of freedom 
from foreign Interference and internal social a,nd economic 
progress. The position of the religious minorities within 
this proposed united Arab state is, of course, of vital 
interest and importance to those who belong to them. The whole 
history of religious intolerance and strife between the various 
religious communities makes these minorities apprehensive of a 
full Arab-Islamic union at the present time. In the simple 
terms in which they express themselves, they fear to be 
‘swallowed up* in one large Islamic state. Arab nationalist 
writers are generally aware of this feeling of fear of the 
minorities and have sought to assuage it by denying the place 
of religion in nationalism; this attitude is, not surprisingly, 
particularly apparent in the works of Christian Arabs who 
support Arab nationalism. Some few writers, in contrast, Ignore 
or at least discount the importance of the minorities and the 
value of their support and maintain that Arab nationalism 
must be built on the basis of the religion of Islam.
Those Arab nationalist theorists who deny the place of 
religion as a factor in the formation of nationalism base
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their reasoning on an assumption that the state and religion 
are and should he completely divorced from one another. They 
maintain that the individual's method of communication with 
G-od and his relations with God are his own personal concern 
and that the interest of the state Is restricted to his 
relationship with the other members of the community. This 
idea is quite contrary to the basic conception of the classical 
shari'ah, * and the institution of the caliphate that the 
state must be formed on the closest of ties with religion and 
that the ruler is God's ‘shadow on earth*. The modern Muslim 
writers who deny this conception of the relationship between 
the state and religion are breaking away from something, for 
the first time in the history of Islam, long accepted, at least 
in theory, as a basis of the political theory of their religion.
The first writer who has examined the place of religion in 
nationalism within the body of contemporary Arab nationalist 
literature is the Christian Arab Constantine Zurayq. In his 
"National (Awakenteg", published in 1939, Dr. Zurayq points
1. The legal system based on the Qufr'an and the traditions 
of the Prophet. The classical system of the sharl‘ah is 
only directly applied in the Arab world today in cases 
concerning personal status, marriage, divorce and so on.
The Arab countries have, In the majority, evolved in recent 
years legal systems which are fundamentally similar to 
those instituted in Europe.
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to the conflict among Arab nationalists who, on th£ one hand, 
look at the whole question of nationalism from a narrow, 
sectarian point of view and those who demand the necessity 
of completely excluding religion from nationalism. He gives 
his opinion that these two attitudes stem from a lack of 
correct distinction between true religious spirit and sectar­
ianism. §e maintains that true nationalism can in no way be 
in conflict with true religion: "for it is in its essence 
nothing other than a spiritual movement seeking to regenerate 
the internal strengths of the nation and achieve its intellect­
ual and spiritual progress, so that the nation can offer its
1 •
share towards the civilisation of the world and its culture."
It is narrow sectarianism that nationalism must fight, in his 
opinion, and not religion. Assuming a fundamental similarity 
between the aims of true nationalism and true religion, he 
concludes that it is the duty of Arab nationalists to go back 
to the original bases of their religions and examine the 
lives of their prophets, to enjoy the spiritual message and 
strength which these will give.
The same subject is examined by the Muslim writer !Abdullah 
al-^AlayilT in his work published in 19^1 and he reaches
!• Op. cit., p« 112*
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conclusions similar to those of Dr. Zurayq. He denies out­
right that unity of religion is a necessary factor in nation­
alism but considers it very desirable to examine the relation­
ship between the two. In his opinion Arab nationalism is not 
capable by itself of achieving any great power and influence 
over people because it lacks symbolic attraction. He points 
out very significantly: "The truth is that when we feel that 
we wish to stimulate and encourage bravery for the sake of 
nationalism, we do not use pure nationalist methods. We 
resort for help sometimes to religion and sometimes to history** 
Nationalism is, then, something basically practical which can 
only be examined from fundamentals to a limited degree. What 
idealistic attraction it does contain is very weak. Nation­
alism itself is very deficient in symbolism and there is no 
solution but to create a symbolic content for it." He 
concludes that the three possible philosophical systems which 
could fulfil the need are either a system based on pure ethical 
beliefs, formalised religion based on a belief in a divine 
Being, or *natural religion*. The first of these is, in his 
opinion unsuitable to supply the necessary basis for nationalism
1. Op. cit., p. 131*
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as it would itself necessarily lack symbolic content and would 
be subject to too violent and rapid changes. These changes, he 
considers, occur as the result of personal changes of opinion 
in the followers of the various schools of philosophy themselves} 
He goes on to examine the suitability of revealed religions 
to supply what is lacking in nationalism; he concludes that 
the mutual animosity of Judaism and Christianity makes them 
obviously unsuitable. The only revealed religion which 
accepts the others is Islam, which would itself prove unaccept­
able to all Arabs as a spiritual basis for nationalism: "l
know that the choice of Islam to be the symbol for nationalism 
or Its religion would undoubtedly and decisively bring about 
the severe opposition of the other religions.1,1 * TNatural 
religion', in contrast, he considers to consist of all those 
factors on which the other schools of thought are agreed —  
the existence of God, the everlastingness of the spirit, 
punishment, reward, good deeds and so on. Based on such 
widely acceptable, and indisputable truths, he considers that:
"It is a suitable symbol to supply a spiritual content to 
nationalism and to bring about the development of its phil-
p
osophy in simplicity and high idealism." * He goes on tb
1. Op. cit., p. 131*
2. Ibid., p. 132.
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explain that acceptance of the so-called "natural religion" 
as the basis for nationalism will not mean the construction 
of a completely new religion, but merely the adaptation and 
use of those elements and philosophies common to all religions* 
He points to the widespread disillusion concerning traditional 
religion in the modern world and blames the differences in the 
religions solely on the religions dignitaries1* : "All the 
disputes which have occurred within the Arab homeland, if we 
examine them basically, have had the fingers of the priests in 
them and have been provoked by them. We say to them in all 
sincerity that all religions have reached agreement on their 
bases and aims and have differed in ways and means only* 
Differences in means are no reason for disagreement; let each of 
us follow his own path to reach Grod."^#
A1 - fAlayilT does not give any specific idea concerning 
how this religious consensus can be achieved nor any further
1* This feeling has for some years been growing in the Arab 
countries. For an expose of the reasoning on which it is 
frequently based see the highly controversial "Min hunna 
nabda1!!." ("From here we start ), by the Egyptian author 
Khalid Muhammad Khalid. Originally banned and later pub­
lished in°Arabic in Cairo^in 194-9? it was translated into 
English by IsmaTll al-Farugl and published by the American 
Council of Learned Societies in Washington in 1953*
2. Op. cit*, p. 133*
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details on what he means by the acceptance of religious 
truths as a spiritual basis for Arab nationalism. It is inter­
esting to observe how Al^AlayilT acknowledges and deplores 
the lack of intellectual and spiritual appeal in nationalism; 
this is in marked contrast to the opinion of those writers 
who consider nationalism to be itself a religion.
We find in this respect that, for example, the Egyptian 
Coptic writer, *Ayadi al-!Abd al*AyadT considers: “Arab 
nationalism is a social entity, political system and religious 
belief. This is because it stands above all sects and is the 
combining force of all religions."1* Similarly, *AlT Nasir 
al-DTn, a Lebanese Druze writing in 194*5* examines the 
criticism of those who consider that a lack of religious unity 
is a factor against Arab nationalism. He replies: "Do not 
these people realise that Arabism is something apart from 
religion and that it is outside the scope of Christianity and 
Islam, since it was founded before either of them and includes 
within itself both Christians and Muslims?"2 * He adds a very 
interesting footnote at the bottom of the page to explain this 
remark: "Arabism is itself a religion for us Arab nationalists; 
it is, nevertheless, a pure nationalist religion. As far as it 
is concerned, paradise exists in this world, just as hell does
1* Op* cit., p. 22.
2. Op. cit. p. 113*
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too. Its call is for what is most valuable in revealed 
religions-their spiritual ideals and v i r t u e s . H e  goes 
on to deny absolutely that unity of religion is a necessary 
factor in the formation of a nationalism; men have existed 
and.tribes formed long before religions were formulated.
The plea on which these writers seem in agreement, that 
accepted religious truths should be comsidered as a fundamental 
basis for Arab nationalist Ideology, does not seem to have 
had any great effect on more recent writers or upon the 
opposition of some religious groups to the movement at the 
present time. The majority of Arab nationalist writers 
today either simply deny any connection between nationalism 
and religion and insist on their continued separation or, 
in contrast, claim that the movement must rely basically 
upon Islam and be considered as a necessary prelude to an 
Islamic union.
The whole question of the position of Islam with regard 
to the Arab nationalism is made more complicated by an 
apparent disagreement among the movements theorists concern­
ing its historic origins. Some nationalist writers lay 
emphasis on the connection between. Arab nationalism and the 
general 'Arab awakening', which is generally considered to
1* Op. cit., p. 118.
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have had a religious "basis and was expressed in such 
movements as the Wahhabi in the Arabian peninsula and in the 
works of the essentially religious reformers Jamal al-Din al- 
Af glaani, Muhammad *Abduh and their followers. They maintain 
that there are the strongest connections between these Pan- 
Islamists and reformers and the contemporary basically 
secularist and political movement seeking Ai^ ab unity. We find, 
for example, that in his work entitled "Ai'abism and Religion" 
Ahmed Hassan al-Baqurl points to a succession of Arab leaders
o o
including ?Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad *&1T, al-AfghahX, Muhammad 
!Abduh and^in the Sudan ;the Mahdl who had all "sought the 
freeing of the Arab mind and Islamic law and their purification 
from the impediments of ignorance and falsehood." "Each of 
them", he writes, "knew his path towards the goal to which 
the Arab nation is sailing. This goal is unity which would
*i
make one nation of these divided peoples." e He goes on to show 
that he considers President Jamal TAbd al-Nasir as following 
in the line of succession of these, with the exception of 
Muhammad fAlT, exclusively Islamic revivalists: "and in the 
shadow of these feelings which emerged from the inspiration 
and glories of Arabism, Jamal *&bd al-Nasir brought about his 
pure and splendid revolution calling on the Arab nation once 
again to play its part in life." * In the same paragraph
1. and 2. "Urubah wa dXn" *. ("Arabism and Religion" )Cairo, 
-1959. P. 68. .
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he refers to President Naslr as a hero "believing in his 
Lord."1,
— * — 1Dr. Fa'Iz Sayigh, a Christian supporter of Arab nation­
alism, disagrees completely with the identification of 
Islamic union with Arab secular, political union and denies 
any historical connection between the two. He maintains that 
the Arab world as a whole, with the exception of Morocco, which 
was never under Ottoman rule, had been administratively united 
by the Ottomans. He considers that this was particularly 
true of the Fertile Crescent. The divisions imposed by the 
Allies on Greater Syria destroyed this unity and took away 
political liberties which Arabs enjoyed under the Turks. He 
concludes : "Accordingly it was the Arabs of the Fertile
Crescent who were destined to utter the first call for Arab
2
Unity in modern times." * He insists that when the idea of 
Arab unity was born: "it bore immediate and primary relevance 
only to the sector of the Arab world which was its cradle,
1. Sati al-Husarl does not agree with al-Baguri in considering 
the Wahhabi movement to have been an expression of Arab 
nationalism. The former wrote: "The Wahhabi revolution was 
primarily a religious movement; it did not therefore have 
any effect worthy of mention in the emergence of the 
nationalist philosophy. "Muhadarat ..." p. 160.
2. "Arab Unity". New York, 1958. p. 50.
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1*namely, the Fertile Orescent/1 * and that it was a movement 
seeking the restoration of a unity only recently lbst. He is 
particularly explicit in his denial that the work of the 
Islamic revivalists in the various parts of the Arab world 
led to the emergence of Arab nationalism: 1 It was not the 
Islamic puritanical revival led by the Wahhabis in the 
Arabian peninsula in the 18th and 19th centuries that evolved 
into the Arab national movement of the 20th century. Nor was 
it the Islamic reformers in Egypt and the Fertile Orescent 
who were the forerunners of the Arab nationalist leaders and 
seers of today. It was rather the 19th century awakening of 
the Fertile Crescent voiced and led by secular Muslim and 
Ghristian writers and theorists and stirred by Western 
stimulents that evolved into the Arab nationalist movement of 
the 20th century.1 8 The difference in attitude towards the 
historical foundations of the movement shown by the Muslim 
writer Al-Baquri, former Minister of Pious Foundations in the 
United Arab Republic and the Ghristian Arab Fa!iz Safigh is
3. ~indeed striking.
1. Ibid., p. 62.
2. Ibid., p. 91.
3. A similar disagreement is shown in the contrasting attitudes 
of contemporary Arab nationalist writers towards the Arab 
Revolt of 1916 against the Turks.
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Sati* al-HussarT examines the place of religion in
? * *
nationalism in his most recent work. After analysing the 
factors in the formation of the various European nationalisms 
and the lack of religious unity in each of them, he concludes 
that unity of religion is not a necessary factor in nationalism. 
An examination of these European nationalisms shows, he writes, 
that£ "unity of nationalism does not follow religions and 
sects. Unity of religion and sect has not guaranteed victory 
over differences in nationalism, nor has any difference of 
religion and sect been able to prevent nationalist unity.
Events have shown that unity of religion is one thing and 
nationalist unity is something else."* The only effect that 
religion had had in the formation of a nationalism is, in his 
opinion, on language, the main unifying factor in nationalism.
In some cases in European history this effect has been positive 
and sometimes negative, but religion itself has never been, he 
maintains, "a factor in the formation of nationalisms." * To 
prove that Arab nationalism does not itself contain religion as 
a fundamental basis, he quotes a number of Arab authorities. 
Despite this denial of religion in Arab nationalism Al-HussarT
4. m
does consider Jamal al-DI’n al-Afgiahi to have been an early 
propagandist of the movement for Arab union and not merely a
1* "Ma hlya al-qaumTyah^" ("What is Nationalism?") Beirut,
1959. P. 190.
2. Ibid., p. 198.
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proponent of the idea of Islamic unity. He states that 
historians have been quite wrong in considering al-Afghanifs 
interest in Islam preponderant over his interest in national­
ism, He quotes al-Afghani as writing: "There Is no happiness 
except in nationalism (al-jinsiyah) and no nationalism 
except with (unity of) language...The two factors which unite 
large groups of people are unity of language and unity of 
religion,.*unity of language is the basis on which nationalism 
stands,,.language is firmer and more long-lasting than religion. 
We know of nations whose religion has changed twice or even 
three times in a thousand years without the recurrence of any 
defect in their language and nationalist unity. We can there­
fore say that the effect of the power of language In this 
world is greater than the unifying effect of r e l i g i o n . T h e  
emphasis shown here on the power bf language as a unifying 
force in al-Afghani's work corresponds with the emphasis shown 
on the same factor in the works concerning nationalism 
written by al-Husari. Prom his examination of the place of 
Islam in Arab nationalism, Sati* al-Husari concludes that 
Islam has certainly had a large part to play. It was, he 
writes, the driving force which led to the Muslim conquests 
which, in turn, broadened the scope of Arab nationalism. It 
was, similarly, the strength of Islam which maintained a
1. Quoted in "ma hiya ai-qaumiyah?” p. 207*
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knowledge of the Arabic language during the centuries of 
stagnation. He concludes, nevertheless, that: "This does 
not mean that Arab nationalism has remained connected with 
Islam; Islamite and yet not Arab nations, have, on the one hand, 
been formed and there are, on the other hand, Arab groups who 
are not Muslims."^*
The Egyptian 0optic Arab nationalist writer, *Ayadi al- 
*Abd al“*Ayadi, examines at considerable length the problem 
of the relationship between the state and religion in Arab 
nationalist philosophy; his attitude may be taken as typical 
of those Ohristians who do support the movement, fte maintains 
strongly that Arab nationalism does not and must not favour 
any particular religious system more than any other and that 
the final form which the philosophy of the movement takes must 
be the result of the effect of all the factors active in the 
Arab world: "The basis of Arabism is mutual understanding 
between the individuals in society and consultation in the 
organisation of the government and the protection of religion 
with regards to its relationship between God and man."2* In 
spite of his frequently reiterated opinion that religion must 
be divorced from the state, he clearly sees Arab nationalism
1. Ibid., p. 249.
2. Op. cit., p. 22.
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itself as a God-given gifts "...Arab nationalism, which
God gave to the leader of freedom and unity the day he drove
the last prop of imperialism of the family of Muhammad ’All
from Egypt in 1952 will never be satisfied without unity and
freedom in all Arab countries." * This conception of Arab
nationalism as a divine gift does not prevent the writer from
insisting that: "Religion is God's affair; Arabism concerns
all," * and that, similarly, "Nationalism is in no way
connected with religion.
The Christian Al- 'Ayadi, clearly feeling the need to
stress that there must be an equal place for Christians with
Muslims in the proposed Arab national union, tries to prove
that the differences between Arabs with these religious beliefs
are merely superficial and not racial. He proves to his own
satisfaction that Arabs and Jews are of the same basic racial
origins and that Christ himself was Jewish and was descended
from Abraham, a Yemeni Arab who emigrated in turn to Iraq,
Palestine and Egypt. He points out that Christ was born and
brought up in Palestine, a part of the Arab world and that
4therefore by both birth and upbringing, Christ was Arab. * He 
discusses, as do so many Arab writers who deny any particular 
religious basis for nationalism, the religious differences
1. Ibid., p. 38.
2. Ibid., p. 57.
3. Ibid., p. 76.
4. Ibid., p. 61*
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which have led throughout history to strife and bloodshed in 
Europe; he strongly affirms that no similar strife must arise 
in the Arab world due to religious differences. He points out; 
"The Christian believes in his homeland, his home and his 
church; the Muslim believes in his homeland, home and mosque. 
They are both, when not in church or mosque, bound to brother­
liness and equality in both rights and duties."**-* There is 
perhaps a note of desperation in the modesty, or alternatively 
the conceit, of the following passage: "Arab nationalism is the 
compassionate mother towards the Christian as well as the 
Muslim. The few, like the small child, is more beloved to its 
mother than is the many or the large child...the small is more 
needy of care so that it grows big, just as the sick man needs
p
care so that he gets well." * is difficult to know how to 
interpret this quotation; it seems to have two quite distinct 
and different interpretations. Al-'Ayadi at first sight seems 
to be merely making a modest plea on behalf of the Christians 
for some share in Arab nationalism and some share of the care 
of the 'mother} state. On the other hand, the stress on the 
fact that the 'mother* shows greater affection for its weakest 
child and the emphasis on the fact that the small child needs 
more care so that it may grow big may be significant. The
1. Ibid., p. 118.
2. Op. cit., p. 118.
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Copts have always in the past, especially during and immed­
iately a.fter the British occupation, enjoyed something of a
privileged position in Egypt and his remarks can be, perhaps,
1.understood to be a plea for the retention of this position.
It seems scarcely credible that the Muslim majority in Egypt 
will be prepared to grant the Coptic minority a position of 
extra care and protection under the State so that this minority 
will be able to grow big and strongI
A number of other recent Arab nationalist writers both 
Christian and Muslim do examine the relationship of religion to 
nationalism, and conclude that there should be no firm connect­
ion between them. Dr. George HannaJ> for example, a Greek 
Orthodox Christian by birth but an atheist Marxist by present 
belief, states this unequivocably in one of his works. He 
points out that although it was the Islamic conquests which 
planted the seeds of Arab nationalism, it was those who were 
concerned with social and national problems who encouraged the 
seed to grow. This, he says, is something of which all should 
become aware —  ignorant Muslims are deluded in thinking they
can exploit nationalism in their favour and deludedChristians
2are mistaken in fearing Arab nationalism. * He discusses the
1. For an account of the nature and importance of the Coptic 
community in Egypt see "Modern Egypt", the Earl of Cromer. 
Edit, of 1911, pp# 616 ^ 625. The Copts enjoyed a monopoly 
in the administration of taxation and accountancy.
2. "Mafna al-gawmiyah," p. 49.
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obstacles and opposition to this movement and concludes that 
religious sectarianism is probably the most important factor 
in the existence of these differences. He writes: "Arab 
nationalism is historical, social reforming and progressive —  
it is a nationalism which is neither sectarian nor religious. 
There is no room in it for strife between those of its citizens 
who worship within Islam and the Christians or any other 
religion."-*'*
The Lebanese Muslim writer Muhammad Majdhub comments on 
the fact that the provisional constitution of the United Arab 
Republic did not contain the previously accepted formula in 
the constitutions of Arab countries to the effect that Islam 
is the religion of the state. He welcomes the change and 
comments: "The U.A.R. is an enlightened and democratic state
in which there is no difference or distinction between religions, 
races or colours...We hope sincerely that the coming permanent 
constitution will consecrate this fine precedent and make of 
the Republic a country free to all sects."
*Abd al-Latif Bhararah, too, agrees wholeheartedly that 
there is no place for religion in the formation of a state. He 
considers that this would: "contradict the nature of human 
history, since there has never been a religion, so long as the
1. Ibid., p. 59.
2. Op. cit., p. 161*
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world has existed, which has not come almost by chance alone 
into the life of the community and been new in the existence 
of the nation, even though the truths which it discloses are 
eternal and everlasting."
Michel 'Aflaq, the Christian Arab leader of the Arab 
Socialist BaTth party, agrees with this opinion that difference 
of religious belief must be given no significance at all 
within Arab nationalist society. He examines the question 
from the Socialist point of views "When we call for economic 
equality and equality of opportunity, this means that we have 
agreed that the Arab countries must be entrusted to their 
rightful owners, the individual people themselves. They are 
essentially a unit, with no distinctions between Muslim, 
Christian, Arab, Kurd and Berber. It would be ridiculous 
indeed for nationalism to be socialist and yet at the same time 
sectarian; for socialism is, in its philosophy, opposed to all 
distinctions and exploitation and the power of one group over 
others."^* He goes on to maintain that the religious minor­
ities have nothing at all to fear from the Arab nationalist 
union and that group sectarian feelings have been deliberately 
manufactured and encouraged by imperialists in an effort to
1. "Pi al-qawmlyah al-farabiyahu, p. 37*
2. "Fi sabil al-bafth", p. 116.
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put obstacles In the way of nationalism*
•Aflaq’s Insistence so clearly expressed here on the need 
to ensure complete equality between the members of the religious 
communities;;!!! Arab nationalism seems to contrast remarkably 
in emphasis with what he wrote some thirteen yearB previously, 
in 194-3* In a speech delivered in that year in the Syrian 
University in honour of the memory of the Prophet Muhammad, he 
stressed the part that Islam had to play in strengthening Arab 
nationalism* He stated his belief that the concept of the need 
to divorce religion from the affairs of the state was applicable 
In Europe, where Christianity is essentially a foreign belief 
expressed in foreign languages and which had gradually bedome 
accepted with the passage of time, but that this concept was 
quite inapplicable in the Arab world. Islam, expressed in 
Arabic and taught b}*- an Arab is, he wrote, an inalienable part 
of Arab cultural expression* He concludedi "The relationship 
between Islam and Arabism is, therefore, unlike the relation­
ship between other religions and nationalisms. The Christian 
Arabs will realise in the future, when their nationalism has 
become fully conscious within them..*that Islam is for them a 
national culture which they must digest and enjoy until they 
(or so that they) understand, love and desire Islam as they 
desire the most precious thing in their nationalism.fl^ #
1. nfi sabil al-ba'th," p. 50
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Wo Arab nationalist work that I have read condemns and 
refuses belief in the existence of God and everlasting li'fre 
and the other beliefs common to Christianity, Islam and Judaism. 
Indeed, the majority do maintain that spiritual beliefs of this 
nature are of the essence of Arab nationalism and that mater­
ialism is something which must be fought by the movement; in this 
particular as in others, Arab nationalism comes into direct 
conflict with communism, Mchel !Aflaq makes his own position 
very clear towards materialism and atheism. He considers that 
religion is basically indispensable to mankind and that what 
differences have arisen between groups and individuals on 
religious grounds have been the result of misappreciation of 
the differences between the essence of religious belief common 
to all religions and their differing outward forms. In this
respect it is seen that !Aflaq is in complete agreement with
— — 1Zurayq and al~fAlayili, * although he goes on to show that his 
ideas on what constitute these beliefs have a difference in 
emphasis and stress on revolutionary, social reform. He 
considers, apparently, that the essence of all religions is a 
revolutionary spirit tbwards social and economic justice. He 
expresses the opinion that religious reformers have always 
been revolutionaries fighting against exploitation. The
1. See this chapter above, p. \~IZ- tV seq.
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misappreciation of religion has, he considers, grown among 
intellectuals and progressives because they observe the 
religious groups as part of the established order opposed to 
revolutionary change. Michel !Aflaq agrees with some of the 
criticisms of the religious priestly classes but is convinced 
that religion Is so vitally necessary a factor in life that it 
will triumph in the end. He is particularly deliberate in 
pointing out that he in no circumstances agrees with atheism 
itself: "We neither agree with atheism nor encourage atheism.
We consider atheism a false attitude to adopt in life, a stupid, 
harmful and dishonest attitude. For, life means belief and 
the atheist Is a liar. He says something and believes something 
else. He believes In something, believes In some principle.
We look upon atheism as a manifestation of sickness, of which 
the causes must be known so that it can be treated. We do not 
look upon it as an evil which must be destroyed; this would 
not weaken atheism but would strengthen it."^4
Wot all contemporary Arab writers who support the idea of 
Arab unity agree necessarily that the proposed state must be 
completely divorced in its form from religion and that religion 
is not a factor on which nationalism can be built. Ahmad Salid,
c 7
for example, when discussing the bases on which nationalism 
must be built, places the religious belief of the people as
1. "Fi sabil al~Bafth, p. 206.
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the first of these: “These bases are, first: “a people who
still believe - in contrast to the majority of peoples today *-
1 •
in God, his religions, his power and the other life,1
Several writers who propa^and for an Arab national union 
stress openly the particularly strong position of Islam in the 
Arab countries and maintain that the union must be constructed 
on this religious foundation* In a book published in 1950 
under the joint authorship of a Pakistani, Muhammad Hassan4 u
al-A’Zami and fAbd al-Karim Muhammad, who seems likely to 
be a Muslim Brother from the frequent references to this 
movement, one finds the most extreme emphasis placed on Islam. 
Arab unity is seen, indeed, merely as a prelude to a full 
Islamic union* It is, I think, surprising to find that even 
at this comparatively late date the writers can visualise as 
practicable a close union joining all the Muslim countries 
in matters concerning economic, political and military 
organisation: “If Arab union were realised, the Arabs would have 
made another step forward and the other Islamic countries would 
join up with it in a general union which would form the Islamic 
league. This would link up the Muslim countries and regions 
and would strengthen the ties between them and unify their 
policies and systems. When eventually the links'1, become strong 
and the cultures, legal systems and all forms of scientifict
1* Op. cit., p. 260.
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economic, military and political systems are unified, then at 
that time will Islamic union in its full meaning have heen
n
accomplished." * The authors go on to say how, when such a 
union is completed, - which they see in the comparatively near 
future, - there will have come into existence a third world 
bloc: “This third bloc is the Islamic league which is neither 
Eastern communist nor Western capitalist, but is rather Islamic 
and Qur*anic. The Islamic bloc alone can maintain the inter­
national balance of power, accomplish equality and spread 
world peace in which both the League of Nations and the United 
Nations have failed. # This optimistically important role 
of the proposed Islamic league is not confined to merely pol­
itical affairs. Indeed, the authois point out that a basic 
purpose of the League will be to spread the light of Islam 
to all mankind: “The Muslims will then be able to steer the 
ship of humanity to the shore and the land of peace; they
1* "al-wah&dah filal-sharq." ("Unity in the East.") Beirut, 
1950,*p, 55* This passage is enclosed in quotation marks 
in the original and seems likely to have come from a 
pamphlet issued by the Muslim Brotherhood. The authors 
consider the Muslim Brotherhood to have been the first 
movement seeking Islamic unity and that it was instrumental 
in the successful formation of the Arab League. Both these 
claims seem dubious in the extreme. For an exposition of 
the history and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood see: 
"al-ikhwan al-muslimun. ("The Muslim Brethej’n" .) by 
Ishaq Musa Husaini. Beirut, 1952. Published"in English 
in4Beirut in 1956.
2. Ibid., p. 56
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will then be able to light up the path of truth, freedom, 
justice, brotherhood and true equality to the misled, troubled 
world and bring happiness to all humanity with the light of 
Islam and the wisdom of the Qur*an and the guidance of the 
best of men.” * It is interesting to observe how similar 
are the attitudes of both secular and religious propagandists 
of Arab nationalism towards the position of the Arabs with
p
respect to the East-West conflict^* and the part the Arabs 
have to play in civilising the world* They both stress the 
value of their bloc as a mediating force and 1 third world 
power1 and are convinced of the ability of the unified state, 
whether Islamic or secular, to be of real value in correcting 
the wrongs of the modern world, ^t is also of interest to 
observe that the above two writers give the following main 
reason for the achievement of the proposed Islamic union:
"The necessity to reach agreement among all Muslims and to 
unify their aims has become imperative so that they can 
free themselves from the chains which the imperialists have
■X
imposed upon them.' This purpose of the union, to free the 
peoples within it from foreign influence and pressure, is, 
of course, the main agreed aim of the proponents of the secular 
Arab nationalist union*
1* Ibid., p. 57*
2. See Chapters Six and Seven above.
3. Op. cit., p. 51*
That the plan for the formation of the Arab Union 
suggested, and supported by the late King TAbdullah of Trans­
jordan laid no small stress on Islam is shown by his Instruct­
ions sent to the Trans-Jordanian delegate at the Cairo con­
ference of the Foreign ministers of the Arab states held In 
February, 194*5 • He lays emphasis on the strength which Arab 
unity would give to all Muslim countries: "Arab Union, if 
combined with unrestricted freedom, sovereignty and military 
independence, will support and strengthen the ancient 
democratic states which with their majority of Muslim subjects, 
have kept alive a flourishing Muslim culture from the beginning 
of our era to the present day."’*'*
Muhammad Darwazah writing in 1958, is one of the small 
group of contemporary Arab nationalist writers who lay partic­
ular emphasis on the place of Islam within the proposed all 
Arab union. His ideas are seen to be very similar to those 
of the proponents of the Islamic league. He considers that 
although religious unity is not absolutely necessary for the 
accomplishment of political union, such a union can be more 
easily achieved if there is a religious unity already 
existent. He points out that no less than 93% of the 
inhabitants of the Arab countries are bound by the religious
1* Quoted in "The Memoirs of King !Abdullah of Trans-Jordan",, 
edited by Philip P. Graves, London, 1950. p. 256.
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ties of Islam and that the various sub-sects of Islam are
seen to agree on all the most basic tenets of their religion.
He moreover maintains that these inter-Muslim variations in
belief are merely the result of the existence of differing
forms of government in the separate Arab countries. A new
society of sincere men who realise the superficiality of these
differences and their danger to Arab nationalism will, in his
opinion, arise to remove these differences. More widespread
education will, he considers, make the differences between the
beliefs of Muslims less important and he concludes that in no
more than several generations a spiritual Muslim unity will
1
have been formed. *
Turning his attention to the fact that there are some two 
and a half million Christians in the Arab countries, he gives 
his opinion that the ties of race, history and language are 
greater by far than the religious differences between them 
and the Muslims. He stresses, in any case, the basic 
similarities between the two religions in their aims and
principles and sees no reason for conflict between the follow-
2
ers of each religion within the proposed Arab state. * He 
gods on to point out that Arab unity is an ‘Islamic necessity* 
as well as a need for a humanity. He quotes passages from the
1. nAl-wahdah al-‘arabiyah.1 pp. 76-77.
2. Ibid., p. 31/2.
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Qur'an exhorting unity and promising the Arabs, if obedient, 
a position of strength and Influence among nations* He 
concludes: "If the Arabs play this great role which the Qur'an 
has made clear for them, the principles of Islam would become 
the religion of all humanity...The Arabs would become its 
standard bearers and light of guidance; they would thus achieve 
greater power among the nations and would be as the Qur'an 
described them?: the best nation which has emerged to mankind."*1'* 
The extreme optimism shown here is typical of the attitude of 
many Arab nationalist writers towards the various problems of 
the contemporary Arab world.
* What is, in my opinion, particularly extraordinary is the 
fact that the proponents of Islamic unity can be sure of their 
cause even when they do appreciate the enormous difficulties 
in the way of achieving such a union as they envisage. *Abd 
al-Karim Muhammad and Muhammad Hassan al-A'zami give six basic
tl s. , * '
reasons for the fact that Islamic unity, unlike political 
Arab unity, has received no official acknowledgement from the 
governments of Muslim countries. These cfifficulties are listed 
as follows 5 1 )Islamic unity is something which effects a 
far greater number of countries than does Arab unity and the 
movement has been subjected to a fiercer attack by the 
imperialists than that directed to Arab unity. 2) The fact
1. Ibid., p. 113.
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that Its "best proponents have been transferred to 1 higher 
posts1 * before they have completed their work and their 
successors are therefore forced to begin from the beginning.
3) Divergences of opinion and the multiplicity of political 
and sectarian differences. 4) The lack of a common language 
of communication between Islamic countries. 5) The great 
distances between these countries and inefficiency in means of 
communication leading to the impossibility of obtaining wide­
spread support for this idea. 6) The lack of maturity in 
religious consciousness, multiplicity of the political and
national movements and the engrossment of each country in its 
2 •
own affairs. * One had, I think, to agree with the majority 
of these reasons given for the failure; little progress seems 
to have been made in the last ten years, since this work was 
published, in overcoming the difficulties of the movement for 
Islamic unity.
The great divergence of opinion and confusion shown in the 
works of Arab nationalist writers concerning the relationship 
between religion and state in the desired Arab union are 
effectively demonstrated in a recent article written by Dr. 
Jamil Kubbah in a special edition of the Beirut magazine "Arab 
Culture" devoted to a discussion of Arab nationalism. After
1. The meaning of this remark is not clarified in the source.
2. Op. cit., p. 51*
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briefly examining classical Islamic legal theories concerning 
religion and state and the application of these theories today, 
he concludes that: "Nationality is completely Independent from 
the religion of the state, Whether the state religion is Islam 
or other than Islam, the nationality of Its inhabitants does 
not have to be Islamic or other than Islamic. The state 
religion is one thing and the nationality of Its citizens is 
something else."1*
Two pages later,"however, when the same author attempts 
to formulate conclusive principles which should be followed 
in defining who should enjoy Arab nationality, he states; "Arab 
nationality should be conferred on every Arab individual who 
believes in his nation and is one of the elements in its 
formation. It will not be right for Lebanese Jews or any 
other group which does not belong to the Arab nation to hold 
Arab nationality. In addition to this, these people should be 
completely deprived of the rights given to citizens of Arab 
origin holding Arab nationality; they should In particular be 
denied the right to express any opinion on problems connected 
with the life of the nation and its mission." * A more direct
1. "al-thigafah al~!arabiyah", January, 1959* P* 50.
2, Ibid., p. 52. This remark seems to advise the exclusion of, 
for example, the important Armenian community from Arab 
nationality and Arab state affairs.
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and uncompromising denial of the rights of minorities to j
express an opinion in the conduct of the state in which they 
live could scarcely be imagined*
The lack of agreement concerning the relationship 
between religion and Arab nationalism so clearly shown through­
out contemporary Arab nationalist literature is apparent, too, 
in the official or semi-official publications issued in the 
United Arab Republic at the present time. The government of 
this state clearly wishes to obtain support for its Arab 
nationalist policies from as many of its citizens as it can. 
While the Muslims are the clear majority of the population in 
both regions, the Christian and other minority groups are not 
negligable in either their size or influence. There are, I 
think, two distinct trends discernible in these publications 
in the U.A.R. today concerning the relationship between religion 
and Arab nationalism. The first of these trends is to represent 
Arab nationalism and Islam as nearly synonymous; the sedond, 
which seems to contradict the first, is to deny absolutely that 
Arab nationalism gives any preference to Islam or any other 
religion.
That Jamal fAbd al-Uasir attaches very great importance 
to the 'circle of Islam* surrounding the Arab countries is 
clearly demonstrated both in his published work the "Philosophy
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of the Revolution" and in his speeches.1. He lays very 
great emphasis on the need to take full political advantage 
of such opportunities as are offered by, for example, the 
pilgrimage to Mecca to coordinate the political policies of 
the Muslim countries.^* The facts that he has frequently 
used the words "Arabism and Islam" in direct and obvious 
connection in his speeches, that he has referred to the 
Egyptian struggle against imperialism as a holy war^ ,* and 
that he has at times stressed a similarity between the 
conditions in the Arab world in the 7th century and the 
present day all seem to indicate that he does not feel any 
sharp distinction between Arab nationalism and Islam. He is, 
indeed, considered by some Arabs to be the leader of Islam 
as well as of Arab nationalism. No less a journal than the
1* See Chapter Sight above, pp.2/W eV
2, In the early Autumn of 1954 an 1Islamic Congress1 was 
instituted under the Secretaryship of an ex-Muslim 
Brother and original member of the Revolutionary 
Command Council which ruled Egypt in the months following 
ffZPtian revolution of 1952. This man, Col. Anwar
1 S» /I' aut^or °f a,)^ ook> al-thaurah *ala al-
nil* ( Revolt over the Nile ), Cairo, 1956(?) and
published in an English translation in London, In 1957, 
illuminates clearly the characters of the Free 
Officers who brought about the coup d * etat * The Islamic 
Congress has held annual conferences in various Arab 
countries since its formation*
3* See Chapter Eight above, p.2>oi.
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"Majallah al-Azhar" the official publication of the University 
of al~Azhar, the most respected seat of Islamic learning in 
the world, issued a special edition in mid-1958 which opens 
with a full-page portrait of President Nasir. The portrait 
bears the caption: "The leader of Arabism and of Islam President 
Jamal *Abd al-Nasir."1* He is referred to not infrequently in 
various editions of the same journal and elsewhere as the 
"pious young man", (al-shab al-mu’min)Muhib al-DIn al-IhattTb 
refers to him as a man sent by G-od: "Then God sent us this 
member of the Qurah tribe in good Uppex* Egypt and he addressed 
Egypt: "You are Ax^ ab, neither 3IIastern or Western."2 *
The recent trend in this Islamic magazine, which has a very 
wide circulation throughout the Muslim world, to concern itself 
more and more with purely political questions, may, perhaps, 
be taken to indicate the desire of the government of the U.A.R. 
to win support on political issues through the means of Islam. 
The magazine^ increasing consciousness with political affairs
is particularly marked since the appointment of Ahmad Hassan* %
al-Zayat as its editor in early 1959? be has himself published 
a number of articles in the magazine which are almost exclusively 
political in nature. Of these we find, for example, an article
1. Vol. 50, No. 4 of 1958
2. Vol. 30, No. 6 of 1958
in the edition for November 1959 entitled "Woe to Iraqi” 
in which he attacks the present-day political leaders of that 
state in the most violent language.*^* Similar articles have 
appeared in the magazine recently attacking communism and 
imperialism while stressing the power of Arab nationalism and
the wisdom of the policy of positive neutrality for* the Arabs.
The Rector of the University of al-Azhar in Gairo,
Muhammad Shaltut, has published a pamphlet in which he seems
to make clear that in his opinion the words 1Muslim1 and *Arab!
are mutually comprehensive. He writes 5 ”The Arabic Qur^an,
just as it made non-Muslims into Muslims, so did it too make
2 .
non-Arabs into Arabs. ‘ many non-Arab peoples became with
Islam and the Qur’an Arabs I And how many non-Islamic peoples 
became with the Qur’an through the medium of the Arabic 
language Islamic! In this way Arabism and Islam came together 
in the sea of this culture which the Qur'an constructed; they
mixed together and became a unity, from which neither part 
may be separated.
This assumption of an indivisibility between Arab nation­
alism and Islam seems therefore clear in respected publications
1. "Ya hasrata fala al-Iraq!" Vol. 31, No. 4.
2. The underlining is in the'original.
3. "risalah al-Azhar." ("The Mission of al-Azhar.") 
published in August 1959, p* 10.
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appearing in the U.A.R. today* In complete contrast to 
this, we find that the official policy of the U.A.H., as 
expressed in the U.A.R. Yearbook for 1959> seems to strongly 
deny that Islam has any specially privileged position over 
other religions in Arab nationalism. The second chapter of 
t M s  work, which is entitled f,Arab Nationalism" deals, 
in some seven thousand words, with the history of the Arabs 
from pre-Islam ■ftp to the present day. ^t is curious and 
significant to observe that in this chapter the word Islam 
is only mentioned twice and completely without emphasis; the 
Q,urlan and the Prophet Muhammad are not referred to at all.
The following passage, which is typical of the style of the 
whole article, refers obviously to the Islamic Conquests and 
yet the words Arab nationalism are substituted for the Implied 
and expected word Islam: "When Arab nationalism became known
for all the benevolent and strong characteristics that so 
clearly marked it, many of the neighbouring peoples who 
were suffering greatly under the tyrannic rule of either the 
Persians or the Homans turned towards this new nationalism 
hoping for justice, for freedom, for the end of tyranny, 
intrigue and destructive disunity." # The article goes on,
1. Op. cit., p. 12.
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again referring clearly to the early stages of the Arab- 
Islamic Empire: "Another objective of Arab nationalism, even 
in the very early stages of its existence was to lay the 
ethical and social foundations of its society in a world that 
was being torn with discord and which tottered on the verge 
of disintegration and utter decay*"'1’* In the Arabic edition 
of the Yearbook, which differs considerably in this section 
from the English edition, the denial of any special plaice for 
Islam in the formation of the Arab nation is even more strongly 
expressed: "No origin ('unsur) was given preference over any 
other, no connections of blood 'or race were given distinction 
over others, no religion was differentiated from any other 
religion and so the homeland became one." * This statement, 
which denies any special place for Muslims of pure Arab blood 
In the administration of the Arab-Islamic Empire, is a revol­
utionary contradiction of what is normally considered to be 
historical fact. It is difficult in the extreme to reconcile 
what Is known concerning the privileged position of Arab Muslims 
over both non-Arab Muslims and non-Muslim Arabs in the systems 
of taxation which prevailed throughout the time of both the 
Umayyad and fAbbasid Caliphates.*^*
11 in. y  M u .......... . >r 1 ■ ■■- ■ f "...........-  
!• Ibid.
2. "Yearbook for 1959*1 Arabic edition, p, 24.
3* See, for example, the articles under the words "jizyah", 
"kharaj" and "ushr" in tfee "Encyclopedia of Islam" as 
well as the passages which examine the subject of the 
relationship between the Arab ruling class&the "pro­
tected peoples" (dhimmis) in any of the accepted works 
of the Western orientalists concerning Arab history.
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The relationship between religion and Arab nationalism 
is, indeed, a complicated one about which it is extremely 
difficult and of doubtful value to generalise. Certain trends 
and attitudes may, however, I think be observed from a study 
of contemporary Arab nationalist writings. All the Christian 
writers who have published wbrks In support of Arab unity, 
and they form by no means an insignificant group in both 
numbers and influence, are, as is not surprising, agreed 
that formalised and sectarian religion should not under any 
circumstances be considered a basis of natiohalism. This is 
the agreed attitude of both the Arab Bafth Socialist party 
and of the "Movement of Arab N a t i o n a l i s t s " i n  both of 
which the Christian element is exceptionally strong.
The Muslim writers who support Arab nationalism are clearly
divided into those who, like al-Alayili, Sati1 al-Husari,
Muhammad Majdhub and *Abd al-Latif Shararah, maintain the 
necessity of separating the state from particular religious 
beliefs and an apparent minority who consider that Arab unity
would be a necessary prelude to Islamic unity which would,
in their opinion, be in turn a prelude to the acceptance of
Islam as the ’world religion. Although this latter group are
in a numerical minority of Arab nationalist writers their
1. Bee Introduction pp.iq~t-o
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attitude may well be expressive of a widespread popular 
understanding of the significance of the words 'Arab nation­
alism*. The words "al-'urubah wa al-Islam" (,lArabism and 
Islam'*) are so very frequently used in such direct connection 
in the Arab world today that any distinction in the minds of 
some Arabs between the two seems extremely fine.'*’*
The propagandists of Arab nationalism are almost without 
exception agreed that the movement must uphold those principles 
on which they consider that all religions are based. An 
optimism which is so evident in many aspects of Arab nation­
alism is well exemplified in the attitude of the proponents of 
Arab unity towards differences of religious dogma and belief. 
They tend to deny absolutely the importance of these differ­
ences and even seem to assume that they do not really exist 
at all.
There seems to be no evidence that any significant number 
of Arab nationalist writers can be considered to be atheist 
or 'materialists 1• Some Arab nationalist writers do, however* 
consider that revolutionary change in matters of religion are 
very desirable. These writers are openly critical of the
1* Wilfred Cantwell Smith is of the same opinion: ’’...the
distinctive quality of their modern Arablsm Is integral to 
their particular version or instance of present-day Islam. 
Insight into the Arabs' contemporary crisis and insight 
into the characteristic Arab form of the faith today, can­
not but go hand in hand." "Islam In Modern History." 
Princeton, 1957, P* 93*
considerable power of the religious dignitaries in the Arab 
world. It may well be, too, that, stimulated by outside 
influences, Arab intellectuals may become increasingly critical 
of the dogmanof Islam and indeed of all religious belief.
In spite of the predominant demand apparent in Arab 
nationalist literature of the last twenty years for an Arab 
union in which church and state are clearly separated, one 
has, I think, to bear an important point in mind. Earlier 
Arab nationalist theorists, In whose work this emphasis is 
particularly evident, were trying to gain acceptance for 
an idea which was comparatively new and had little popular 
support. The movement was in those days essentially reliant 
upon the support of intellectuals alone, who no doubt were 
anxious to alienate as few Arabs as possible from any aspect 
of the movement and to gain support from anyone who would 
give it. If an effective Arab union is formed, however, 
and the movement retains its recently acquired widespread 
popular support, it may well be found convenient to stress 
Islam to a greater degree. It is interesting to observe that 
Fa'Iz Sayigh, the well-known Palestinian Christian Arab 
nationalist Writer, forsees this as a possibility, although 
merely one of several; "perhaps the resurgence of traditional 
Islam, embodied today in such movements as the Muslim Brother­
hood in its infinite variations and animated largely by
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political reaction to the political deeds or misdeeds of 
the West5 may eventually suffocate the secular ideas of 
nationalist Arabism and emphasise the Islamic ingredients 
inherent in its origin and somewhat dormant in its present 
reality.1* * The lack of distinction shown between Arabism 
and Islam so clearly evident in the publications, both 
secular and religious of the U.A.R. today, seems to indicate 
that these remarks may well prove justified.
1* Op. cit., p. 93.
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CHAPTER SIX!'
ARAB NATIONALISM AMD THE WEST.
ZIOMISM AMD DEMOCRACY."
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In the eyes of the majority of contemporary Arab nationalist
writers the history of the relationship between the Arabs
and the West has been one of direct collision since the
Napoleonic invasion of Egypt at the close of the 18th century*'5'
The Arabs, in a state of decadence and retrogression since
the fall of the *Abbasids, have been in turn invaded by the
Mongols, the Ottomans and the countries of Western Europe.
The later Invaders brought with them ideas and influences
which were completely new to the Arabs and considered it
necessary for their own interests to place the Arabs under
direct rule of varying degrees of stringency. Inevitably this
domination was unacceptable and hateful to the Arabs and the
last decades have seen them striving in each area of the Arab
world to free themselves from the individual occupying powers.
With the achievement of this freedom in the majority of the 
area, there has developed a strong movement seeking to unite
1* c.f. Nusaibah, op. cit., p. 35* “The Napoleonic episode 
did not, in itself, awaken national consciousness from its 
torpor in the Arab countries as It did in Europe, but it 
set rolling that process of direct and sustained Western­
ization which has since encompassed the entire world and 
cast it into the Western mould. It initiated a chain of 
events and ideas, the latter in their totality constituting 
modern Arab nationalism.1
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all Arabs into one state with the agreed aim to bring them 
back to what they consider was a unity and influence they 
enjoyed in the early days of Islam,
It is not surprising that there are strong traces of an
animosity which comes close to xenophobia in the present-day 
attitude of the Arab towards the Western nations which have 
directed or attempted to direct their affairs in the last 
years. The literature of the contemporary Arab nationalist 
movement gives strong evidence of these feelings of distrust 
and open hatred. Arab nationalist writers base their hatred 
for the Western imperialists on the grounds that these nations 
helped to split up the Arab world into various separated, 
political entities and dominated these entities economically 
and militarily, that they created or helped to create the 
State of Israel from a part of the Arab homeland and that they 
have so far successfully opposed the Arab nationalist movement 
which seeks a political union between all parts of the Arab
world. The Arabs are not exclusively critical, however, of
all the influences of the Western World; a minority of Arab 
nationalist writers do, in their works, give some credit to 
the material benefits which the West has brought with its 
other influences as well as to the stimulus which the Arabs
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have received from Western political and social philosophy.
A large majority of Arab nationalist writers see the 
Western Powers as diametrically opposed to Arab nationalist 
unity. To substantiate their thesis they point to the fact 
that the Arab revolt of 1916 was begun under false pretences 
and the fact that the signing of the Sykes-Picot agreement in 
1916 (^ irgned) between Britain, France and Russia came only 
shortly after agreement had been reached with the Sharif of 
Mecca, guaranteeing allied assistance in setting up independent 
Arab rule in the majority of Greater Syria, Mesopotamia and 
the Hejaz. They maintain that British and Prench policies of 
the time were deliberate and planned treachery. From these 
days onwards, they consider, the Western powers have remained 
determined to prevent the Arabs from uniting. Even the 
creation of the Arab League in 1945 which several Arab writers 
recognise to have come into existence as a result of the 
initiative taken by the British Foreign Minister Eden in his 
speech in the House of Commons in 1941, is considered by 
contemporary Ara£) nationalist writers to have been a deliberate 
obstacle placed in the way of Arab union and to maintain the 
status quo. Ahmad 6a1id, making clear that this is his 
belief, sees the imperialists acting in direct alliance with 
the forces of reactions ,rBritain and with her Prance, was 
able, by means of their helpers, the rulers of some Arab
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countriess to impose a charter on the League which made its
assembly incapable of taking any unanimous decision - as the
charter makes obligatory » against the imperialists, by
reason of the presence of the reactionary forces acting in
concert with the imperialists at the heads of the Arab
countries, from the majority of which the Arab League was 
1
f o r m e d , *
There are frequent references in contemporary Arab 
nationalist literature to the League as a British idea and 
invention put into effect solely to serve the interests of 
the Allies. Indeed Arab nationalist literature as a whole 
seems to depict British policy throughout this century as, 
on the one hand, open support for Arab unity and, on the 
other, discreet yet effective opposition to it. Kemal 
Jumblat, for example, the Lebanese Druze leader, refers to 
apparent British support for Arab nationalism in 19515 while 
he maintains that at that time Britain was in fact opposing 
the movement; "Everyone will recall that it was British 
foreign policy at that time to call for assistance for &rab- 
ism and to spread the philosophy of union; it called on its 
agents and friends to demonstrate in its favour as much as they 
could, while at the same time secretely and in fact working 
for the destruction of Arab nationalism itself and either to 
retard its progress or make it correspond with Britain's 
lm Op. cit., p# 50/l.
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interest in the East |
The creation of the State of Israel in Palestine in 1948 
had an enormous effect on the minds of Arabs and did much 
to make more bitter the relations between the Arabs and the
West* The Arab defeat in the Arab-lsraeli war, despite their
p  i
reputed superiority in numbers, * was a crushing blow to Arab |
pride. As well as this, the Arabs look upon Israel as a
great and powerful danger In the midst of their homeland*
They refer to speeches by Zionist leaders which make plain 
that it is Zionist intention to expand in all directions 
inland* The Arabs have a living and genuine fear of this expan­
sion and this fear may, I think, be considered to account 
to a large extent for what inter-Arab cooperation there has 
been since 1948.^*
An important effect of the Arab-lsraeli war and the Arab
1* Op. cit *, p* 27*
2. Apparent Arab superiority in numbers of armed men in the 
1948 Arab-lsraeli war is disputed by Gen. Sir John Glubb 
in his autobiography nA Soldier With the Arabs." London, 
1957, P. 94.
3* Note the comment, however: "One immediate effect of the
failure in the Palestine war on Egyptian political thinking 
was outright denunciation of pan-Arabism. Inter-Arab 
cooperation and solidarity were considered to have failed 
a vital test*" Anwar G. Ghejne, Art. "Egyptian A^ fofeitudes 
Towards pan-Arabism*" M.E.J. Bummer 1957, p. 253.
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defeat was the conviction horn in Arahs that their leaders 
were inefficient and corrupt and had acted in a manner which 
was in the worst interests of the Arab cause. An intense 
dissatisfaction with the social and governmental institutions 
existing in the Arab world was the diredt result and had 
a great effect in convincing the Arabs of the need for rev­
olutionary change. The emphasis on this need for rapid 
change in Arab nationalist literature is to a large extent 
attributable to the effect on the Arab mind of the creation 
of Israel and their conviction that they will only succeed 
in defeating Zionism if and when they strengthen themselves 
by reform within a political union, Arab nationalist writers 
refer to the creation of Israel, almost without exception, as 
a deliberate act of opposition on the part of the West to 
the growing movement towards Arab unity* Muhammad Majdhub's 
comment is typical; he considex^s that Israel was created 
primarily to divide Syria from Egypt. He concludes, in a 
section of his work devoted to an examination of the Arab 
policy of positive neutrality and the strategic importance of 
^SyP't Syria, whether separated or in union; "The setting
up of Israel in the heart of Arabism seeks, in the first place, 
to separate Syria from Egypt. The United States and Britain 
and the other imperialist countries of the West would not
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support this growing state established by force with both 
arms and declarations except in order to break up the supports 
of freedom-seeking Arab nationalism, which is represented in 
the freedom-movements in Syria and ICgypt." ^  *
The reasons for the Arab opposition to the idea of the 
creation of a ’national home for the Jewish people1 in Pales­
tine are obvious and well known. They were well stated, for 
example, in the speeches of the delegates to the conference
called by the Arab Committee for the Defence of Palestine in
2 .
Bludan in Syria in 1937* # I1!1® Arab fears of the power potent­
ial of a stabilised Jewish state of Israel were reiterated by 
Constantine Zurayq in his book published in 1948. He wrote: 
"If a Jewish state were in fact created in Palestine and 
established itself Internationally with the recognition of the 
United Nations and the other nations it would in a short time 
have the greatest air power in the Middle East. It would, too 
--may God prevent it —  have a merchant and naval fleet which
1* Op. cit., p. 73
2. Of the representatives at this conference a total of three 
came from Egypt and North Africa, nine from Iraq, some 
fifty from Lebanon, thirty from Trans-Jordan, eighty from 
Palestine and over one hundred from Syria. The conference 
was called to unify Arab efforts in opposing Zionism 
in Palestine. The speeches delivered at the conference 
are reported in a book: "Kitab al-Mu'tamar", edited by 
Fu’ad Khalil Mufarij, published in Damascus in 1938. The 
book is prefaced with the words: ‘'Palestine belongs to 
the Arabs, not to the Palestinians alone 11
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would be able to exert their influence over all these shores... 
This state would open its doors to the thousands of emigrants 
who would come to it from Europe as well as to the millions 
of dollars which would flow to it from America. It would become 
a human and financial power which it would be difficult to 
confine to its own area.”1*
In spite of this apparent awareness of the power of 
Zionism, only a small minority of Arab nationalist writers at 
the present time accept the desire of the Jews to form their 
own state and their consequent pressure on the Allies as
p
important factors in Israel’s creation. Arab nationalist 
writers are content, in the majority, to refer to Israel as 
merely a fabrication of the Western Powers. They place the 
blame most of all on the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent 
on the United States; Russia’s early acknowledgement of the 
existence of Israel, although sometimes condemned, is not 
stressed in the majority of contemporary works in support of 
Arab nationalism.^* The typical attitude expressed in these
1* "ma’nah al-teakbah.” (nThe Meaning of the Disaster.”) Beirut, 
1948, p. 83.
2. There are obvious psychological and tactical reasons for the 
apparent refusal of some Arab nationalist writers to see the 
history of the creation of Israel in a realistic historical 
context•
3. Similarly, Communist supply of Israeli forces with arms 
and aircraft at the time of the “Second Truce” in Nov.
1948 is not condemned. See Lt. Gen. J. Glubb: Op. cit., 
p. 191.
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works towards the British role in the creation of Israel 
is well expressed in a book published under the joint author­
ship of Nablh Amin Faris and Muhammad Taufiq Hussain, both
*  r
of whom have taught at the American University of Beirut.
They write : “Britain used its mandate over Palestine to
facilitate Zionist immigration by the thousands. With
British help and encouragement, the Zionists acquired the
1.fertile areas of Palestine.” * They continue, making no 
attempt to substantiate their assertions: “Even before the 
date set for the withdrawal of its troops —  May the 15th,
1948 —  Britain withdrew and left the country in a state of 
chaos, having done all it could throughout its twenty-eight 
year mandate to ensure the fulfilment of the Zionist dream.” * 
Arab nationalist writers seem agreed in considering that 
the Western Powers were motivated by two reasons in their 
support for the establishment of Israel. The first of these 
is considered to be their desire to create a consumer market 
for their products in the Middle East and a centre for 
economic infiltration and secondly their wish to have a
1, “The Orescent in Crisis.” Kansas, 1955* P* 89.
2. Ibid., p. 89. The underlining is mine. It Is nothing less 
than incredible to find such completely biased comments in 
a book writen by respected academic writers, published 
under the auspices of the Rockefeller foundation. The 
authors claim, surprisingly, in their preface: “it was
not our purpose to promote any one idea, or advance any 
one principle, or side with any one cause against 
another.”
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strategically centred base from which they can conduct
military operations in the future* The assumed general 
Western opposition to Arab nationalism is considered to he 
motivated by a fear of an Arab revival which might lead to 
the creation of a “Third World forceMichel*Aflaq inter­
prets the Suez canal crisis as an expression of this fear 
of the Western Powers and their determination to prevent the 
fulfilment of Arab nationalism: 1 It is clear, too, that the
Suez canal crisis was nothing more than an occasion to expose 
their aims and fears of the recent Arab awakening and their 
determination to fight with it before the fulfilment of its 
growth*’1 * This quotation comes, it is interesting to note, 
from an article written in September 1956, before the armed 
hostilities.
The Suez crisis proved to be a great stimulus to Arab 
nationalism. It seemed to give evidence, by the comparative 
solidarity of the Arabs in each Arab country with Egypt’s 
stand, even in Iraq with its strongly pro-British government, 
that a feeling of oneness did exist which was strong enough 
to unite them to a certain extent at least, when one of them 
was threatened. It is indeed since 1956 that a new tone is
1* “ma’rakah al-masir al-wahid." p* 89*
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discernible in Arab nationalist literature, in both discussions 
concerning the ideology of the movement and in comment 
concerning the West. It Is sincd this date only that one 
finds writers sure and confident and proud of the already 
proved existence of flrabism as a binding force. The emphasis 
in recent works is no longer on the need for proof of the power 
of Arab nationalism or on discussions examining the factors 
constituting Arabism, but rather the fact that its existence 
has been indisputably proved. Arab nationalist works published 
since 1956 are marked by an exuberance and self-confidence 
never before apparent.^* It must hot be assumed, however,
Arab nationalist writers stress, that the support of all the 
Arabs for Egypt at the time of the actual military operations 
did more than give proof of the Arab solidarity already 
achieved since the beginning of the crisis with the national­
isation of the Suez canal In June, 1956*. We find, for example, 
that Ahmad Sa’Id writes? "When the Franco-British-Israeli 
aggression occurred against G-haza and Egypt, both Arab
1* The military operations of the Suez war have been presented 
in the broadcasts and popular press of the Arab world in 
such a way as to convince the 'masses’ that the Egyptian 
armed forces won extraordinary success in the actual 
fighting. For an opposite assessment based on reliable 
information see: Edgar O ’Ballance: "The Siani Campaign." 
London, 1959* w
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nationalism, which was fully awake and its conscious leader­
ship of "both the people and government had arrived at the 
closest levels of coordination."^* It is, similarly, after 
the Suez affair that Arab nationalist writers have developed 
what seems to be an obsession with imperialism and a remarkable 
xenophobia. They consider that the "aggression" was undeniable 
proof of the evil intentions of the Western Powers towards 
Arab nationalism. They assume without question that there 
was in'fact collusion between Britain, Frame and Israel in 
the whole campaign. Dr* Hannah, incredibly, considers that 
the whole operation was conducted under the protection of 
the United States. He praises the stout defence of the Arabs 
by the communist countries and "People's Democratic Republics!! 
against: "the wicked aggression which Britain, France and 
Israel conducted against the Arabs, under the protection of 
the United States."2,As it is considered that it is the aim of 
Western policy in the Middle Fast to fight Arab nationalism, 
there is, perhaps, some logic in the attitude some writers 
adopt that a primary aim of nationalist policy must be to 
fight the West.
1. Op. cit., p. 56.
2. "ma'nah al~gaum±yah." p. 124. For a clear and seemingly 
.indisputable denial of any Anglo-American cooperation
in the Suez War see the memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden:
"Full Circle." London, I960.
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The situations in Algeria and Oman are the source of 
much indignation and, indeed, fury to Arab nationalist writers, 
and are to them positive proof of the continuing evil of the 
intentions of the West towards the Arab world* Ahmed Bassan 
al-Baquri has this to write concerning imperialism in an 
article entitled 1 Imperialist France and Islam.1' "Wherever 
imperialism, or rather oppression, if we wish to give the word 
its true meaning, persists, it is destructive and ruinous 
and an evident calamity. How could it be otherwise when 
its proponents direct themselves towards the subjugation of 
peoples and the destruction of nations?" * There is in Arab 
nationalist literature great emphasis placed on the rightness 
of the Arab cause in the Algerian war; no Arab political 
work of recent date which I have read attempts to give any 
explanation of the French point of view. They are condemned 
out of hand in strong terms as pursuing typical imperialist 
policy, of a type which the Arab world is assumed to have 
known for many years. It is interesting to observe how 
Michel *Aflaq, whose comment is typical of those nationalists 
who examine the situation, considers the struggle to be one 
between the imperialists as a whole and the Arabs as a nation, 
not between the French and the Algerians; "in order to be
1, Op * c it., p . 11 *
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sectire in the future, imperialism sees no choice but to 
strike at Arabism and to scatter it in all directions, for it 
realises more than do some of the Arabs that the Algerian 
revolt is the revolt of the Arab nation. It knows that the 
Algerian revolution is a complete revolution, which gives 
full meaning to the freedom and nobility of man and that the 
success of this revolution will affect the bases of imperial­
ism in the whole world. It knows that the Algerian revolution 
is an Arab revolution which will assure a new stature for
the Arabs; and will raise the level and intensity of the
1 * —
Arab struggle in every region.1 * Muhammad Majdhub, too,
sees the Algerian war, if not as one between the Arabs and
imperialism both combined, at least as one between the Arabs
and the French. He lays the responsibility for ensuring
success for the revolutionaries on Egypt and Syria. While
there was active support, he writes, from these countries
for the Arab cause in Algeria before the United Arab Republic
was formed, this support was not well organised'; ’‘Egypt,
before its union into the new republic, did help Algeria
and Syria too helped her; neither of them ceased this help
after the union was announced. We do not exaggerate if we
say that the Algerian revolution rests more than anything on
1* "maTrakah al~masir al wahid." p* 145*
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the shoulders of the Egyptians and the Syrians.”"1'* He goes
on to comment on this support after the unions ”lf in the
past, this aid arrived in a manner which lacked planning and
organisation, today it has become more effective and organised
2 .
and it is sent with regularity and speed.”
Several writers refer to the situation in Oma.n as being 
similar to that in Algeria. Indeed, Ibrahim Jum!ah makes 
the direct comparison. He writes; "The war which has broken 
out in Oman against the Arab freedom movement is very similar 
to the war of total destruction which France has declared 
against the Algerians; there is no difference between the 
British Imperialists in the Arab South and the French Imperial­
ists in Horth A f r i c a ! H e ,  too, stresses that the battle In 
Oman is not merely between the inhabitants of that area and 
the British, but between the latter and the whole Arab nation. 
Significant, too, is the extreme emotionalism of the language 
in which he describes the conflicts ”Arab nationalism stands 
behind those struggling in Oman, in the far Southeast of the 
great Arab homeland. They are small, defenceless, Isolated 
peoiDle whose blood Britain spills and whose resources Britain
1* Op. cit., p. 35*
2« Ibid., p. 36.
3. Op. cit., p. 234.
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exploits and leaves to poverty, ignorance and deprivation/1 *
The visualisation here of imperialism as a force exploiting 
the resources of the Arab homeland is similarly one frequently 
stressed in contemporary Arab nationalist literature*
Arabs feel particularly strongly that this is the case with
2the oil industry operating in the Arab world* * They consider 
that the oil companies assure for themselves profits which are 
unjustly high* There is a widespread feeling that if the Arab 
world were united, the Arab government which could be formed 
would be able to secure a higher price for its oil and a 
greater share of the profits, including those made in the 
distribution of the oil. Under- the present circumstances 
they consider that the tpil) companies can threaten to slow 
down production of the oil from any one of the separated Arab 
oil producing countries if that country should demand a bigger 
share of the profit from the oil produced within it.
The completeness of the distrust of the policies of the 
Western powers in the minds of contemporary Arab nationalist 
writers- is demonstrated by Ibrahim Jum*ah!s attitude towards
1. Ibid.
2. This conviction is expressed in many^recent Arabi£ pub­
lications. See, for example, "AmrTka tanhab batrul al-krab./ 
/America Steals Arab_Oil"), published in a series* "mashakil ~ 
al-gaumiyah al-!arabiyah" ("Problems of Arab Nationalism") 
Cairo, 1957*
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tli© international charitable and cultural organisations,
U.N.K.S,0.0., UN/W.R.A., Point Pour and the U.S.I.S., which 
are all mainly supported by the United States of America. He 
writes: "By these treacherous means America advances the ranks
of the imperialists, not seeking any humanistic goal, nor 
aiming at the good of the people of the area* In fact it 
seeks to destroy the capabilities of the Arabs, to break up 
their independence and retard their progress towards freedom 
by means of allurement and snares.1 *
A similar distrust is evinced towards the Western plans 
for military pacts and economic aid for those countries joined 
into these pacts; Arab nationalist condemnation of the Baghdad 
Pact, visualised in this form, is unanimous. The "EJise’nhower 
doctrine" is, similarly, condemned as an Imperialist plan to 
gain influence in the Arab countries. Dr. George Hannah 
considers that the doctrine represents a definite danger to 
Arab nationalism. The reasons he gives are first, that Arab 
nationalism is still growing and taking form and needs a 
period of time to consolidate itself on humanistic and yet 
nationalist principles and must have freedom from external 
influence during this time. Secondly he considers that 
accepting the doctrine would place the Arab governments in the
1. Op* cit,, p. 128.
j
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American sphere of influence and give America the power
to direct Arab nationalism. Thirdly, he gives his opinion
that acceptance of the doctrine would place the Arabs clearly
on one side in the 1 cold war" and incur the anger of the
other side and fourthly, in a "hot" war, the Arabs would find
1themselves forced to support the American side, * He goes on 
to point out, moreover, that: "The Eisenhower doctrine is 
against Arab nationalism because it ignores the danger of 
Zionism to Arab nationalism."
Arab nationalist writers strongly emphasise the necessity 
for the Arabs to avoid involvement in the "cold war" on either 
the side of the West or the East; there are very frequent 
references to the need to follow a policy of non-alignment 
and of "positive neutrality". Almost all Arab nationalist 
writers in recent years lay great emphasis on the wisdom of 
this policy for the Arabs. They have, no doubt, been influenced 
in their conviction of the advisability and success of this 
policy by what they consider to have been the success of 
the other neutral countries in adopting this policy; they 
have been particularly influenced by the example of India and 
Yugoslavia in this respect, as it is shown by the frequent 
references to these countries in contemporary Arab political 
works•
1. "ma!nah al-qawmiyah." -p. 126/8.
2. Ibid., p. 136.
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Al'AyadT, the Coptic writer, considers that neutrality
is of the very essence of Arab nationalism and stems from the
Arabs1 love of peace: "Arab nationalism is, by its very
nature and origins 'neutralist1 -believing in neutralism in
its external relations. That does not mean that it is
isolationist or separationist; it means that it is 'peaceful*,
believing in World peace...Its external relations are based on
friendship with all without exception. Enmity is the last
1
thing about which Arab nationalism thinks. * It resorts to
2
enmity only as a means of defence and to repel aggression." * 
Michel 'Aflaq sees a policy of neutrality as a sure means of 
bringing about a positive change in international relations
■3
which will lead to peace and cooperation among all nations. 
Muhammad Majdhub maintains that neutrality, which he equates 
with peaceful eo-esistence, is the sure means of guaranteeing 
further life to the human race in the age of the hydrogen 
bomb and artificial satellites. Neutrality is the only means 
of achieving peace "which is a necessity of life to mankind,
1. This seems remarkably in contrast with WalTd Qamhawi's 
criticism of the movement. See above p. 72_. It contrasts, 
too, with the frequent Arab assertion of the inevitability 
and desirability of a war of destruction to be waged 
against Israel.
2. Op. cit., p. 24.
3. "ma'rakah al-masir..." p. 176.
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„i.
for war means total destruction and complete extinction*
As it is obvious that the majority of Arab nationalist
writers consider that the Western imperialists are the known
and undisputed enemies of the movement seeking unity and that
they consider that the policies of the Soviet Union and other
communist countries have been marked towards them by a con-
2,
trasting friendliness and understanding; there seems to be 
something of basic illogicality in the professed adoption 
by the Arabs of a policy of positive neutrality* A minority 
of Arab nationalist writers do, indeed understandingly, 
acknowledge a preference for the Eastern to the Western bloc* 
Muhammad Majdhub criticises the defensiveness of the attitude 
of the Arabs to a charge of sympathy with the communist bloc- 
an attitude which leads some Arabs to claim that they accept 
communist aid only as a last resort. Majdhub considers 
that this attitude results from a misappreciation of the 
situation. He maintains that there are clear ties between 
the Arabs and the Eastern bloc which are not merely economic* 
"it is not loyalty, justice or honesty for us to cooperate 
with a country which has extended to us the hand of friendship 
in our time of need and difficult circumstances which nearly
1# Op* cit *, p. 80*
2. Bee Chapter Seven abovet "Arab Nationalism and Communism*"
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led us to destruction and then for us to assert that our 
relations with her are economic only which will come to an end 
when their economic justification is at an end* * He goes on 
to deny that positive neutrality is a mere policy of opportunism 
and taking advantage of the cold war.
That there is a certain incongruity in the stress on the 
need to follow a policy of positive neutrality shown in the 
work of the Iraqi communist writer xAzTz al-Hajj is obvious; 
he writes: nOur positive neutrality is not a negative attitude 
nor a manoeuvre to make use of the military blocs. Positivity 
means precisely, opposing imperialism and continuing to direct 
fire against it, without respite nor negligence nor seeking 
points of contact with it. Thus positivity means a fighting 
alliance with all the enemies of imperialism and reaction and 
wars. In their vanguard come the peoples of the Socialist 
bloc.1,26 Al~<Hajj lays somewhat greater stress on the need for 
positivity than on neutrality in his examination of the 
external policy which Arab nationalism should follow.
Michel 'Aflaq, too, writing in December 1956 clearly sees 
the East as more friendly to the Arab caiise than the West. He 
acknowledges the help given to the Arabs by the United States 
in condemning the Suez action and thus ensuring its failure 
but he nevertheless has this to say concerning general
1. Op. cit., p. 88.
2, Op. cit., p. 59.
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American foreign policy; “in her continuing help for Israel 
and her support for the Baghdad Pact it is as though she were 
saying that the Arabs must remain split up and divided and 
that their lands must remain an economic area exposed to 
Israel’s attacks, a consumer market for the West’s products, 
provide strategic bases for Britain and France and that the 
Arab lands must remain a pasture for corruption and treachery 
He concludes; ‘’This is what encourages the Arabs to extend 
the hand of friendship and cooperation to the peoples which 
appear to understand their problems a,nd to be an effective 
help to them, no matter what may be the differences in belief 
and ideology between themed these peoples. What keeps 
the Soviet forces away from the Arab countries is the distanc 
kept by the imperialists and their comx^lete withdrawal from 
them. It follows, then, that this is a means by which the 
Arab nation can achieve its nationalist aims and allows it 
to enjoy its complete freedom and unity.’ * He goes on 
immediately to write that despite the obvious revolutionary 
similarities between the East and the “New revolutionary 
world1’, he refuses to see all the good on one side and all 
the bad on the other. He makes plain his complete agreement 
with a policy of non-alignment with either side; only by 
non-alignment can he forsee that the Arabs will attain their
*7
objectives of freedom and progress.^*
1. "ma'rakah al-masTr.." p. 125.
2. Ibid., p. 126.
3. Ibid.
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It is not, perhaps, out of place to give an example of 
the less logical and more deliberately emotional accusations 
cast at the Western Powers which occur so frequently in 
contemporary Arab nationalist literature. In a discussion 
of the meaning of the word “sha'b", Ahmad Sa'id interpolates 
that the American view of the Arab "sha'b" is clear. He 
points to President Eisehhower's Congress speech in 1957 
in which he said; “we must never let the Middle East fall 
into the enemy's hands." Sa'id interprets this statement in 
the following way; “The enemy referred to by the President of 
America is you, Oh brotherI with your desire for freedom from 
the Imperialists and their helpers and their exploitation. The 
"enemy" are all those who help you and stand by your side 
in the struggle against your reactionary enemies, the capital­
ists and the imperialists.“ *^
Despite the outright condemnation of the political and 
economic policies of the Western countries towards the Arabs, 
so evident in Arab nationalist writings of recent years, some 
theorists do state that they do not want to deny absolutely
all the contributions which Westerdculture and civilisation1
have made to the Arab world. Muhammad Majdhub, for example, 
states ; “Arab nationalism as a philosophy, a movement and an
L. Op. cit., p. 26. The widespread use of the communist-type 
phraseology shown here is a striking feature of contemporary 
Arabic political works, especially In those works published 
in most recent years.
attitude does not deny to Western civilisation the services 
that it has contributed to humanity in the fields of science, 
technology and culture. It does not adopt an attitude 
similar to that of the Westerners to the Arabs, who detract 
from the value of the Arab civilisation, heritage and 
nationalism.*
Muhammad Wahbi devotes a chapter of his work to an 
exa-mination of the attitude of the Arabs to the West. He 
considers that this attitude is characterised by firstly, an 
outfight opposition on the basis that Western civilisation 
is merely material, while that of the East is spiritual, and 
that the former has imperialism as its basic motive. He goes 
on to write that the second attitude is one of complete 
acceptance as a result of admiration for its very materialism 
and thirdly an acceptance of only the scientific side of West­
ern civilisation. He considers himself that all these points 
of view are based on the false assumption that Western civil­
isation has only a material content. He maintains that the 
achievements of Western civilisation would not have been 
possible if this were the case. He writes; "There is no
1. Op. cit., p. 65. It is interesting to observe how, even 
here, the writer turns implied praise of the West into 
open criticism.
2. "al-'urubah wa al-insanTyah." ("Arabism and Humanity.")
Beirut, 1959* P* 15*
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spirituality in the Blast today; spirituality is, however,
represented in the West, The origin of prosperity is this
very spirituality.“ * He concluded that by the very nature
of the strength of the influence of Western civilisation it
cannot be avoided by the Arabs in the contemporary world. He
denies, moreover, the existence of any particularly Western
civilisation; there is today, in his opinion, only a world
civilisation. He considers that an understanding for and
belief in the value of freedom form the essence of this
civilisation; 1 freedom is the essence of other effortw whether
they are scientific or social. For this reason, the concept
of national freedom was one of the most important contributions
2 *
which arose from this civilisation in the political sphere.,f 
He goes on to point out regretfully that it is only the external 
and visible facets of Western civilisation which have had 
any real impact on the Arabs - he lists machinery, nationalism, 
war, weapons, hygiene, medicine and political parties as the 
obvious examples. Western civilisation has, however, he writes; 
“veiled from their sight those of its factors which are least 
apparent. Ethical, for example, and human values, the value of 
the individual, the position of women, social progress,
1. “al-^urubah wa al-insaniyah.“ ("Ars/bism and Humanity.“ ) 
Beirut, 1959? p. 15.
2. Ibid., p. 20.
scientific study and freedom of thought and those other 
ideals which emerged with it, these all form its spirit and 
the nerve centre of its life* The new civilisation lives 
today in the Arab intellect as a body with no soul*" *
It is indeed unfortunate that an Arab writer can give this 
opinion in a work published in 1959*
The fact that Dr* Zurayq foreaw the problem and warned 
against the possibility of its development is shown in his 
work published twenty years before this date. He wrote; 
"Economic organisation with science behind It and with phil­
osophy at the back of both of these are, in my opinion, the 
main-elements of which the truth of the West consists. Who­
ever wishes to rise up with the national awakening should make 
sure that he understands clearly these three roots. In that 
way he will feel the spirit of the Western civilisation flow­
ing out towards us. If he joins to this understanding an 
appreciation of the internal personality of the nation with 
respect to both its strength and weakness, he will be able to 
look correctly at contemporary Arab life formed out of the
o
interaction of these two mighty forces." *
There is a strong feeling in the minds of some Arab 
nationalist writers that the time has come for more constructive 
thinking in the development of the ideology of the movement
1* Ibid., p. 28*
2. "al-wa'y al-qaumi*" p. 37*
and in examining the ways and means "by which the union can 
he achieved, as well as in developing policies which the uni­
fied state will be able to carry out. The superficial 
attitude of the majority of Arab nationalist theorists in 
condemning outright Western imperialism and blaming all the 
troubles of the contemporary Arab world on the West Is seen 
to be merely negative, although, of course, all are agreed 
that there is some justification of this attitude, Michel 
*Aflaq, writing in 1955 expresses this opinion, although 
what he has written himself since and some of which I have 
quoted, seems to belie this? "The time has come for the Arabs 
to put an end to making excuses and running away from respon­
sibility and throwing all the blame on the imperialists and 
for them to look deeply at their problems from within, and 
consider themselves alone responsible for their destiny, both 
first and last. It is up to us to consider imperialism as a 
result of our backwardness in changing our faulty Internal 
circumstances, not a cause In the creation of these circum- 
stances and their continuance."
Similarly, WalTd Qamhawi, writing in 1956, considers that 
the exploitation of anti-foreign feeling is nothing less than 
the main danger facing contemporary Arab society; "The first
1, "ma*rakah al-masir..«" p. 2 7 ,
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danger is that hatred for the invaders and fighting against 
them wfl.1 become, with the passing of time, a safety-valve for 
the relief of the feelings of the nation, distracting it away 
from the evils which confront it and diverting it from the 
reforms which must he made. Every Arab, whether,ruler or 
ruled, swears by the fiercest oaths that the foreigners are 
the cause of corruption in rule, for the spread of poverty, 
the obviousness of tjrranny, the decline in morals and the 
confusion in the markets I For this reason, whenever the 
masses in any Arab country become restless, immediately the 
leaders divert this restlessness to the rock of the invaders. 
They know that the masses are too powerless to weaken this 
rock by their buffeting,•.In this way they prevent the masses 
from stifling their feelings and they return pleased and co­
operative to their leaders.1 ^ *
No examination of the relationship between Arab nation­
alism and the loosely-defined “Western" world would be complete
without some indication of the former*s attitude towards 
2,
democracy. I wish to avoid a general discussion of this word
1* Op. cit., p. 255.
2. For a general discussion of the reasons for the apparent 
failure of democratic institutions in the Middle East 
see: "Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy in the 
Middle East" by Charles Issawi. Article in "international 
Affairs", Vol. 32 of 1956, p. 27.
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which is so difficult to define and which has been frequently 
applied to many differing forms of political rule. It 
perhaps is sufficient to say that in my opinion the word is 
generally used to refer to the conceptions that the right to 
rule is vested in the people of any nation, that each individ­
ual enjoys equal voting rights, is obliged to perform equal 
duties when required to do so and enjoys absolute equality 
before the law. Freedom of speech and expression are, it Is 
understood, essential parts of democracy.
Each Arab nationalist writer has refened, almost without 
exception, somewhere in his Work to democracy and the need to 
build the new Arab society on democratic principles. Apart, 
however, from such reference, Arab nationalist writers do not 
lay great emphasis on this need nor do they attempt precise 
definitions of what they understand by the word. Some, more­
over, seem to consider that it is used to denote merely a 
system of government which allows a multiplicity of political 
parties. They frequently use the word in a disparaging way 
and connect the word with the type of rule which the Western 
Powers attempted to set up in the newly independent Arab states 
in which political power was vested in the party most able to
obtain a majority in parliamentary elections. There is a 
widespread feeling among Arab nationalist writers that this
system was instituted by the ’imperialists* so that they
could bring influence and pressure to bear on the individual 
political parties and in this way maintain effective control 
over the country*s affairs. It is felt that the Arab 
politicians who took part in government under this system were 
corrupt Reactionaries1, quite uninterested in the good of 
their country. Arab nationalist writers seem widely to feel 
that Arab society with its recent traditions of powerful 
tribal, feudal and religious leaders does not allow the effic­
ient running of democratic I elections which presuppose that 
each voter expresses his wish according to his assessment 
of the candidates for election and their policies. Dr. Walid 
Qam&awi, writing in 1956, is typical of many Arab nationalist
o
writers in declaring his opinion that elective systems of 
government are quite impracticable In the Middle East. He 
concludes s 1 It is all the same whether the system of govern­
ment is monarchical or popular', elective or dictatorial, 
religious or hereditary, the relationship between rulers and 
ruled does not contradict what I have said. For this reason 
almost Identical political philosophies exist, for they 
arise from one source. This source is the belief that politics 
means merely playing with words and expressing a conviction 
in the value of negotiations, hiding from people what is not 
obvious and showing them the opposite of what Is
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1 *concealed*1 * It is felt* in short* that in the Arab world 
today efficient* revolutionary progress for which the majority 
of Arab nationalists campaign can only be affected by strong 
and efficient government; this is interpreted to mean the rule 
by a dedicated, enlightened few of the Illiterate and uninformed
p
many. • This attitude is well expressed by a Syrian writer,
*Ali Badur, who does not hesitate to state outright that 
democracy will not solve the present problems of the Arab 
world* In a clearly expressed and extremely forthright article 
he declares that the multiplicity of inefficient leaders in 
the Arab world is the main obstacle to unity and that this 
desired unity will only be attained by some form of dictator­
ships "Democracy is the enemy of progression; our struggle for 
the sake of unity will be a long one. Only stability (istiqrar) 
and perseverance will be strong enough to attain it* It is
1. Op. cit., p* 486/7. {^amhawifs effective cynical and 
satirical style of expression, quite untypical of the 
majority of Arab nationalist writers, is well shown here,
2. Revolutionary change which has taken place in the Arab 
world recently does not necessarily seem to have been_ _ 
motivated primarily, however, by this desire. The Iraqi 
regime of Nuri al-Sa'id may be interpreted as having 
been of this form; those who overthrew it did so mainly
in protest against the autocratic_jiature _of his rule* For 
a complimentary assessment of Nuri al Sa'id see Lord 
Birdwoods "Nuri Said." Gassell, London, 1959.
1.benevolent dictatorships which last longest*'1 * He concludes; 
"We need the sword of a Bismark more than we need the eloquence 
of a Mirabeau — ~ a group of Army officers devoted to Arab 
nationalism more than 1 cultural propagandists1, those
2 •
parliamentarians love-sick with words and nothing else*"
Arab nationalist writers seem, in the majority, to con­
sider the importance of the individual only in so far as he 
is a member of society; it is the society which is of supreme 
importance, WalTd Qamhawi"’clearly expresses this widespread 
belief simply and with all the force of a direct statement: 
"The purpose of the existence of the individual is to serve 
society.rl^ * The Egyptian Goptic supporter of Arab nationalism 
lAyadT"al-*Abd al-*Ayadi examines the same relationship and 
reaches a similar conclusion! "Arab nationalism respects the 
personality of the individual and sanctifies his freedom. It 
is the basic obligation of every person to be a nationalist. 
That is to say he must believe in Arab nationalism in both
word and deed. After that he is free to think believe and do
4.
as he wishes."
Those Arab nationalists who support the policies of the 
United Arab Republic express their belief that the recently
1* "Al-Ad.ab," Sept. 1957* P* 63*
2, Ibid., p. 64.
3, Op. cit., p* 417.
4, Op. cit., p. 22.
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instituted system of electoral representation in that state 
known as the 1National Union1 (al-ittihad al-qaumi) is in 
fact a new form of democracy which is appropriate to the 
conditions of the Arab world* The objectives of the National 
Union are defined in the first Article of the decree announcing 
its formation! "That National Union aims at the realisation 
of the goals of the Revolution of July 23rd 1952 and the 
exertion of efforts for building the nation on a sound basis 
by setting up a socialist, democratic, cooperative society 
free from political, social and economic exploitation*"
The decree gives precise details concerning the size and the 
organisational form of the National Union but is extremely 
imprecise in defining its actual powers. The Union is to 
consist of local, district and provincial committees on which 
sit its elected ’active1 members* These local committees may 
make complaints and recommendations on certain unspecified 
matters to the National General Committee or to the Supreme 
Executive Committee of the Union. These organisations are to 
meet together annually under the chairmanship of the President 
of the National Union who shall be elected by a majority of 
the delegates; the Presidents term of office is to be for 
three years, and he is to be the head of the Supreme Executive
1*. Published in the U*A.R. "Yearbook for 1959"9 p. 57* 
The Yearbook is published by the U.A.R* Ministry 
of Information*
Committee* The relationship between these executive committees 
of the National Union and the executive power of the state 
itself, vested in the hands of the President, is not made 
clear. The only clearly defined power of these committees 
is to nominate "candidates for membership in the National 
Assembly (parliament)*" * It seems that the National Union 
is designed to have influence merely In matters of local 
government of the state; its powers seem likely to be purely 
advisory.
The claim of the National Union to be a completely 
democratic institution seems somewhat difficult to substan­
tiate. Its supporters claim that it is in no sense a ‘one 
party system* of the type found, for example, in communist 
Jugoslavia. While, however, Article 3 states that membership 
of the Union is op&n to all Egyptian citizens of not less 
than sixteen years of age, ‘active* members must be recommended 
by two active members and their candidature approved by the
local executive committee. "This approval is subject to the
2.
endorsement of the Regional, Executive Committee." It seems 
clear from this that the National Union will be likely to 
represent only those citizens who support the policies of the1
1* Article 50. The National Assembly of the U.A.R. is the 
legislative body in the government of the state. It has 
no executive authority*.
2. Article 5*
National Union as well as the general policies of the state*
It is indeed obvious that the experience which the ArM)s 
have had of the West up till now has left them with the firm 
conviction that the West is completely selfish for its own 
interests and that these interests do not correspond with 
those of the Arabs. That some of these interests are diamet­
rically opposed to those of Arab nationalists Is obvious. It 
is likely for mapy years to come that, for instance Arab 
nationalists and G-reat Britain will be in direct opposition 
to one another over the privileged position of the latter in 
the Persian Gulf shiekhdoms, in Oman and in Aden. It is 
similarly impossible that France will give up what she con­
siders to be her rights in Algeria. Added to this, and 
probably more important than all the rest. Is the question of 
Israel, whose existence has been guaranteed by the West.
There seems no possibility of any rapprochement between the 
Arabs and Israel for very many years to come; the problem of 
the Palestinian refugees appears insoluble* From all this It 
seems, therefore, that the relationship between the West and 
the Arabs will remain extremely strained for the forseeable 
future, although it is unlikely that this relationship will 
become any more bitter than It has been in recent years. This 
bitterness Is very apparent in contemporary Arab nationalist 
literature.
CHAPTER SEVEN:
ARAB NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM'
Communist Influences Vlnrthe vArab; world ;arey of comparatively t?A >> 
recent date ahft hee f  f ect of these ihfldences lias only been 
reflected . ih reldtlyelyJ^ecent;^riab nationalist works. ; Those 
writers. whose first works in support of Arab, national! sm were.i};;: 
publi shed, before ■ or during the., la st war 11 Dr. Zurayq, Amin ; 
Sal idy :;*Abddliah^ and Dr. 'Yusuf; Haikal, as well tri
as the works: of'Sat I 1: al-lMsai^^which. were published more;; hi'h 
recently'show ’noisfgns< that I have observed of1 communist ' 
inf luence :or leven of - interest; Inoomimh^ upon 7>; z
Arab qnatfphalism as a moyement leadingamong otheir things;, to* 
a more equitable disfribution^of iwealth. in theArabvworld,^ but 1 
they display no rpbaesislpn: with;;;a ^ class -struggle as such and ' 
they give no -evidence of ;ah;ihterestiln^(cpmmunlstvwprld 1 
or its ideology. ,
. There ha ye been: .small communist parties In existance in 
all parts of the; Arab world; since . theyearly nineteeh-thirtie ?
but. tbey theyerXen3oyed;. either p ^ o h g  i localvsupport or signifi- -y 
eaiity external: fImhcial s u p p o r t l u f , ;a- bebanesei
1 •, Fdr ' a detpl led study : of M he histp^^ andpdeyelopmehtv ;of thbtii 
c ommuni st- part 1 es and t  he lr; inf lue hce ; i n the Middle 'East 1 ; 
see.:' t C p m ^ i a h d l S h t i ^  sm 'inyiheiMiddle;'East*1.;, t Outfit 
WalterZy;vliqueur; London,l956>i A second edition, withi . t; 
a post scri pi, was. publi shedantigB^^ p.' ■ * ' ■
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anti-communist writerputs a very recent date to the1 
commencement of effective communist influence in the Arab 
world and gives ^ hree, main reasons for its, infiltration* ' ,
These’ factors are; l) ladk of support for the ruling body.
2) the penetration of ^military.::men into^ politicSy ,and 3)' the 
inter-party struggle among the people. ,fThese factoids created 
the ■ problems - of the Middle East and led to military’ and 
political-revolutions .and numerous incidents. These factor's 
created an anarchical situation'which ^ prepared the way for 
communist infiltration and necessitated a.rapprochement with 
Moscow.1 - * He goes on a little- later, to write’that the ■ 
Egyptian-Russian arms, deal of 1955/6 and the loans which 
followed from Russia were important in aiding communist pene« 
tration: nTh© : decision which' Egypt took to buy arms from the 
Soviet Union and the‘communist bloc and the Soviet economic 
and military loans to Egypt and,Syria which followed this ■ 
played an. important role in:, establishing Soviet influences 
in the Middle East.*1^ *
- A strong factor - in the:.coniparative- lack of influence of 
communism in the Arab/^ worldv.upA-t.O-’-'thiB late date, .despite the- 
existence of - the communist parties.is no doubt the fact that
1,: /al-ia^dlgj^l/afe al-awsai^.n (110 ommuni st 
- - : Inftltratioh in the Middle East*.v) ;Beirut, 19599 P* 15*
2. Ibid., p. 14.
when;-^.si.rEuropejah' influences j were strorig [in ^ he >reav communist 
; ; ; publications:- and activities wef e strongly curtallei.. Arab
* I fntellectualsin' general and Arab nationalists in;. particular
seem, .'moreover:,'''Xtc,;:^ vel;been‘,^pfe.ep9cupied’to..-a.-■■remarkable degree ■ 
' V.--; with theirstrpggle;vfpr: cpmpleiie freedom and Independence from
,v " '■<<^ Western imperialism; - although early Arab nationalist literature 
. contains not infrequent mentions of the'’necessity for reform 
: >[ ■ and progress these aims are naturallyogiven, far, less prominence
’ than the. urgent :;.andf;pre.|&ing ;.nbed:'for political independence 
: V ..and unity , Those: A^ab nationalist works[;publls!ib^ :in more 
■: ■.',^'. 'teGent;years:':dp? ; in; contrast display [great emphasis:. on the 
: ^  [-v nee<kf pr [revolutionary; s;6blal;[refpm at
; >[/>rthb^ :.same; timevds>&[show. a>;gred£ vlnte^s t ^ a ^
: >/"w;ith the ideological,s slinlJarities ^ hnd-v/diffei?ences [between 
;, natIonali sms aiid’bQmmuhism*: y\They similarlyy1 full of
.'discussions cpnpernlhg the [/cold war1 andj^he[opposing ideo- 
;^logIes of the .capitalist arid:bpmmunist camps.
" : ; . The majority of Arabnatf^ be - '
i ;-V ‘ diyidedihtp^c 1 e^Iy ■ defined [g^bups^ ofr; supporters:-or- opponents 
y  \'= ^ of eom^nism, ;aithdugh c  small '[minority ponsisting of the
; V;: two Iraqi writers 'Aziz .al-lSlj nhd fAmin [*Abdullah ,and-;ihe
Lebanese writ©n. Dry^ Cxeorg^ ^^  ;cpnsldered as btrong
' sympathisers;;.w.it^ fideail coimmni^ indeed of
1the Russian variety, * It is, I think, necessary to make a 
distinction between * ideal1 communism or Marxism and 
communism as it is practised in the Soviet Union and Communist 
China. Apart from the three writers refered to above, no 
other Arab nationalist writer whose works I have read, agrees 
wholeheartedly with the Soviet form of communist rule, even if 
he believes in the principles of Marx. Indeed, in their 
discussions of communism, Arab nationalist theorists do not 
fail to make clear that they see a distinction between Marxism 
and leninism. It Is interesting to examine what Arab national­
ist writers think about communism as a principle and as a 
system of politics as it is applied in the Soviet Union and the 
other communist countries.
Arab nationalist writers deny that the communist revolution 
of 1917 in Russia and the spread of Marxist principles in 
Europe had a great effect in the Middle East. They strenuously 
deny any similarity in the social and economic structure of the 
Arab world and either Western Europe where the ideology was 
formulated or Russia where an attempt was made to put it Into 
practice. Dr. Qamhawi is in the minority of Arab nationalist
1. Michel 'Aflaq, too, the prominent Bafthist leader is con­
sidered by Laqueuer to have been : "One of the founders of 
the Syrian Communist Party but left.it in 1943*" Op. cit., 
p. 330. I have not seen or heard suggested elsewhere, how­
ever, that 'Aflaq was in fact a member of the communist 
party at any stage of his career.
theprist's' in :consideri early. Arab progressives saw a
t ; . similarity. Russia and’: the • ■;
•Arab world and that the Soviet solution to these problems . ,■ V '
. seemed;to them to be pertinent to the Arabs. He. writes;
"When some Arabs looked at their homeland and saw it afflicted ,
- with many of the social and economic problems which existed .
; in Czar1st Russia^ they thought that the only way to reform
; .their.ins tItutions would be to follow the path of the Soviet
Union> to embrace its philosophy and to immerse itself in its
c/iyilisaf ion. ; I have seen ho. evidence, to substantiate this
/: *: statement in;.the contemporary Arab nationalist literature I
s .have read and we caii take it to refer exclusively -to those: Vv ' ^
Arab 1-progressives" who were in fact members or active sym- , . "
pathisers . with the. actual: Arab . commuhist parties.
j;. « • . Dr . C lovis : Maqsud is typical of the ma j ority of Arab
./■I natipnalistWriters in denying anything; but the most super- V
ficIalVof similarities.betweea the Soviet Union and the Arab
W  World.,.. 'He; examines the sbciar and Industrial; situation in
' Europe; and the influence of commuhism there and the split / .
: which ..developed between the Mar xi s t theorists and the supporters
: of the Leninist form of communism. It is this Leninism adopted 1
by the ;Russiah coitmunists which has had an ef f ect in the Arab .: i
.. countries, and not the original Marxist, theory V "if: there were V/
, i. Op. Cit. , pi 289*; ," ;•
any Marxism in /the Arab world it was not the result of con­
viction in the principles of Marx as he laid them down, but 
rather,-:the :■influence ..of-the ^ interpreted that Lenin gave to
theseiphincipies and which inlfact bhangqd of the Marxist
. principles-. . From this there /becomes* clear.: to/ us- a/ basic 
difference between the growth of - the ..left ^ movement in - our 
nation and its growth in Europe *.v * Socialism: grew in the Arab 
countries as the result of the; clash with: coimnunism or in 
reply to the bitter struggle it caused*" * This distinction 
seems to me thoroughlyvjustifled -and of importance in achieving.
:an: understanding of Arab socialism. The conviction.Arab 
nationalist writers express;.of the need for -socialism seem to 
have stemmed not so much out; of a firm humanistic belief In the 
need for change in the: Arab world-aoujuch as In answer to and 
sin'defence of communist propaganda*!^---:;
Michel lAflaq denies that European and Arab social and 
economic situations are .notably •similar:and therefore that a 
similar remedy can be applied to cure the ills of both.- He 
maintains that when communists call to Arabs to join and support 
communist ideology they ignore two facts. - These are first,
1, Op. cit., p. 58.
el _
2. See Chapter Two pp^l^fbpve, and Bakdash*s remark 
P^Sbabove. , . * ..  -
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that "The Arab nation is historically ind.ependent;7of:::West 
European history:and;that the ideologies and political 
system emanating, from Western civilisation do not answer the
1 the Arab situation, nor offer it ahy progress. Second­
ly, the: Arab nation is not like any small ,and:: secondary nation. 
which!bah he Ip to. fulf i11 any.mi ssion other than its very own, 
and ride in the train of another nation and live off its char- 
i tie si111 •y-v.-G qmmunls t thought Is only strong in the .area, he . 
considers, because of the weakness of general thought and of 
nationalist philosophy in particular. He denies absolutely 
that communismis strong- in thevMiddle East as a result of the 
strength of its ideas and as a result of the social and economic 
conditions of the area. The danger in the problem is, he writes, 
obvious and the solution clear: "We are sure that communist 
"ideology ;will remain a.very serious danger::to. Arafe nationalism 
spflong as this nationalism does not provide; itself with a 
comprehensive,-tightly-rknit^? and ■scientific ideology."2* 
v ; The question of the attitude of communists towards Arab 
hationalism is, of P  our b e ; a ,yery4nterebtinp oneqand is examined J 
at ;some length by 'Rafiq al-Ma;1 luf in his. recent work. He 
quotes, from a speech delivered d u  1957 by -IChalid Bakdash, the !
I V Op^ cite, p. 15.
?V "f i sabllv;al-BathV^ Path of the, BaJ.th Party."
V : Beirut Vfl959> p.73.'V(iu8^ written; in 1944.) .
& tP
iekder .of , the =■ Byria^-Lebaneee ;|ecMmuhistp^rt^fcefore;; the party1 s 
dehtral^dpmmfttee . / plans of/action ;bTor the 
coffi^ h&t;;: party iq>adbpt- world, ; T^ ommuniat
pair tie s in. the ;r Ap aby c ountri es ' must sUppbrt^rah nati o na 1 ism 
;as ’^a/step. iri the' ;direbti6rt.: oifv sec ialivsmh They must sec ondly .: - ■. .■,* 
:.£Lid;;h:ational capitalism and. aligh themselves with- it* The 
communists must, thirdly, Bakdash maintains, infiltrate into 
the nationalist and socialist.p a r t i e s A l ~ M a fluf goes on to 
report that Bakdash yin the same: speech gives his reasons for 
the need to sxipport Arab nationalism in this way. It . is .the . • . • 
nationalist movement which will in his opinion arouse .'the.massesv? 
against:the Western imperialists . as. enemies of unity and as the i 
creators of Israel.’ In this way, Bakdash considers, feeling 
will, be'raised against the United States as, the country most 
responsible for the creation of Israel and communist policies * "
xyill^as a re.suIt. of an inevitable "loss of American influence,...
be very well served. 'In this same .speech, Khalid Bakdash is . 
quoted as saying: ,fTlie peopled organisations, as for example, 
the student'groups, the intellectuals and the small traders, are 
all strong factors in the1 battle against the imperialists. The 
b^t:iy.ity-''0’f these classes cannot possibly bring .bad result so, / 
ylbhg.as.'titey-yform; '■;d/group "-about ^  and go along
u3Qder:its.l^ by side with the pea A s for
1. Op* cit., p* 24/5*
the rest .of the nationalist, -bourgeois groups, these are not
a part of the.revolutionary classes; they can, however, be
v:-: relied upon temporarily and'in a limited way in helping the
> ; vrevolutionary movement^ .so deliberately and openly 1
- \ ^acknowledging c ommunist "desire to make usejof, the efforts of
v.v-- a the: Indtipnalists for . their own"purj)osesi^Sakdas^; complained
/ :fv bitterly in 1951 that :t,he;:imtiohalists-had-been employing -
3 ;’;\ty‘ ^thO'vSame^tactiQs : ; "They try to exploit the - increasing popular
J : oriexitation towards- socialism, ' they . especially destroy the
effectiveness of - our slogans of distribution of the lands of
„2*the feudalists and big landowners, to the peasants.’ It
certainly seems at the present time that the nationalists have
succeeded in gaining distinct advantage over the communists 
in these tactical engagements.; The nationali sts have success­
fully incprpprated. much basically communist; ideology in their 
ideology without destroying its essential nationalist flavour 
and appeal. For the 'communists, on theother ^ hand'f/to incor- 
 ^x pbrate the nationalist- ideology based oh^ayjpride in, both
and ’ Islam in their own Ideology would. clearly: destroy 
 ^the uhiyer^ of communism;
■ ;foarfef^ attempt: to Mhke -capital; out of
--vthe ;;a;ctiylties;:^  of -m merely ;opportunist
v:l*::/ ^  cit./ p. 38.
: :160^:
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motives, al-Malluf considers that-the Syrian communist leader 
is of the opinion that nationalist intellectuals are basically:; i 
communists in any case: ,fAs for intellectuals, Bakdash considers
that with their publications, broadcasts, talks and discussions,-; 
they will be of great use in removing Western imperialism and 
in exciting students and workers. They would in fact prefer to 
believe in communist but they fear to do so for reasons con­
nected with their'bourgeois upbringing and they satisfy them-
,v *. ' £  v *  7 "  5  "O'" ' ,* .. 7 ,  !■ I •’ v . 5 >  V -  / • > : , •  \  5. v  ; ’ ‘ ^ " ■ V 1 P  ( . 7  v  -  '**' !’ ! V  P.. i  - ■ ' - r - 7  "*■ . 7  - v t  7 , '  7 7 ' •  '•
1selves by announcing their allegiance to Arab-nationalism.1
: ■ ■ In my examinatI on of-.-contemporary;; Arab; nati pnali st 
literature,. I have found no direct and orderly criticism or 
appraisal of Marxist or communist ideology. The socialist 
principles:to-which the majority of Arab nationalist writers 
olaim'ailegM and' the great and bl^ ibus!, emphasis
7 they '■ struggle aiad the ^ language in! which they
/express -these;^  bpOTictibns do givp;: strorig-^evidence of com­
munistijafluenpeb in the w^y ,in which, they internal
sociaii;:!^ structure.:of the-Arab world.
, Theretape , h o t ^  infrequent, • mehtlbhs of ^ M r  1 Sarx^ hs' a.: •
x - i ’b S - . v ! 7 * ' - h h t - T r , ? 3 ;  v -: '••••."! .! "•/.x -; :„xv. - h h h ' - h - ^ t . v 7 -  . '' 
great socialist. .* We find, for .example,, that Ahmeid SaTid
hritps,;/^ materialist interpretation of history:
1. Ibid., p. 29.
2.' See Chapter Two above, p.*6*5 e-Vseci,
’3# c.f. Laqueur, Op. cit., p. 352.
"This appeared strongly and forcibly in the train of the 
industrial revolution which Europe witnessed at the end of the - 
Middle Ages.*.It was Karl Marx, the first socialist, who 
adopted this materialist interpretation, affirmed it and made 
of it a principal philosophy In the study of'the development 
of human society.""1'* Although Sa*Td refers to Marx in this 
extraordinary-and presumably flattering manner, he is quick - 
to point outv that the.materialist Interpretation of history 
is not entirely satisfactory. He points to the example of the - 
Algerian nationalists and- their helpers in the present war- 
and concludes that spiritual, intellectual and emotional factors 
have a great part to play. in-..the. progress of history. In. 
extension, he maintains that although the Imperialist powers 
have" great material superiority in this wary the non-material 
and moral strength of'the Arab world will prove successful 
in defeating, it. ' . - •
* Dr. Muhammad Majdhub in his list of criticisms of communism
' ■ ' . -xr: : '••X ' ■ . -_t V'- “ - V  - j i ' : V. i. ■ V V  • . A  ; . ■? v,' . a  • / .o. - - -.It' *> . ■ • •• • PV
agrees with this denial of the complete validity -of the mat er« ■: 
ialist Interpretation of.history.' He-goes on to point out that 
the communists insist on agnosticism or atheism as a basic 
part of their dogma and that they, ridicule spiritual philoso­
phies .7 :MGommunist phll o sophy V'Y: hev- writes^ "does not hide its 
feelings about religion and its inclination to destroy and 1
*1 . I '  ,
abolish it. He contrasts this attitude with that' of Arab
socialists who,- he writes, : "are certainly not sympathetic 
towards atheism;and consider themselves the guardians defending 
the spiritual heritage which the prophets and messengers have 
created . They go/even further -than that and dec lare
that' rbligiphYls^ the Arab EasitV-&h eleme^Ybf lts vitality 
and progress."^* Dr* Majdhub goes -on to show that he/agrees 
with many other Arab nationalist^writers InYcqhsid^ that 
coHMunist dogma does; not l admit .the existence of- any national - :■
cx
entity as; such, denies that nationalist spirit and calls for 
the-abolition of national boundaries. He quotes Marx1s sayingt 
that the workers have no nationy but disagx^ees. with it out- 
■:right: "Arab socialism is not prepared Yto, giy^Juip its national­
ism,. because this nationalism, is the aim of every Arab and the 
only link .and common factor among all Arab; patriot s ." ^ * He- 
refutes Marx, / perhaps rathei^: naively, : by 'writing:■> "Experience 
has shownxthatthe-workers themselves adhere,to nationalism 
just as the other classes adhere to It."^* He concludes his - 
‘examination-by denying absolutely^that communist ideology, 
born of a European philosophy based on special European condit­
ions will find fertile ground in the Arab world. The Arab 
nation, he points;out, has a different history from that of
1. Op. bit*, p. 104.
2. 3* and 4. Op* cit., p. 104/6.
Europe and..;; the;industrial' revolutioh! taking place , within/it!! ; -,
differs, completely from that of Europe. The-problemsof the 
Arab .workersy are, thereforecompletely distinct from those of Y 
European workers! and demand a different solution.
-Y ■' It is interesting to see yhqw; Mi che 1 *Aflab gives: much! the V- 
same criticisms of communism as early' as. ,l944y ./ He objects 
in particular to! coinmunism. • s denial. of .nationalism/ and the. 
insistehee :6h! 1 hterpretation of a 11 aspects of life in; terms : :■!• 
p f t h e ;! matprialy/ Vy 4d biiM^ a ; mere. ec o^/Y •:
nomic system,! but ..a !! mis si on t t bo ■ 7* .an ar t i f i c i a 1, .universal!st 
mission which denies the truth ofYnationalisms in the world . 7 ; 
Vand denies.7theYhistprical influences on-which the nation stands•
: .It organi s es; I if e c omple t e ly on a • mat. er i a list basis and imposes 
.a .particular type of both internal political rule and external/; 
relations., as well as partibular ; social systems , spiritual and 
and moral beliefs and! even family; ties. . Thus communist phil- • 
ospphy eanhot be diyided up :xeither you accept it all or 
reject it all.1 ^ * Similarly, in an article written in 1947 . ;
Michel !Aflap givesV a typical radical left-wing socialist 
inferprstation to.the wrbngs oi the internal situation in the ; 
Arab world, but.denies strongly.that communism is the best 
solutionr- "Our society is in a sicklyV state; the situation is 
one.!• of :f euda.llsm and explolfa t ion and to this sick; situation: 77
■ \1>V; bp* f.;,.CitV.;|’. -P• :■ lC)4-6 • T- v : . V;' • ; *;*• \y . •',* •' / .
** v^.  V i a V c i v b ' ’. . c v i ' - x v v c x s  7 .  - \  - / .
is suggested a sick solution ■-- this; is! ;tM commimist movement %; 
which has come to cure the ■•Bicknes's. withYsicto
Ahmed,3a*id, too, althohgh'yhi-SvVork--shows*-a.-generally 
sympathetic and f r iendly :&ttItude tbwards ytlie c ommuni st world, 
in marked contrast to his uncontrolled and vicious criticism 
of the Capitalist* counfcr 1 es,ylsXrpt compjletely coaqyinced ■;
that the communist bldcYfsyfoConsidered, idedlbglqally in 
harmony with Arab natlonallsni;Yv;;..vHe/:cibdtes'Y-Mao Tse Tung: as 
saying: 1 Reac11onaries Ymust be Vdestroyfeci Meheter they! are 
f o u n d . S a * T &  considers thiat7;Iti;i;s...clearly, necessary to 
define the word Ceae tionary/-';’ ":'a'c6.pp^ i;iig :;t'oyMarxY’he; Vrites,. 
belief in the Arab homelandYaiid yih Arab: nationalism contradict 
the essence of the sob I all At; or gahi s;a t i on.•; Hey t p.o quote s 
Mark1s denial that the workers have any .homeland * Ahmed Sa *id 
asks with great -indi^aiioh:Y"Is a belief Ylnythe /ArabYn^tion 
and its independence"hnd .its- freedpm. yfromV theYtnfluence • of Y:XyY Y 
Moscow; for example ,Abpn:s.i.dlr'edy^  : : : Y/
International; sociaiism,Isthlsbeilef.reactionaryi; Isbvery 
Arab who believes In his homeiandXand--;-itsf fre’e.doin' frpm the yy
influence of Moscow /oryfeshih^ spiritual hr material,
a react!onary?;// Are,:theXArabb considered by Mbscow to be ';Yy Y 
reactionaries? Moscow *s attitude towards, yugoilayia, fdr v; Y/y -7 
example, reinforces this view, in spite of ;the/,smiIbs:; of ItheV - Y
!• "ma*rakahal-maslr al-wahid*1 p* 15.:/ ‘■.z v- r • * >•.*;,r^. .a  . 7: Y " ;t y <■  ^  ^ ‘ • .''Y-°l Y"-' ' ’ - • 1 ; • t*
Soviet Central High Committee He continuebytdrstate that
this is the great problem of contemporary socialism.* Hations 
wish to free themselves from capitalist monoppiiCC .and exploit- * 
ation and any attempt to gain influence is imperialism, whether 
from the West or the East. . ’' i;
*Aziz. al-Hajj and *Amir ^Abdullah, the two Iraqi communist 
sympathisers ifYnptb'P^ the only'tWo- Arabv^wfltethy
whose works I haye^:read:^whqV-.ar.e ‘.outright and' absolute in their , 
.support for comnmni'sm and yet at the veameytlme yplafmM^ 
to the Arab nationalist movement. Youthen ^
/considering them as Arab nationalists;;'forfnoteis!^ JaY'inAtter^ rpf some/ 
doubt; the-fact that they consider themsel%e& ^s /A u o h Y Ia /fp e r^  
a strong enough point to justify their-inclusion in this study. 
Whether sincerevArab nationalists or not it is clear from their 
works that, -unlike .many > contemporary Arab nationalist writers, 
they do not consider the formation of thev United^Arab Republic 
in February 1958 as a very valuable step-towards the fulfilment 
of the true aims of the movement.
!Amir 'Abdullah discusses internal, difficulties in the 
Syrian region after the union with Egypt"and 1 points out: "React­
ionary forces conspiring in the 1 People*s; Party V;and the 
'constitutional* bloc and the tribes,, whose hands wCpb paralysed
: / and 'prevqhtedY from!^Yadiipn-fbefore the union,! ha.ve /now woken up 
yY/aM pn!:!theiry4®struotiije activity. Ati the same
time these f orees'Yhave‘be^uh-^^ayyioIbus Attack ;agains tthe oom- 
muni sis and; .progressive elementdyihYSyridy11^ YY^T&e Connection 
inf the fahthor * sxVMM/between communists Vdhd progress!vds is. 
obvipusVi Similarly 'the same.writer llsts copperat1on and,.friend* 
ship with the Soviet Union as the last of his aims of Arab : 
unity. These aims are given as: "Fulfilment of the’ means of 
winning victory in the Arab fight for - frebdokx);an<i/!the’vmainten- 
ance off; the freedom- of the; liberated, Arab: cbuntriesyahd securing 
their development and progress by re 1 iance.-upon-thefirmest . 
ties':; of;^ friehdshipyand/ cooperation wiidt/t£bY;S and i £b
other socialist countries.and the other forces of peace and. .
2 - ■ AY.:YY! YyYY;' V Y
freedom in the world." * The- insistence here of a : full and - Vb
firm;/frlendship7'^t£ the Soviet Urfpn,ds:,qi^ of.
thbYattitudeYof -a, ma j ori ty of Arab;,ha$lona 11 sty writers y!-MoVY;;;''Yf;
look, as we have seen, with some/suspicion at yleast ;upon 7that/yYY
country's policies* . .YyYYY.Y-YyVyY^ y.
It is interesting to see how^A^e^ Sa* 1 ^ justified 
ihbisYT ehrs; thati&f^ nationalists 'inajr!be regarded as 'react- * 
i onaries/ybyY theY c ommuni sts from ;the following asses sment by 
*Miir; AbdullahV *. He ; interpre t a;-the ■ present Egyptian calif or
1 • Op*, cit ., p. 24.
2. Dp.; citVV ,P* 32/3.
Arab unity to pome from the 'bourgeois' social and economic 
c las s• ;Discussing the suggestions put forward concerning the
Y„r . y,V "X  v  y y  -4"'f X 7 ? y -■ y y Y  X - - y  --O' Y y  = > , 7  7 !y,-- ■ ■  ,ay\ ;. y  y-y- ''-vy y / X y y  X
means of fulfilment of Arab unity, he writes:- "The solutions 
put forward to fulfil this aim differ according to the classes - 
which put -themforward y - The top 'bourgeois* class in Egypt, 
for example, suggests today a solution to the problem of unity ?
- a . 7 3 tv ■ >. ’ ’ v*. *. ‘ ■ ■ V*', .■ v- , ' - ■ ■' ---v.-h ■ - - .■ - _ . : -  7 ■ y V = \  7 XY\4 ,y y Y V ‘ * :"Y 7 ■ 1 Y - ;.7=V / ,y - J- , '7'"- :.,,7:;iJ
which denies the * principal1 interests of the working classes and f 
revolves within the circle of the. political and economic int­
erest's of this bourgeoisie."^* X- • . ■*.
A-truly incredible over appreciation^of the communist 
system/is/5 shown /by^  *Azia al-iSjiw- : He refers to the ’cold wan* 
struggle in'the r followi]og-terms: "The, battle taking place in 
the world today-between the.two camps Is not one over spheres
of influence. The battle is one between the forces of freedom
and peace and socialism on the one hand and the forces of 
slavery, war and exploitation on the other. On the first hand 
. stand all the70ppressed'peoples and ;all the freed Asian countries 
whether they7 like 1t or not , whether they ’ know it or not,, so 
long as they fight imperialism and its « pacts and•spheres of 
yinfluende and its aggression. The So vie tv.Uni on1 and all the 
yojfer'.Xspcialist/^cpuntribS'Vmove in the.-.-' vanguard.::of this world 
organisation opposed to*war, exploitation and slavery." * He 
goes on to express his surprise at the fact that some Arabs
1* Op. cit., p. 43*
•2. Op. ext., p. 60.
equate these forces' of.good and evil: "it is most surprising 
that the Arab patriots who criticise/the Soviet Union today v/v-yf 
propagand for socialism and-affirm that they are .Indeed build­
ing this system*- Dan you not see, however, that, Arab socialism 
turns criteria- upside down and equates between sbciallstrBtates/
which the workers and -peasants rule and countries1 which: s,re 
run by the nuclear and petrol monopolies?"!*/ : It:/Is interesting
to observe in this, passage the use. of /wbbds1 !which .hay^ 
obvious emotive value. The extraordinary-"Miyety ;^ A^iz al» 7 
Hajj-displays is scarcely credible; if he/ can be assumed to / 
;:be.lleye what he writes, then hi^YAtt^^ eyidehcb YY
;Yof:/the /effectiveness of communibtyprbpagaM Middle/ X Yx
can only be bruljY/eiM 
that the:-Arabs Y are ignorant of XtheVhomm is some thing
they readily admit themselves* , , ■
The long contact of the' Arabs with the West ern w or Id ha s 
"given them the Impression that they do know a great deal-about, 
it and/that they are justified in their dislike of -it. v .O.ommun- 
ist ideological/ and direct Russian Influence /in-,the world
is of such recent date that Arabs,do not know quite why they 
should oppose communism directly and in-all fields, or even 
in some VcaAesYas we have seen, whether thejy;;si|o4Id. -oppose It 
at all. Muhammad Majdhub expresses this widespread feeling:
’" It -seems to .us* '•vthat^ -the-i^Arabsv:know- a great. deal, about the 
.West from their collisionfWithvit. On the other hand they do ■
1* Ibid., p. 61*
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not know very much about the East because of the recentness 
of their contact with it and because of its political and 
social system* TheXWbstXiias takbA/mprb;
to smear the true f a C b X W b d X a M V / t o  diffusb 
slandebs and . faisehppds: cbncernii^YItV'-Xy YYxXY^ V/XX. -yX; - ■ %;;/; ;/xy.YXXv 
y ^YjpheXlhck,of /knowledgeXqf-or; at. least, disbelief in „y ; ■: 
pommihilstyaimeYbf -world domination;:a M :;.thWir‘ complete cdnvictYVy 
Ion thhtytbls is; thb ; aim of the We stern world;,X lead A r ^  yyX;
;ndtiomiistXWrIters ; to:; exprepp very uhder^ surprise^ arid X
^rdlgnationvdt XtheYreac ti onx of X theXWestX toXrPc eht Arab Xendeay^ Y 
ourbX^dXs^lW aid from; tbe communist; bloc. The obviousXexampley X: 
of;'^ MibX/type/ of si tuaiidnA sXthe! Egypt i b n 'arrangement / to;|buy X XX 
prms/ fr'oinXXtlieX-commuhi At couhtriesXin; 1955/6, theXWesternX reacts*/;; 
ion to which is considered, by many obseryersx-M be.fe&X the;.;-.■■:■
witM^wajLV pfc Asw4hXdam*XX;The:^ indignant Arab v • r;Y: X '
/attitude; to ! this reaction is ;clearly ^ and forcibly expressed by 
Dr. ibrahxin Jum* ak: " The arms which/Egypt and:S^ from
/iElussia, ;are not,, in themselves coi]ofeunist>Y foryarmsX are merely 
arms and are not.subjected to any nationality or ideology.#.
They would be pure Britain or-America and
diseased if bought from the Eastern bloc.1 *
-The^caution, , circumspectioh: ahd-ieyen/at ■vtkmesXpbviously 
critical attitude which Arab natiqhaiiXsMY^PP^/4#X the
1. Op. cit., p. 96/7.
majority towards ;the/ideological aspects : of1 communism are in  ^r 
marked contrast to their'-‘almost •unani&ottS/;‘;pr^^ Soviet and
c ommunist b 1 oc foreign and economie. policy 4 0 4he: c ouhtriesi.
They are surprised and delighted at tliel:at4lt^^
countries towards them; they consider .that t M  Astern natidhsy ;| 
on the one hand, still maintain their^ /l^nf^uenc'e^^gaiM'ti. their 
will, exerting force in the area and economic blackmail* ■They 
consider that although the communist yfc-i.pb,^'■ e'd.1 ii";-V'
some suspicion on ideological grounds,/Arab nationalism can lay 
no actual crimes at their door and their presence is not and 
has never been felt in the same way that-¥estern influence is 
felt*. The communist countries have, moreover., .given 5fairly 
generous economi c aid.and come, to the aid of the - Arabs in 
times,of need, without'attaching any apparent conditions*
This attitude ;ia clearly expressed hy the head of the broad­
casting system of the United Arab Republic,'and/consequently 
an influential personality in the direction ofjArah^fchought,
1* The c.omment of the American observer R.L, Allen is perhapb : 
justified at the present ^ time s 1 In general, Middle: Eastern 
countries have -been disappointed and frustrated 1 in their 
econmalG relations with thq^ B.p^ iet^ ^^ # 4  'disturbed o v ^  
the techniques employed and over the heavy dependence; which 
is. developing and have become inci'easingly sensitive to 
the political implicaM^ns^ Such /disillusion­
ment is not, however, apparent in recent.Arab nationalist 
writings * From article;" enti^iod; "Reported Middle. East
-and,the Communist World”, p* 81 of ’‘Middle East Report,.
1959.1 Middle East.Institute,',Washing€dn>;.::'i> 1959V: ed'*t
W. Bands.
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Ahmed Sa^id. He writes: "The Arab people finds in the social­
ist camp a support in its fight: against its* enemies and a force 
helping to bring about the failure of their plots, an aid to 
the Arabs in all their political, military and economic
battles which, every day and in every,place, confront them
1.against these enemies." * He goes on to give the usual and 
very, naive Interpretation of communist motives in giving this 
help: "The socialist camp sees*in the Arab people'and its
freedom and power over the Middle.;^^ast; a N^ popular f ^and govern­
mental force opposed to the chief powers of;capitalism. This 
, f ore e will c ome , b e t we en, c a pi tali sm and ,/■ the , s t r a t e gi c 
exploitation of the Arab area on one hand and will also ' 
exhaust the power of its capitalist enemies.and.will thus 
pave the way to the creation of a socialist-^society in the . -
Middle, E a s t .He concludes on the" next page that: "The 
capitalist camp is in the ^ position of an enemy towards Arab
nationalism;: the socialist camp stands;,as a supporter of. Arab
~Z ' ' V •
nationalism." * ■ *’
1. Op* cit., p;- 170*
2.. Ibid. ■ ' , - -
3.. Ibid.,, p. 171. Some Arab nationalist writers, it will be 
observed, prefer to use the word "socialist" where "com­
munist" would clearly be more apposite* Xaqueur^ . 
comments concerning communist motives in the Middle East are . 
.no,.doubt justified: "The declared aim of the Soviet•economic 
drive in the Middle East in 1955-66' was ■ to help the Arab 
countries to get rid of "Colonialist" economic tutelage* Its‘ 
real aim was that the political .’and economic' stability of the 
countries concerned should become dependent upon the main-
: tenance and■increase of trade with the .Soviet bloc.and China" 
Op. cit;,' p. 361. . , _
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■ Several Arab ^ nationalist writers detect a ba.sio change in 
'both the: Internal,//social situation In the Soviet Union and in 
the:.political./ideology of - communism in recent years. .They 
refer in particular bo the twentieth party congress of the 
communist party ,in .the. U*S .6 *H* held in 1956. as the . point of 
departure for the new policy* Clovis Maqsud-, for example, 
analyses the internal political and social situation in the 
-Soviet Union after the death of Stalin and considers that he 
sees evidence of the rise to power of a new'managerial class.
It was,' in his'opinion the emergence of this new class- which 
led to the changes in attitude apparent from the- congress. * 
"This congress," he writes, ."made the Soviet; Union alter its- 
positioh into that of a great power which has interests and - 
desires'some of which correspond.with the principal interests 
and desires* of the Asian and African governments and peoples. 
Its^attitude * has changed from, being,'as it was in the time of- 
the Stalinists, that of a government which.considered that all 
who did not conform with its ideological policy were enemies 
it wished to destroy* It was this change in principles and 
politics.which made the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal and the 
Syrian-Russian rapprochement possible without those firm 
relations being established which would have resulted In a loss 
of sovereignty for both Egypt and Syria* On the contrary, the 
■relations which were established//strengthened'-; the sovereignty . 
of these two Arab regions and affirmed,, their; independence.-",’!*'*
1 Op; cit.,,p* 44.
The Iraqi pro-communist - writer, *A-zTz at-H&j j; considers^-/ ;
as fmay / be; Expected, that it is'v fede liber at e 'i add uhseiflsh;: desire :J
on; the part of the Soviet /Union which ha/s led ^ to - its’; help /arid;'/:v j
^ . suppopt;h?bf/the/& a merely negative aimof '/.// : * f
V /ffbillhg the /plahsPpfh He divides the whole
/fv^wqrid;tnto t&e/ S o c i a l i s t ^ a n d  comments
/ / wifh snrprise -oh the ; fact that some; proponents of the policy
/ . ;..v^ ;b^ ;(|;pq9itiy0 neutf al£tyt^adsiMe .that the two camps may be ■
/ eqirated in their , relattqn^hipd/towards the Arab/world*: “ To
://, . ;refute tM^ he; contrasts- of war and interference
- / ;;±rL wor'ld. on the part of; the; Wed ter rnpower s;with the /
; help and. encouragement shown to the/ Arabs by the Soviet Union.
In assessment of Russia fs motives for gif ing this help,, he
writes: "The socialist countries have helped the freedom- 
/. seeking revolutions since theirv/birfeh./and have / supported the
/; ;// liberated Afro-Asian countries not only because they-realise
that these, movements and their. triumphs strike at the imperial­
ists and their plans for war. On ■ the: contrary they wish for 
the continuation*of ■ the development of these, countries for the 
SP94;/bfefh®if peoples and for the good of huinanity .as a whole."***•
/ 'f ,;;// •/* /I have noticed little evidence fhv ^ a t e  lit­
erature of any disillusionment caused to Arabs concerning 
. /coimnuhi sm by the intervention of the Russian army in the
; / W UL ♦ Qp* Pd-b/* , 4 - 4  *: / \./S: Vf / ,  . £f-:'V :?'•/
Hungarian revolution of 1956 f although, the majority must, be ft 
aware/ of. the course of events : from the, books and articles;: in . 
Arabics/which1 deal with the sub ject. ; Those ifewfriters; who. do . ,
refer to the: massacres ih Hungary, at all seem to tend to be : 
sympathetic; towards the Hussians rather than the. Hungarians *
The fqtlowihgf :qdb^  fhpnh/Dr f. A/jdh^^ book. shows/// f ;:
the complete. det ad hmenf ■ with/t whi ch th e sub j e ct is d i sous sed* fit: V 
It is inter e sti ng / to observe, mof e o very fhow the West 1 s blamed, 
at least. ihtpart";f or: the;jhituatiph:;; "It would have been : 
possible for the Hungarian, revolutloharies % o : aQhieve what they 1 
wantedfif■;■;fhey/;iia;dmerely/foll^ the ri ght path. It had 
been the intention - of the /new v leader £//of • the; Soyiet Union to f . 
grant: them;:a'bigger/vshahe^ -\,df' th&etqndbhce,.^ ..a in their - .
relations/wi th/Mosc oW, aft ef v/;ihey:reallsedtihe . seriousness of :. 
the situation and the . fury of the ma j ority.n The demonstra t ions-',, 
however, took on a radica 1 deviationist stamp, after the .inter­
ference;-of /the;/ttest; and. incitement/^fof thei^ople: tb ^
,secedewhich. threatened that /Hungary ’ would withdraw^completely. / 
frbm/the Eastern;bloc/ and socialist principles. . This situation ■ 
£ore ed Moscow.; to ..use violence and brutality . t o maintain the . ; 
byst emf feist ihgf in/ ‘ ..y>- . / : if. •/ ' t / ' ' ’-/f
.-. It /would, \however,; be /very fslse :and misleading to. give 
the impression-that -Arab, nationalist -writers ;hre unanimous ly ■ 
uncritical of the internal: political.systems uf rule in the . v 
communist c oimtfie s. Dr *. ?Abduilah; ’Abd/al^Uaim is cutting and-
1. Op* Cit. , ;  p* 112 *  r ; ' •  i - t / 1 I f  / ; / / ■  - V / t i  v t - i -% ■ . -  . / • ; ■ • ;  / •  •
f t : /■ satirical in his/assessment of/the force and .terrorism he ; 
f t  s '' considers/to be; atht he base/of ycommupdsiy, rule. f  He/di scusses : the , 
/ :ftt 8.once pt-<. ...that; -tlie-' ,ide.a-l'- communist society where government would 
1 f ;. be unnecessary i s rec ognisably far awayand that thecommuni sts 
/say,that in the^meaOThilef a socialist society must be con­
structed whichfwi 11 eventually lead to. the .ideal. He comments 
' f  with bitter sarcasm: "in ant i c i-pat’i on of that promts ed s tage
:.-:// - : and of that happy/day, there is .no alternative but to accept:
■ the existence/of/a government and,• moreover, that d b  shall be
:. the most "extremeVo.f' /go^pnmentsf in violence ,, cruelty and .// J
f //:// / pppressioh.;"-J* j!. Hb goes,/on to point out the basic / fallacy in 
y r ;: ’/: cbmmunlst rule and how /it is in;no real way democratic : "There * 
fy-/■ y/;£s; no/- solutiohbtherfthan a tyranrdcal form of /government/ which. ;
will grasp the’revolution with a grip of iron and which will, 
t /y./y'ap;/theyVsayy /fulfily the 'dictatorship bf the working plus.ses 1.
s dictatorship of the working classes? It is the 
/// rule of the majority by means bf/ibe:b^ the ,
.pi’/iffpule of the communist party; by meana ; of yitS/central committee 
V of ' fifteen members and the rule ofthe cehtral commi11e.e by 
y / v .means/ of the politicaifoffibe ^ythp pblitburp? by. ^ hich consists 
P:-,///. of five m e m b e r s t - H e '  goespnto criticise verybitterly the
v ■-/ / I/Op. cib.y, p, 108; / '-"/"v/v " ■>■/, •;/.’/: / '
■;':dydr;H 2v^ d  :///'y ,/ by//
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'police-state ' form- of government in the communist countries, 
/which relies, he considers, on armed forces to*maintain order 
over everything, the "trade unions, the factories and all the 
people
Dr ^ vHaasanv8a *by too ^ belongs to the minority of. Arab 
nationalist writers who. are: outright in their criticism of 
communism; he "believes that communists do still maintain their 
basic aims of world domination* He points to this in one of 
his recent books and gives as his opinion that the current 
political and,ideological movements in the Middle East are not * 
sufficiently stoong to combat-communism* He stresses the need 
for a new, effective ideology: "The strength of compulsion and 
of1 oppression, and the strength of the nationalist sentiments 
streaming forth, and the pivoting about the personality of one ■ 
single leader, the strength of the. call for a 'democratic, 
cooperative,.socialist society!, the stremgth of (the call for) 
the. commencement of the creation of unity as a living truth 
and.the-strength of the policy of positive neutrality, these 
are not sufficient alone to stand up against the strength 
of communist ’ i d e o l o g y D r *  Sa!b shows his own personal - 
refusal to be influenced by communist propaganda by pointing 
out that the suppqsed communist; miracleswhich have .been brought 
about in Russia and China aire no greater than those accomplished
1.: Op. cit., p. 15*
lAmerlcayjE^ for^examjDle^ - He: quotes from .
; ;r \• ; ’ Jttie disiilusfoned 'Jugoslav: communist who - ■
v ■ - 1 ■,claims;iu h^ Class** that the communists do not
;:; vtJ-t trpally;;lnidw thence I’ve s what toe^;hre' doing Jin the 'field of
economics. “Thus,1* concludes Sa*b, "we find ourselves before 
;J, t - J the fact that In thctpresent^ situdtion there are many
different ideological paths towards a better human destiny.ul#
, ; ::v:v j t l T h e  de;velo]pentb; ^  place Iraq since the
/;■ trevolutibn; df tl u ^  by many Arab writers to
; ; ;Vshow. a; definite■ communist influence : in that- country and anti- •
communist feeling has grown rapidly in .Arab .nationalist circles,
t  -'tvtirtherest;/ o f - the  ^ ^ a b  world,'}a;s; a result# *A11 Nasir al- 
t-: i J j Dili,: a. • tebaheset^wri^tar Jwho^ has been Active in developing and ,
j’t.spreadingJtiibiiideplpgy, of Arab; nationalism since he formdd the
tv,:, w";^  Beirufexsectiph bf of Nationalist Action*’, one, of
Jit ttjthe- earliestv’ArabJnatiohalipt,parties, >in 1936, is typical 
, : \ ; ::In the strength of his criticlsm bf/ c ommuiii sm. of tills rec ent 
- trend. - He .is.obviously;c'dOTihced of.;;,tlie//c.6inmunist''aim^  of
;; . : world dpminatlon r : 11 Coiiimunist lmperialism isV lndeed and in truth
v t;/: - a; terrible-^ ard; tblghtful.;imperiaiismt it: is: an: imperialismv’of tlnd
JV''; V '''vlnte;lieci\j,-.::a'f; thought it Is completely
i t ; / v qpposed to^  the-.lndiyid^ national being. - It Is an
; t:;va^bpi'ute / terrible and yetvimperceptible: overpowering
inf luence.• •it’. is absolutely oppos ed: to people 1 s customs:/ 
religions and history.M . He goes on to give his. opinion that 
/the dim;df this /imperially all:the peoples of the .
Jearth rule: of Hus sia which / /.he - sbyS /. “i stgre edy
;-for power over the; earth .by means of commuiiism J that daughter 
of Jewry. or vthe second Z ± bnl sm.1 •^  : He very significantly! adds .
;a : footnote at the bottom of the - page refering. to this last 1 
remark which say a: 11 The positivejprbef ^ of the truth of what : ; - ;
we say, .if there/is/any meed for proof, is the present situation 
: in every: country which the Hussians have cblonialised in the \ .
. name of. socialism - f or example' Rumania/ Bulgaria, Hungary and ;
others .,r?* t -It .is ■ frbin :assessment.s svich as, this and the attitude 
;3lereJ/shpwh thatone lias the/suspicion .;thatjthevfsu^ v;v!.:
, of the Hungarian revolution was:' not !entirely without effect in • :
: bringing /about. a; disilluslonmeht among s ome / Arabs .with regard •' 
tq certain/basic- aspects of c ornmunist< policy. Indeed, one has t; 
ttha; impression that,, despite what some of them in fact-express' ,
;lit writihg s '’/hot- :a. few; Arab nationalist theorists have serious: 
/doubts concerning/the ;motives for-offers/of:aid from the 
jsbmmunist bloc and.the advisability: of accepting such aid. 
Theyfeelln such' heed of help/ however, against their assumed 
enemies the ^Western imperialists that' they fee 1 constrained to
1., 2. and: 3•’ “mihnah al'-ir'aq.H (" Iraq1 s/ iri kl1* *) Beirut , '1959 , 
page 7. (pamphlet) .
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put their doubts:, fears and conscience to one side. .
The policy of some Arab governments in accepting economic 
and military aid from the communist countries while at the same 
time effecting deliberate suppression of Arab communist parties 
and: conducting violent anti-communist propaganda -campaigns-must- 
lead to considerable; confusion invthp^minds1 of-the- lesser 
informed Arab, peoples. ‘ Dr. Muhammad Majdhub makes this 
^obvious from; his own attitude to this problem. He makes an 
implicit criticism of the policy of the United Arab Republic 
in conducting an ahti-b battle with commun- :
ism despite the fact, that it.accepts aid from the Soviet Union. 
H^ -; considers that, it istwrpng and "ridiculous to accept aid from 
.th%;East:• while’forbidding;"the people to hear the principles on 
h^ic.htit-'i's. ba sed.^/^Soi iong.^s ^ ©v, remain. battling with the 
^imperialists a M  so longiaA the’Eastern bloc holds out} to us 
••^the'J:hind‘ ;-pf -.friendship, it is disgraceful, ridiculous' and a 
’r jfeurde^  that we should open up a new bloc before
i’t.Ke. people and- yet encourdg^^ tHelint ernai : princip^
:;whicli':'t'M;S;;:bloc is..construe11 ngif?v * This attitude is sig-
; hifleant:and;;pfbbably; quite* Arab countries;
Viit;may perhaps point to what may result in the growth of
1. Op. cit., p. 142.
Gpmmunist influence d n  the;arpa/as a Consequence of the 
acceptance; offaid from the cqmmuiiist/-countries-i;S^
The! reiatiohsHip".tetwe^'A^ toinmunism
is, as this examination has made' clear, a very complicated 
one^ hbdptj^ipfiSbnerali^ and impossible*
;Ihere: are; some; Contemporary(Arab nationalist writers .who are 
absolutely opposed to both the " ideological a ^  pol­
itical manifestations of communist policy. On the other
hhnd there, is a minority-of> writers;h&b/Uuppo^
Arab unity and the^fprmation^of : the; are
open:in./their complete agreement with feuth/aspects; of ; com­
munism. The; position of the' greatestlnumb!^ /Arab"nation/;;/
allst writers lies spmewhere);/betweenthe
open .criticism vaM unquestiohing support"/ Thpse^  ^wboare; not 
entirely convinced by cpmunism seem to express .their 
pritieism/in'examinations of its ideological• rat her than its 
prac t i dal //politic al a spec t s> a c.ompl i cated ; sublee t about 
which they may not be very well informed. In .spite of the 
Widespread disagreement concerning the .ideological aspects 
of communism among Arab nationalist writers they, in the. 
large .majority,' express delight and gratitude in accepting 
mi3 itary and economic aid frpmlijie^'-cpmmunist countries to 
;-hb-lp?ithdm-:ln;.their struggle; with the West. This/criticism 
of 'dpmmui^st ideology and acceptance of communist aid has
created :an--obviously. 1*11 ogica 1 situation which is noticed and : 
criticised by some writers* t ,
‘ In trying to .assess the, effects of communism on the-ArabpnH
«. V ’ s V U, \ s ~ s  t, , «, ■,.■> y  ** ; <■ . * , ,= - •. . - *• t v .’ < *1 ' % . • ► t ,* , . >- r' .*• *,y- /<•.• ; '  *.'•<■' ■ - j. ' - - -*1' -V'f-'
nationalist movement, one ought, of course, to make a distinct­
ion between communism as an idea based .on the belief that 
social equality and justice can only.be achieved through the 
revolutionary rule of one party, the communism party, and that 
,the' resuurces of the country?should- be-managed-exclusively by 
the Stefcte, and between the concept of* communism as a univer­
balist politic al phi-lo s ophy. The majority of Arab nationalist 
theorists do not seem to be in conflict to any marked degree 
with the social and economic-theory,of communism* :They refer 
to limitation .’of private property and personal for tune, and 
seem to support the idea of state-ownership of land and ind­
ustry.^* , ’ The-'soeialism1 they support, seqms, in factpto be of 
an extreme left-wingtyar emphasis is placed
in many works , on ; the/need for ^ change, of a violentlyrevolut*- 
ionary nature. The neaetion of the majority of these writers 
t o 'the idea of .a one:party>form of rule is* not, unfortunately, 
very ‘ apparent; they; simply d o  not deem to have given the
subject a great deal of thought, especially in their discussions
p V^:iy/.'•;/ hyvH •;,*/ y d d f / u ' h v d h b ? ; ■ ;
v. of c ommuni sm. *
'lt'.-;:Seer:vGhapter;v‘Two above, pp*^cl *A-
2. For a_brief discussion of'the "Natibml^Union'^.-.c^Mal- 
ittihad al-qaumi)' party being developed in the United 
.Arab ° Re public?,, see Chapter Six, above pp. A4-Z. <d~
/,;;:;■ ■/ Some Westorn observers/ are of the opinion that the ^ trad- , 
/dtional:/viey: that/ Is lam/forms .ah M effective bulkwark agaihst 
: c ommuhism" is no longer applicable in the /Arab world.. WaIter y / 
//:^ qheury/f or,/:example, "writ that: "the discussion' afeouty the /,/-■-/ 
yy-ajfinity:..beb^  Communism- is no longer/: of vital
//'interest./ / It/ was.;/bf; importance so/ long ; as .the /vast majority /:/••
/ /of the / people/ /beiieyed /ixi rellgioh; and /I slam. cont 1nued to /be /; .;-/: 
/;f he only active; f oree in their lives."^•/' He. is in fact, : / /; /.^ .
/clearly of the / qpi ni oh • that - because Arabs dp / not yhtv the pre sent , 
■ time /dispiay/a /pfebccupftion^/with religious/observances of/;;a .: v: / 
.//formal mature/,; as they did in the past, the/ inf luene’e of islsmi 
//-hasdeclined. /.• Arab ■ nafibhalists are^ however,y by definition . / 
/-//those/who have pride in the Arab nation which they assume to // / 
/ exist', from.1 the; cfeif/to; the; Atiantic •1 5/They are. conscious: /.//
/ that it Was Islam which originally motivated the creation of / ;;/
/ . this hatton, and they are intensely/proud, both Christians .
. as/, well as Muslims, of fhe. culture and civilisation which the :
/ Qur1 an and Is lam created-; Whether or not the Arab world ./.■///; /
; ac c ept s uniyer sail st c ommuni s t * dogmas /would ultimate ly s e era t o 
. depend on whether , or. not Arabs do retain their pride in Arabism,
, of which Islam is. so important a part. In this respect at /: /'
1*-Op; cit., p. 6. See too the article "Communism and .Islam." 
/;/ . by Bernard /LewisI./1 International Affairs" Vol. /X2Q&;/ Jan* -
•‘■le.a'sf^ctherefqr©':Tslam; mayyuertainly/be considered still ;
toibe -an’/importaxxt bulwark against communism of a universalist ;
nature* •
If,'however, one considers-that:by, communism one;means the 
/adceptance of an internal form of:totalitarian rule, bs-sed on a 
:one-party system, after, for example,: the Yugoslav model,
■one must accept that Islam is not necessarily opposed t o • *
c ommunism. If one accepts thisttype/o for. cojmnun-
ism, one cannot but agreed'-with //^queurthat« oulit 
: ;are how/m ore: like ly 'than /most /others/1 o y provide/;a favoin^a 
; br'eedIng-ground f or / c ommuni smv n - * The dividing ; line between 
tota litar Ian die tat or ship and c pmmurii sm is ;agr eed by.: many: t o 
be very/, f ixxe /Such/ die^iaiorst^^s ’may /0 learly bee ome firfeljt
tps^abiishein/tlie-,Arab'worl^ // * v/:;,//y * ....
//^ / ;v:^ however,-/be' mbstv UPwisd; t^
c one ept s#pf / democracy /are wide ly under st odd/; and fa ecretly 
/accepted in the Ahab/woridy/ despi the/fact that/man#/ Arabs 
; seekj/ for psychological reasons, to deny/this at the present 
time. , h In the unllke ly event of the establlshmeht•’ of . communist 
/Ipuppet" regimes of the hast European variety in the Arab/y- t 
world, the new rulers would be likely to find, in my opihion 
that: "it is easy to conquer any Arab country, but their 
natural ihclihatioh^tb^rebellion .makes it difficult and/bkpenr/'t 
/.Slyer for; the invader to maintain his control*"2 //y ////v/:;■ :7i:v
1* Ibid. , :






lo examination of the ideology of contemporary Aral nationalism j
would he complete or of value without an attempt to define the j
; i
place of Jamal !Abd al-Nasir, President of the United Aral J
■ j
Republic, within the movement* It is ly no means easy, however*!
J
to deal with this subject in a satisfactory manner* Nasir is, |
J
on the one hand the undisputed leader of the Arabs, held in 
great esteem in all the Arab countries, and yet, on the other 
hand, he has not spoken always in his speeches in the way 
typical of the vast majority of Arab nationalist writers and 
theorists of the last thirty years. The latter have been and 
are, almost without exception, individuals who have apparently 
seen themselves from an early age to be Arabs first and fore­
most and only secondly nationalists of the political entities
in which they live. The opposite seems clearly to have been the
case with Nasir until comparatively shortly before the form­
ation of the United Arab Republic of which he is now head*
Arab nationalist writers have been seen in the majority 
of their works to use the words ummah (nation), shayb (people), 
watan (homeland) and al-qaumiyah (nationalism), with particulare
reference to the Arab nation, people, homeland and nationalism 
all of which they consider to exist. Masir, however, In the
majority of his speeches delivered before the autumn.of 195^ 
used these words to refer specifically to the Egyptian nation, 
people and nationalism. We find for example, that he said" in 
a speech delivered on the 23rd. of .February, 1953 5 ."Yes, let 
us have confidence in ourselves and in our nation; Egypt, 
whether weak or strong, is a free nation.1* (ummah). In the same 
speech, clearly referring to Egypt and not to the Arab world, he 
said: "The forces of evil have since time immemorial conspired 
in vain against this homeland (watan) and its eterna.1 civilisat­
ion." He also used the word "qaumiyah" in the same speech in 
an obviously exclusively Egyptian context; the word Arab is 
nowhere mentioned in this speech; "We are not fighting for 
the sake of our freedom and. our nationalism; no force, no matter 
how strong,, can stand in our way.1 In another speech delivered 
in Gairo, in which he addressed the Egyptians as Egyptians and 
ma.de no mention of the word Arab, he said: "We are,.0 citizens,
a strong people (sha1 b ), an ancient people."-1**
Iii the following year, on the 31st. of May , 1954 in a 
speech delivered in Bulaq, he defined in comparative detail 
what he considered to be'the limits of the. homeland (watan) .
He said: "We do for Bulaq what we are doing because it is a 
part of this whole homeland. We look at the whole country,
1. ©n the 26ththofoHov©mber, 1953*
from. Alexandria to Aswan. We look at the country as a whole 
from Alexandria to Tel al-Kabir; this is the whole homeland.'1 
At al-Gizah on the 23rd. of the same month, he stated the aims 
of the Army revolution of 1952 referring solely to Egypt and 
without mentioning the Arab world: "This revolution took place 
only to fulfil national glory (al-’izzah a1-qaumiyah) in this 
country." He ended the speech with these words: "Lastly, J 
want to affirm to you that Egypt will never after today be 
ruled by other than its loyal and honourable citizens, who 
believe in the homeland (watan), the people (sha'b), freedom 
and national glory."
Throughout the "Philosophy of the Revolution", issued in 
1954, Jamal *Abd.aIpNasir refers to Egypt as the homeland(watan) 
It is very evident from this work tha„t Hasir was thinking, 
when he wrote it, primarily as an Egyptian. In-Part Two, where 
he examines the aims of the 1952 Army revolution and the means, 
by which they may be attained he wrote: "There is no doubt 
that we all dream of a strong, liberated Egypt. This is a 
matter on which no two Egyptians differ."^* It Is interesting, 
too, to observe the way in which Nasir refers to the Arabs as 
one of the numerous waves of conquerors who have ruled Egypt 
for periods throughout history: "in my opinion, Egypt's historj
under the Pharoahs cannot be overlooked. Then comes the inter­
action. between the Greek culture and ours. The Roman invasion
1* pp. 31 and 33 of English and Arabic editions respectively
and the Islamic conquest, with the waves of Arab migration
which followed should also not be left out of the picture
At the conclusion of this chapter, having discussed the means
of achieving the desired aims of the Revolution, and the work
open to men of * under standing and experience**, he wrote, s
"Our mission lies in gathering them together to work for the
2future of Egypt - strong, liberated Egypt."
A complete absorption in Egyptian affairs is similarly 
shown in a speech delivered on the 15th of November, 195^> 
shortly after the supposed attempt at his assassination 
reputedly made by the Muslim Brothers: "We Army men work from 
ideals and principles and the confidence we express today is 
only a confidence in these ideals and principles* All these 
aim at one goal-- the glory of Egypt, the freedom of Egypt, 
the dignity of Egypt, untiat social justice which will satisfy 
all citizens is achieved in this homeland*"^*
1* PP* 38 and 42 resp.
2. pp* 47 and 53 re'sp.
5. The apparently exclusively Egyptian aims of the 1952 rev~ 
olution in Egypt shown here and frequently elsewhere in 
Nasir*s speeches delivered between i952 and 1956 differ 
remarkably from the aims more recently stated to have 
been those of the revolution which are stressed in many 
more recent Arab nationalist works. In the official 
Handbook for the U.A.R. for 1959, p* 18, for example, 
we find: "This revolution was the turning point In the 
whole of the Arabs1 modern history. It was quickly respond­
ed to by every part of the Arab world and was taken as the 
much hoped for rise of the Arabs against corruption and 
oppression, both external and internal.
Since President Nasir1 Is now the popular figurehead of 
Arab nationalism, it seems indeed remarkable that in the 
speeches he delivered In the whole period from 1952 to 1956', 
periods of several months at a stretch often passed by without 
his using the word lArabI publicly at all* In this period he 
used the two words. !Arab* and 1 qaumiyah * (nationalism) in 
direct connection in his speeches no more than perhaps ten 
times* The speeches Nasir delivered on his trip to India and 
Pakistan and in Indonesia ih 1955 at the Afro-Asian conference j
i
In Bandoeung are extremely interesting In this connection. He j
j
made great efforts to present himself as an Egyptian rather j
than as an Arab and made only infrequent passing references to \
the Arab countries. In India, for example, he stressed that )
both India and Egypt had great civilisations in ancient times,
t
and that each could therefore be justly proud. In the Bandoeung 
Conference on the 19th. of April 1955? he reiterated that the ; 
six aims of the Egyptian revolution were: 111) To raise the
standard of living of the ordinary man in Egypt, both mater­
ially and spiritually. 2) The creation of a true democratic 
life based on sound principles In the country* 5) Abolition 
of feudalism by agricultural reform. 4) Freeing of the economy 
from the grip of the monopolists who deprive the individual 
of his freedom and the state of its sovereignty. 5) The
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strengthening of the Army to defend our sovereignty and to 
fulfil our international obligations, 6) The spreading of 
social equality.'1 The speech makes no mention of either Arab 
unity or the Arabs*
In a speech he delivered to the Muslim countries over the 
radio from Bandoeung on the following day, in celebration of 
the holy month of Ramadan, Nasir expresses delight at the obvious 
respect felt by Asian countries towards Egypt and consequently 
his own pride at being Egyptian. Neither the Arab countries, 
nor even the word 'Arab1 Is mentioned at all. On the Pres­
ident 1s return from Bandoeung to Egypt on the 2nd* of May 1955> 
he said;, in a speech he delivered in Cairo: "in the last fifteen 
days, I thought of you all frequently and about Egypt and about 
Egypt's future, 1 longed all the time for Egypt and for the 
people of Egypt. I left the homeland (watan) for far off 
places only to fulfil your aims and to emphasise your principHesv 
The whole world feels today that Egypt, has a separate being 
and an independent personality."
In the Officers1 Club in Cairo, on the 19th* of the same - 
month, Nasir reiterated the six aims of the Revolution, all 
exclusively concerned with internal Egyptian affairs, just as he 
had outlined them in Bandoeung. In a speec±i he delivered in 
the same club on the 23rd. of July, 1955, he expressed his
absorption in Egyptian affairs. He said: "We will all coop­
erate together, the army with the people, the people with the 
army, to build up a strong Egypt and to fulfil our hopes and 
reaffirm our aims* We will all, people and army (seek to 
achieve) the aims for which we revolted. We will create a 
great Egypt, a strong Egypt, an Egypt made strong by its glory 
and its nobility. (We will work for) an Egypt which can strive 
to unfurl the flag.of freedom in all regions, an Egypt which 
can unfurl the flag of.glory in other countries, an Egypt 
which can unfurl the flag of dignity in all civilised 
lands*" It is interesting to observe the constant repetition 
of the word Egypt in the oratorical style employed in this 
speech, a style.reminiscent of that employed in the speeches 
of recent European nationalist politicians. In a speech 
delivered on the 5th* of July 1955 we again observe the 
repetitive use of the word Egypt to inspire his audience with 
suitable fervours "The revolution will1last so long as Egypt 
has a people, so long as Egypt has patriots, for this revol­
ution represents evdry individual Egyptian,every group of 
the people of Egypt, every village in Egypt and every town in 
Egypt."^
1* Remarks of this nature did not, of course, go unnoticed in 
the Arab countries. As T. Little comments, Nationalists of 
the region, although deeply Impressed by the evacuation 
agreement, believed that. President Nasir was lukewarm towards 
Arabism and solely concerned to revive Egypt, even if it 
meant coming to terms with Israel*" "Egypt , Benn, London, 
1958, p. 255.
Although this examination of NasirSs speeches show his 
primary concern for and interest in Egyptian internal affairs, 
it would be false to maintain that he had no thoughts at all
■j
for the Arabs■throughout the period up till 1956. * Indeed, 
both the '‘.Philosophy of the Revolution" and his speeches show 
clearly that jamal *Abd aI~Nasir was always keenly aware of the 
desirability of strengthening Egyptian relations with the Arab 
countries. In Part Three of the "Philosophy of the Revolution",; 
Nasir expands earlier remarks concerning the geographical 
position of Egypt and the effect that this position must have 
on Egypt*s destiny and role in international affairs; "The 
era of Isolation is gone...It has become imperative that every 
country should, look around to find out its position and its 
environment and decide what it can do, what its vital sphere is, 
where is the scene of its activity and what its positive role 
can be in this troubled world." * Although he consciously lays 
primary emphasis on Egypt as an independent country, he stresses 
Its central position In the Arab-world: "Neither can we Ignore
1. In January 1956, the new Egyptian constitution was announced 
which acknowledged officially that Egypt was part of the 
Arab nation. Prom this date until the Suez War in Nov.
1956 Nasir continued, however, to lay far greater stress 
on purely Egyptian affairs than on Arab affairs.
2* pp* 51 and 59* (Eng. and Arabic edits.)
Jthat there is an Arab circle surrounding Us and that this j
i
1 ‘circle is as much a part of us as we are a part of it." * He 
again stresses this position in the /Arab world: "It is not
in Tain that our country lies to the South West of Asia, close 
to the Arab world, whose life is intermingled with ours."
He concludes; "There is no doubt that the Arab circle is the 
most important of all these circles and the circle most closely 
connected with us.n^* It is interesting to observe throughout j
' I
these passages how Nasir refers to the Arabs in the third and ]
not the first person. j
i
Later in the same work, Nasir shows clearly that hk is ;
thinking in terms of close Egyptian cooperation with the Arab
countries. In a discussion of the sources of power of the
group which the Arab countries and Egypt together form, he
wrote that the first of these sources would be: "That we are a
group of neighbouring nations welded into a homogeneous whole -by;
every possible material and moral tie that would unite any such ;
4.
a group of nations." In the following sentence, in which he - 
referred to one civilisation, it seems clear that he 'was point- 
infect6 that of the Arabs and not the Egyptians; "Our peoples 
possess peculiarities, potentialities,and a civilisation
1. pp. 51 and 60..
2. Ibid•
3. pp. 53 and 61*.
4*. pp. 64 and 74.
inspired by the spiritual principles of the three divine 
religions which can never be overlooked in any attempt to 
build- an new, stable and peaceful world." The use of the 
word peoples1 (shu*ub) in the plural here is significant; 
his most recent speeches refer, of course, to the *Arab 
people1 in the singular.
Nasir*s first public reference to Arab unity came in a: 
*message of greeting1 published to the people of Iraq by the 
Iraqi newspaper al-Balagh on the 4th. of August, 1953* In 
it, Nasir said; "Arab unity is the only path by means of which
; 4* ' •/ ■* y '
1we can attain the aims of all the .Arab nations* {umam). We
have suffered greatly in the past as a result of the intrigues
which the occupation sought to create between us a M  all this
led us to lose our confidence in one another and even to lose
our confidence in ourselves* We must now take warning from the
past and its lessons and strive until each of us has faith in
himself and in his brother* In this way we can achieve the
2 .
aspirations of the Arab people. This statement, quoted above
1* The plural "nations", too^ here contrasts with both the 
customary singular^used by more typical Arab nationalist 
writers and with Nasir*s own more recent usage.
2* Nasir lays great stress in his speeches on the need for
Egyptians and, later, Arabs to have confidence in themselves. 
Wilton Wynn In his book "Nasir of Egypt" (Oamb. Mass., 1959) 
considers this 1 search fox'4 dignity* the.prime motive of 
Nasir*s character. G-eorges Voucher, too, writes: "It was 
wounded personal dignity and outraged national pride more 
than a desire for political revenge or the poverty of. the 
people which caused the Egyptian revolution." Abdel Nasserr- et 
son equipe." Paris, 1959? P* 11*
in full, oomes quite unexpectedly in the body of Nasir*s \
speeches, in which before this occasion, mention had scarcely 
been made of the Arabs at all* It is interesting to observe, 
incidentally, that in Nasir*s early speeches, from 1952 to 1955? 
reference was made to the Arabs almost exclusively in speeches 
directed to non-Egyptian audiences.
The first direct public use of the words *Arab nationalism* 
connected together in his speeches came in a reception for Arab
i
students held at the Officers* Olub in Cairo. For the first 
time, on the 29th. of May, 1954, Jamal *Abd al-Nasir declared 
his belief in Arab nationalism; "I have always pondered deeply 
over the Arab homeland- and Arab nationalism, but I have never ;? -i
had the opportunity until the present occasion to hold a meet- j
ing with Arabs. What do I now feel? The truth is that I cannot j
distinguish between you, that Is, between the Algerian and j
the Iraqi or the Jordinian and the Syrian. I am unable to i
differentiate between your names and the regions from which 
you come. You have all united under one name: Arabism. At 
the same time, I have felt strong feelings of brotherhood 
towards you; I am indeed a brother standing before his brothers, 
brothers in religion, in Arab nationalism, in sentiments and 
aspirations.1 He went on. to say that all efforts of the 
imperialists to split the Arab world apart had failed and that 
Arab disunity inspired by the West had caused the Arab defeat 
in the Palestinian war. The speech lays no further stress,
however, on the need for closer Arab relations In the future.
The personal influence of Jamal *Abd al-Nasir in the 
policy and organisation of the 1Voice of the Arabs1 broad­
casting station is Impossible to assess. On the one hand, the 
virulent anti-British and anti-colonialist attacks carried 
out by this station and the attempt to paint the picture of 
revolutionary Egypt as the friend of all persecuted nations, 
accords with Nasirfs theories concerning the !circles of 
influence1 put forward in the "Philosophy of the Revolution."
On the other hand, however, the remarkable conviction and 
insistence with which Egypt is represented as an Arab country 
in even the early broadcasts of the station, corresponds to no 
similar conviction detectable from Nasir*s speeches from the 
same period* The,overwhelming, majority of.his speeches from 
1953 to 1956 do not refer to the Arabs at all*
However this may be, the following extract, from a speech 
delivered on the 4th. of July, 1954 in celebration of the 
completion of the first year*s activity * of the.1Voice of the
1* In the first broadcast of the new programme, Gen. Naguib 
said that the purpose of the 1Voice of the Arabs1 was to 
improve social and cultural relations between Egypt and the 
other Arab peoples. Naguib expressed his concern with Arab 
problems and a desire to "achieve the aims of the Arab world 
at the eax‘4llest possible time." He made, however, no reference 
to Arab political unity and stressed the plurality of the 
Arab peoples and the need for their full individual Inde­
pendence . See B.B.G. Publication "Summary of Radio Broad­
casts In the Middle East." No. 378 of 10th. July, 1953*
Arabs1 is remarkable'for the strength, of the apparent conviction 
in the existence of the Arab nation and of Egypt!s place in 
It;" In the name of Almighty God, in the name of glorious 
and eternal Arab!sm and in the name of the one Arab nation, I 
send you an Arab greeting from Arab Egypt*" He goes on to 
refer again to the united Arab nation; "Egypt broadcasts the 
1Voice of the Arabs1 from your heart in Cairo in war against the 
imperialists and as a thorn to prick the backs of traitors;
Egypt broadcasts it to announce your personality and your 
strength...one nation which boundaries do not divide, which 
personal desires do not destroy and in the face of whose free­
dom no imperialist plot can stand." He also stated In the 
same speech: "I congratulate the great 1Voice* on its first 
birthday; 1 salute it in the name of Egypt which revolted for . 
the sake of Arabism." This is apparently the first time 
Nasir referred to Arab nationalism as an aim of the Army 
revolution, which is usually stated in this period to be seek­
ing nothing more than a free, united and democratic Egypt.
On the 23rd. of July, 1954, Jamal *Abd alSNasir delivered 
a major speech in which he outlined the achievements of the 
revolution and its aims for the future and defined the attitude 
of Egypt towards Arab unity: "The aim of the revolutionary 
government is that the Arabs should be a united nation whose
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citizens work for the common good. (This government) believes', 
that the position which the Arabs occupy between the other 
regions of the world, their mighty services to civilisation, 
their valuable .economic resources and their connections’ with, 
the Islamic East and,the East as a whole qualifies them for a 
great part in which they can Influence. the.world *s affairs .'1 
He affirmed that J "The Arabs1 problems are the problems of the I 
Egyptians too." He went on'to stress the need for effective i 
united Arab defence against the common enemy of imperialism 1 
and the need to strengthen the Afro-Asian bloc to achieve a 
third world power force. In spite of,all*this emphasis; on Arab J 
unity, . however, he ended the speech in a plea to Egyptians to 4 
be proud of their Egyptian nationality: "Do not forget that you | 
are the descendants of the Pharoahs and the Arabs, that you are J 
Egyptians and that Egypt is a land of glory, civilisation and 
knowledge. Have confidence in yourselves, support the cause of 1 
freedom and the revolution.", He ends tia&hspeech, as he frequently 
. ended major speeches,.with the words : " W  is very great;.
’ - I ’ . . *
glory-be to Egypt I" *
1* It Is interesting to observe how, at a later date, Nasir
maintains that the pride of the Egyptians in the. civilisation 
of the- Pharoahs was deliberately implanted in their, . ;
minds by the imperialists. In a speech delivered on the 
23rd of July 1959? fcn celebration of the seventh anniversary 
of the revolution he. said: . "We have been able to see that! 
the ' Pharoahonic propaganda'which the imperialists, along with’ 
all their other propaganda, tried to plant firmly within the:, 
Egyptian nation, was merely , a vain attempt oh their -.part- to 
divide the Arab' nation and destroy it part by part."
From the clear statement here regarding a policy of support 
for Arab unity, one would have ejected to find that from this 
date Nasir may perhaps have laid greater stress on Arab affairs 
in subsequent speeches. This is not, however, the case* Through 
out the rest of 1954 and the following year, reference to the 
Arabs came only infrequently and usually in speeches addressed 
to Arabs, not to Egyptians. On the 6th.. of January 1955, for 
example, Nasir addressed an assembly of Syrians at the Officers* 
Olub in Z-amalek: "We in Egypt always feel that the glory of 
Egypt is part of the glory of the Arabs, that Egypt's strength 
is. Arab strength and that Egypt's dignity is part of Arab 
dignity." In marked contrast to the specifically Egyptian aims: 
of the revolution expounded in Bandoeung some months later,
Nasir said in. the same speech: "When we began this revolution 
we did not do so seeking Egypt!s glory alone; we were seeking 
the glory, strength and dignity of all the.Arabs." . \
It is the Suez War of the autumn of 1956 which followed the 
"Egyptian! sat ion" of the S\iez canal and the Israeli attack on 
Egypt which seems to mark the time when Nasir became fully . 
aware of the desirability of adopting an unequivocable policy 
of Pan-Arab nationalism. The change Is dearly marked in his 
speeches of the period. On the 1st. of November, 1956, Nasir 
delivered a speech over the radio In which he protested emot­
ionally against the Anglo-French operations, rejected the 
ultimatum thay had made that the Egyptian as well as the
Israeli forces should retire from the Suez Canal region and 
expressed his complete determination to fight to the last.
This speech is remarkable for the fact that the words “Arab”,, 
“Arab nationalism” or the Arab countries are not once mentioned. 
The conflict is described as one between the imperialists and 
Egypt* Nasir once again refers to Egypt as the “homeland” :
”0 Brothers, let us■ think today about our homeland, about 
Egypt.” He stresses outright that the Imperialists were fight— ’ 
ing Egypt, not the Arabs as a whole as he has frequently since
j
maintained: “We will fight bitterly; we will never surrender, j
i
for we are defending the honour of Egypt, the freedom of Egypt£ I 
the dignity of Egypti” Similarly, in a speech he delivered at j
al-Azhar on the following day, he again made no mention of the !
Arabs and referred directly to the Egyptian “homeland and !
people.”
President Nasir seems to have been genuinely surprised at 
the strength of the support for Egypt which camejtrom the Arab 
countries during this crisis. In his next major speech, 
delivered on the 9th. of November, we find that he lag£ great 
emphasis on the help both offered and given by all the Arab 
leaders to Egypt. He stated significantly: “The Arab peoples- 
everywhere cooperated with us against the Imperialists and the 
interests of the imperialists, from Iraq to Morocco. When 
we entered the battle, Arab nationalism was only words...when
we came out: of the battle it had become a:; real fact.”
The form of union envisaged by President Nasir throughout 
the period from 1952 to 1958, when Egypt and Syria merged 
into the United Arab Republic, does not appear clearly from 
his speeches. Arab.union is referred to in merely the vaguest 
of terms. There seems no evidence to show that he was gravely 
critical of the Arab League and that he envisaged a really
close union, such as that exists now between Egypt and Syria, :
between all the Arab countries. The bniy speech in which he ;
gives any indication of the form of union he desired in the ;
period from 1952 to 1956 and his assessment of the value of 
the Arab League, was delivered on the 22nd. of July, 1955.. In 
this speech he appears■to envisage a strengthening of the Arab 
League and not its abolition as some Arab nationalist writers 
have suggested: “Our Arab policy seeks to unite all Arabs by 
making them one nation, or rather one family...Our path to 
achieve this aim has been to adhere to and to respect the 
Covenant of the League of the Arab countries, to clarify what 
is obscure in it and strengthen what is weak. The Mutual 
Security Pact has been the fulfilment crowning and strengthening; 
the Covenant of the Arab League.” * He ended this speech, again 
rather surprisingly, with the words: “God Is very great; glory
1. See above, Chapter Four, pp*;v3>b eAr
be to Egypt*", That the form of union binding Egypt and Byria 
together. into the United Arab Republic is far closer than the ; 
authors of the Arab League Charter seem to have envisaged is
shown by an examination of the provisional constitution of the :
1 • new state* *
An examination of the ideology of Arab nationalism in 
contemporary Arabic literature shows that certain attitudes 
and trends are apparent in the works of a majority of the writers 
who support the movement for unity. For example, it has been 
seen, that with a few notable exceptions there is some sort 
of community of attitude among Arab writers of the last twenty-' 
five years concerning the place of religion in the state, the 
Western world and democracy and communism* It is of interest 
to examine President Hasir!s speeches in the light of the 
general Arab nationalist attitude towards these problems*
A majority of recent Arab nationalist theorists apparently 
insist on the need to divorce religious and state affairs, in 
the proposed Arab union. Although the provisional constitution 
of the U.A.R* and the Egyptian constitution which preceded it 
do not refer to a state religion, it seems clear from his 
speeches that Arabism and Islam are, or were, nearly
1. Article nine of the Covenant does, however, signify its
approval for the possibility that individual Arab countries 
might seek closer union than that actually provided by the 
Arab league*
  “j
synonymous in Nasir's mind. * In the "Philosophy of the 
Revolution" Nasir wrote of the circle of Islam surrounding 
Egypt in much the same terms as he wrote of the circle of the 
Arab countries. He stated; "The pilgrimage should have a 
potential political power. The world press should hasten to 
follow and feature Its news not by drawing attractive pen 
pictures of its rites and rituals for the delectation of 
readers, but its representation as a periodical political 
conference at which the heads of all the Islamic States, lead­
ers of opinion, scientists, eminent industrialists and prom­
inent business men assemble to draw up at this world Islamic 
parliament the broad lines of the policies to be adopted by 
their respective governments," *
The first reference to Islam in Nasir!s published'speech© 
comes in an address delivered In Alexandria on the 18th. of ; 
April, 1953* A short speech, in the typical phraseology of / 
class and anti-imperialist .warfare ends as follows; "if we 
think that imperialism will give way easily before us,.we are 
wrong. The path is narrow and difficult... .No matter, what the_■
1. See also Chapter Five, pp.i^abo$e. It will be observed 
that Nasir is given the title "Leader of Arabism and of 
Islam" by the respected official journal of the University 
of al^Aahar.
2., pp. 68 and 80. The "Islamic Congress"^ set up in late 195^ 
under the Secretaryship of Anwar a1-Sadat, which holds 
annual meetings in different Arab countries, seems to be a. 
concrete expression of Nasir1s policy expounded here.
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path, we will go on struggling until we reach our goal...We 
will reach the end, of the road, if God Wills, thanks to our 
solidarity *. *Xf Egypt frees itself, then Islam becomes free.*1 
The meaning of the last remark is obscure and open to various ; 
interpretations.
During the per’iod in 1953 a-nd 1954 when opposition against 
Uasir from the Muslim Brotherhood was extremely strong, the 
■Egyptian leader laid considerable emphasis, in his speeches, 
on God and religion. God is portrayed on the side of the 
Egyptians against the British over the dispute concerning the 
evacuation of the Suez, canal bases. On the 15th. of August, 
1953* arguing that all loyal citizens must be prepared to 
fight and die if need be for the cause of freedom, he expressed 
his belief in predestination: "1 am sure that the fate of every 
man is limited by the day, the hour and the minute in which he 
will die." In a speech delivered on the occasion of the 
celebrations for the feast of al^Adha, on the 19th. of August, 
1953, he said: "So God will give you a great victory and the 
whole earth will shine forth with the light of its Lord, for 
a proof of His help and pleasure came to you on the night of - 
the 23rd. of July, 1952." 1*
At the opening of the Arab Islamic Conference on the 26£h.
1. The date of the coup d*etat carried out by the Egyptian 
Army against the regime of King Farouk*
of August 1953, in Cairo, Nasir frequently used the words 
1 Arab ism and Islara(!-juxtaposed very obviously next to one 
another. The speech'traces the course of Arab history since 
the early days of -Islam and interprets the misfortunes of the 
period as divine retribution. The following passage is typical; 
"G*od!s anger began to fall 011 us and His light to recede from 
us. For we had left the path of the truth, the path of love and 
co-operation in God!s way, the path of patience, of holy war- 
(al-jihad) and sacrifice to raise aloft' God*s word." The whole 
speech refers frequently to passages from the Qurfaix, on which 
its style seems modelled.
In a speech 011 the 26th. of August 1953 Nasir referred to 
the need for a "jihad" (holy war) against imperialism: "Arabs 
and Muslims In all parts of the world must believe that they 
face one enemy, the Imperialists. They must unite once more
M I
under the banner of federation (ittihad) and holy war (jihad)." 
The use of the word 1 jihad1, with its special connotations In 
Islamic law, must be deliberately employed here with at least
1. While other Arab nationalists refer frequently to the 
need to unite against the "imperialists , none except 
Nasir,; so far as I have observed, make a direct appeal 
to the Arabs as Muslims to fight in a "holy war" against 
the "imperialists" as, apparently, infidels.
1
some knowledge of its religions implications. * On-the 1st. 
of January, 1954, Nasir used the word once again in calling 
for unity and sacrifice in fighting the British occupation:
"The only path to freedom is holy war (jihad) and the form­
ation of an army composed of men and women in every village 
and every town until the whole people become strong."
It has been seen that Arab nationalist writers are united 
in common condemnation of Western "imperialism." The speeches 
of Jamal fAbd a 1-Nitsir show that he may indeed be considered 
a typical Arab nationalist in that he agrees wholeheartedly 
with this condemnation. In the section of the "Philosophy 
of the Revolution" in which he discussed the position of 
Egypt. at the centre of the Arab, Afro-Asian and Islamic 
countries, he referred to the great circle of imperialism 
surrounding all these other circles: "imperialism is the great 
power laying round the whole of the region a siege incomparably 
more vigorous and more rigorous than the siege that had 
surrounded our trenches in Falujah and all our armies and
2.
governments in the capitals from which we received our orders.
1. See article under "jihad" in the "Encyclopaedia of Islam."
2. pp. 61 and 72* Some 2500 Egyptian soldiers, of whom Nasir 
was one, were surrounded at Falujah for several months'" 
during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. The garrison refused 
to surrender and was eventually evacuated during an 
armistice•
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He .saw the activities of the Colonial Powers in Africa as 
unquestionably motivated,by:the desire for power and considered 
that it was Egypt!s clear duty to fight on the side of the 
'subjected* African peoples : 'rWe cannot under any condition, \ 
even.if we wanted to, stand aloof from the terrible and 
terrifying battle now raging in the heart of that continent t / 
between five million whites and two/hundred million Africans 
He wrote, somewhat vaguely and with great and obvious ambition: 
nWe certainly cannot under any condition relinquish our res- ;j
ponsibility to help to our utmost in spreading the light of |' ‘ P ' ' , p ' ‘ \ j
knowledge and civilisation up to the very, depth of the virgin j
1. - T
jungles of the continent.,f * j
l
Nasir*s speeches have been, since his first assumption of . j
power, full of accusations against Western imperialism; he ;
discounts absolutely any possibility of an altruistic desire ;j
on their part to bring material benefit to the countries over 
which they: have control. The following remarks, made in a ;
speech on the 20th. of November, 1953, &re typical of many 
passages in his speeches: "The British very well know that to 
strengthen Egyptians will mean a weakening of their own 
strength and influence in this country. They claim before 
the world that they are.working to raise the standard of life 
in,the countries whose lands they occupy; this is a logic 
impossible to understand and cannot accord with reason in any
1. pp * 66 and 7 8 *
304
way."1 •
Jamal *Abd al-Nasir is apparently typical of Arab 
nationalists in -overestimating the extent of the cooperation 
between-Great Britain and the; United States of America* He 
accounts for the vacillating policy of the American govern­
ment in offering aid and arms and then withdrawing such aid 
in the following terms: "The reason for this is clear;
America is- completely and absplutely bound up (murtabitah) 
with her ally England* Both have a common enemy'which is 
Russia* America will not satisfy us to anger England.
The attitude shown by Jamal *Abd Nasir towards communism 
and towards the Soviet Union is similarly seen to be typical
of that we have seen to be demonstrated, by the majority of
3 —
Arab nationalist writers. Nasir has frequently spoken in 
the terms of a straightforward belief in a struggle between 
classes. His remark in a speech delivered on the 23rd. of 
February, 1953, expresses this clearly. In pre-revolutionary 
Egypt, the country was, he said: "divided into two factions,. 
each hating the other. These were, in one category, the 
camp of the slaves and the other, the ruling classes." His 
speeches are, similarly, full of direct references to the 
1 evils of the capitalist economic system, with no emphasis
1. Ibid. -
2. In speech at Suez on the. 3rd. November, 1953.
3* See above, Chapter Seven.
at all on its advantages. Capitalism is seen by Nasir as a 
means by which individuals exercise undue influence over 
society and the state,; and, moreover, one by which foreign 
states can infiltrate and penetrate :and destroy the sover­
eignty, of an independent state. The vast majority of his 
speeches contain passages and references which clearly show 
this attitude.
Although Ndsir seems in these passages to have accepted 
some of the basic economic principles of communism, he has 
never, so far as I am aware, made reference to Marx, Marxism 
or communism in favourable terms. His refusal to allow the 
communist party to operate in Egypt before the union with 
Egypt and in the U.A.R1., after its formation, demonstrate 
clearly his distrust for a party which he considers to be 
opposed to the ideology of nationalism* Nasir has said, 
moreover, that he considers communism to thrive only on 
economic backwardness and. to be opposed to progress: "We
all know that the only desire ,of communism in, Egypt is to 
spread disorder, for it can only live in anarchy. It does 
not accept that the living standards of the people should be 
raised, for in this case it would not be able to spread its
poison among them."^* Since this comparatively early date,
_ >
however, Nasir has rarely, spoken in outright condemnation of
1. From a speech delivered on the 21st. of August, 1954
communism in his speeches, although it is true that in the
recent and continuing war of words betwean Nasir and Qasim,
President of Iraq, the former refers to the latter as a
communist as well as a Zionist and stooge of the imperialists
and no doubt some criticism of communism: can be understood
to be implied by this.
Nasir, in common with the majority of present-day Arab
nationalist writers, clearly sees no overriding objection to ;
accepting economic, military and diplomatic aid from the
communist countries in what he considers to be his struggle
1
with Western imperialism. * -Communist aid for Egypt and the 
Arab world in. great quantity stems, of course, from the. 
C:zechoslav-Egyptian arms agreement of autumn, 1955* He well 
expressed his attitude towards acceptance of the communist 
offer in a, speech delivered on the;- 22nd.! of September, 1955* 
He stressed his disappointment with French, British and Amer­
ican policies which laid conditions on the supply of heavy 
arms to Egypt and maintained that the agreement with Czech­
oslovakia was a simple commercial agreement. He pointed out
1* Sino-Soviet credit guaranteed to Egypt from Jan. 1954 to 
Dec. 195B is quoted as. 626 million dollars by R.L. Allen 
on page 80 of "Middle East; Report, 1959* Published by 
the Middle East Institute, Washington, and edited by 
W. Sands. .
very forcibly, too, that he felt absolutely obliged to obtain 
heavy arms for the defence of Egypt and the Arabs from the 
danger of Zionist attack* In defence of the charge that the 
agreement meant that Soviet and.Communist influence In the 
Middle East would inevitably become stronger, Nasir said;
"When. I hear some spokesmam declare that this is a victory 
for Soviet or foreign influence in- the Middle East or Egypt,
I recall the remote past and 1 assert that this commercial 
agreement without conditions or restrictions that we have 
signed is not a victory for Soviet or foreign influence, but 
that it merely ends the long period of influence in which we 
have been dominated and controlled*1
In the speech he delivered at Alexandria on the 26th* of 
July, 1956, in which he announced the nationalisation of the 
Sues Canal, Nasir expressed a remarkably naive belief in the 
sincerity of the assurances given to him by the Soviet Foreign 
Minister on his visit to Egypt that the Soviet Union; "did not 
wish to come between us and the Western Powers and that Russia:*- 
desired for peace between us and the Western Powers*" Nasir 
again stressed In this speech that the loans, offered by the 
Soviet Union were completely without conditions. It seems 
that he is completely convinced that the Soviet Union is dis­
interested in its friendship for Egypt and the Arabs. In 
one speech, at Banu Suwaif, he stressed forcibly that the
relations between, his, government and the Soviet Union is one 
of direct friendship. He stated; "When I visited the Soviet 
Union, they 'knew--that, it was a visit of friends to friends,
, for their stand with us was.that of a friend towards friends." 
It could n&t be more apparent, indeed, that Nasir sees the 
Western "imperialist" Powers as his sworn enemies and the 
communist countries/as his friends,; It does therefore seem,, 
somewhat illogical that he., in common with other Arab nation-
• ' » i
alists, should7insist on a policy of "positive neutrality" 
between his friends and his-enemies. Nevertheless, Nasir 
stated in the same . speech's "The policy, 0 Brothers, we have 
followed in the past and will follow in the future, is one of 
Arab nationalism, non-engagement and positive neutrality."
The name of Jamal fAbd al-Nasir and the words "Arab 
nationalism"; have in recent years, become inseparably connected 
with one another in the minds of both Arabs\and Western ■ 
observers alike. All Arabs are not agreed in considering him, 
however, truly representative of the movement, for which they 
have themselves always worked. These Arabs consider him to be 
an unscrupulous Egyptian nationalist who is willing.to exploit
Ara,b nationalist feeling and even Islam for the sake of
: ■ ' ' ■- ■ 1 '■ personal and; Egyptian ambitiohs>; *
1* This is, clearly, too, the opinion of many Western observers 
Bee for. example,- the comment of .Lt, Gen. G-lubb ;"0;olonel ; 1 
Nas sev Is personally charming. He i s. delightfully frank and 
sincere in appearance, but he is nearly always telling: 
lies." Op* cit., p. 377*
Among mahy supporters of pan^Arab nationalism he is, on 
the other hand, considered to be the movements outstanding 
figure and undisputed hero. They consider his assumed 
defeats of -"imperialist" policies, his- arms deals with the 
communist bloc, the nationalisat 1 on of the Suez. Canal, the 
format I on of the U A  .R?* and the C ont i nued bloc king of the 
Suez G Ana l; t o; Israeli shipping .and eargoes aswe 11 as his 
superficially successful policy of "positive neutralityn to 
be great victories for the Arabs as.a whole. Whatever; may 
have been the motives and influences which conspired to make 
Jamal ‘Abd al^Nasir-adopt an unequivocable policy, of full 
support for Arab nationalism, there is no; doubt that he is 
seen by a very, large proportion of the Arab "masses" throughout 
the Arab world today, as their leader. The extravagant but at 
present justified language of the U.A.RV "Yearbook for,1959" 
well expresses how they do in fact see him: "He fought the 
enemies of Arab, nationalism inside and outside the Arab : 
homeland. He goughtimperialism,, feudalism - and exploitation; 
he raised high the. bannervof Arab nationalism- for the sake 
of-building a new Arab society on new, solid and sound 
bases. At the hands of this hero,: Arab nationalism, became a 
real, live bond .linking the whole of the Arab nation.• * '
1. Op* cit*, p. 18* *
The position of. Jamal. *Ahd'al-*Hasir in Arab nationalism -] 
is certainly a controversial issue. Whether one considers ; ! 
that he is a typical, enlightened representative of the con*- t i 
temporary movement seeking Arab unity or whether one will 
consider that he represents a mixture of the least desirable ; 
characteristics of both Egyptian and-Arab nationalism, will ' !
entirely depend on one*s own nationality, beliefs and character/#; 
It is clear, however, that Nasir is now to a large extent a : 
prisoner of his own policies. He. ha.s created the vision, of - '
himself as the leader of the Araps in their,-"war" against : ; 
Israel and .the "imperialists" aicid has personified himself as a i 
pan-Arabist seeking an effective Arab union from "the Gulf to : 
the Atlantic." Committed so firmly to a policy of revolutionary^ 
Industrial and social progress, the creation of a united Arab : 
state and, apparently, the destruction of Israel as a Jewish 
state, Nasir must show results in these fields or his present , 
support may ,well be./ lost., The appearance., of President Qasim 
;of Iraq as a personality perhaps forceful enough t.o challenge 
his position-as the leader of the Arabs Is an, extremely dan­
ger otis development so far as Nasir is concerned. Communist 
party activity in both regions Is, moreover, thought to be a . 
growing danger - to Nasir *s regime . Disaffection among Syrian / ; 
intellectuals concerning various aspects of "Egyptian rule is 
becoming increasingly outspoken; the resignation in 1959. of
all the Syrian Ministers from the Central Cabinet of the 
United Arab Republic is obvious evidence of a serious clash 
of Ideas. The discontent in Syria is, moreover, having conv. 
.siderable effect in reducing Nasir*s personal popularity 
In the neighbouring countries of Jordan and Lebanon*.
President Jamal *Abd al-Nasir is considered by many Arabs/ 
to be a figure of truly historic proportions. Since his 
wholehearted adoption of Arab nationalism, the movement for 
Arab unity has unquestionably become, much more vital than it 
has ever been before in the last decades*. As a German writer 
has observedt; 11 Pan-Arabism as an idea and aspiration is 
nothing new. What is new is that it has found in Nasir a 
visible point of focus, a "leader-personality" (Fuhrerperson- 
lichke it)'through whom it can find concrete form and express** 
ion*"!* He has succeeded, if in nothing else, in giving the 
Arabs far greater confidence in themselves. The strength of 
his own personality and the emotional appeal of his name, 
coupled with the loyal support of his army and his propaganda 
services.may*well, In my opinion, enable him to overcome his 
presepthdifficulties, at least for a considerable time. The 
problems he now faces are great, however, and they should not 
be underestimated.
1. "Die Arabische Revolution: Nasser liber seine Politik."
-.by Fritz Rene Allemanm* Frankfurt, 1958, p.-103.
The theorists of Arab nationalism have long stressed
Egypt *s "natural1 position in the heart of the Arab world.
They, are not. in any way surprised that Egypt should have found
in Nasir a leader; who was willing to accept this position.
AnTs Bayigh well expresses the typical Arab nationalist
attitude towards Nasir*s adoption of Arab nationalism as official
policy : ”People will not ponder why Egypt acknowledges
today its Arabism* They will wonder why Egypt has done so 
1.
only today;11. *
Article in. Beirut magazine^ “Arab Culture”, 3rd Year 
No. 1,' p. 60. _ ,
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Contemporary Arab nationalisms whether one considers that it 
was inspired by the lgth century influence of the pan- 
Islamists or* in the early 20th century, hy the Arab revolt 
led by the Hashimite family against the Turks, is a force 
which has clearly been actively seeking pan-Arab unity of 
some form for a number of years* Although the theoretical 
and short-lived government set up by Faimsal in Damascus 
in 1920 was brought to an end by direct French military 
pressure and if allowed to stabilise itself might have led 
to some form of Hashimite union embracing Irs.o^  Greater 
Syria and the Hejaz, the main reasons for the failure up till 
now of the full a.ims of pan-Arab nationalists must, I think, 
be sought within the Arab world itself* Some Arab national­
ist writers show great interest in their works in trying to 
analyse the reasons for the movement*s failure to anhleve 
complete success. It is, I think, pertinent to a study of 
the contemporary ideology of the movement to examine what 
Arab nationalist theorists themselves consider to be its 
faults and how they describe and account for the opposition 
to pan-Arab unity within the Arab world.
Before the Arab countries did achieve complete
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sovereignty and independence, as they have all now done with 
the exception of Algeria, Aden* and the Emirates of the 
Persian Gulf and Southern Arabia, and in the yea.rs immediately 
following this independence, the lack of unity in the Arab 
world could conveniently and justifiably be attributed to 
the direct or indirect action of the Western Powers; even 
today, indeed, Western imperialism is still frequently blamed 
for the present disunity* The majority of Arab nationalist 
writers are, however, now aware that there is a conscious and 
powerful opposition to pan-Arab unity within the Arab 
countries themselves, an opposition which cannot be ignored 
and should not be underestimated. The Syrian writer, 1Abdullah 
*Abd al-Daim, writing in 1959, clearly recognises this 
internal opposition to the movement. He emphasises that in 
the movements beginnings the struggle was between nationalists 
demanding freedom and the Imperialists who refused it. 
Imperialism is not, he considers, any longer the only enemy 
and is itself now almost non-existent; henceforward the 
battle is between the ranks of the enemies of imperialism 
themselves: !llt is a struggle in the very heart of the
enemies of imperialism themselves, a fight against the trances 
of imperialism in the souls of the people - a fight against 
greed and personal Interests and against the efforts to 
create a spirit of separatism within the body of the unity..
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There is no escape from a fight "between those who want
unity as a Vehicle1 and means of profit and those who cons ids r
that it is the beginning of new sacrifices and new toil -
between those who consider it to be a means and those who
*1
consider it to be an end in itself.1 * It is interesting to 
see how *Abd al-Daim seems to characterise the Arab nation­
alist movement as essentially socialist and infers that 
opposition to unity comes only from the selfish and react­
ionary; while this is no doubt to some extent true, other 
writers do detect other aspects in the arguments of the 
opponents of Arab nationalism within the Arab world.
Opposition to unity of the Arab countries has come, they 
consider, internally as the result of disagreement with the 
ideology of nationalism, from the fear of a united Muslim 
state on the part of the Christian and other religious 
minorities, from fear of Egyptian domination within the 
Union as the inevitable result of Egyptfs serious and grow­
ing overpopulation, from the fear that the at present 
separate Arab countries which enjoy a high standard of 
living would lose this in an effective economic union and 
from the opposition to the movement which comes from the 
political leaders of the Arab world, who do not wish to give
1. Op. cit., p. 86.
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up their personal power. There is no question, too, hut that 
many Arabs distrust the character and policies of President 
Jamal !Abd al~Nasir, who has become personally involved as 
the undisputed figurehead of Arab nationalism today. They 
fear that he might misuse the personal power given to him 
in the provisional constitution of the United Arab Republic; 
many who consider him responsible, sincere and thoroughly 
worthy of holding such power are not satisfied that his 
successors will be so incorruptible. While, however, Arab 
nationalists will freely admit such doubts in private con­
versation, Nasir1 s popularity is so great that it is consid­
ered inadvisable to express them in writing. External 
opposition to Ara*b nationalism is considered to stem from the
Western Powers, from Turkey and, especially on the ideological
2level, from international communism* *
Arab nationalist writers are greatly concerned to expose 
what they consider to be faults in the ideology of Arab
nationalism- faults which the movement’s opponents use to
their own advantage. 'Abd al-Latif Bhararah, for example,
considers that the movement is opposed on the ideological
level by criticism of nationalism ass Ha philosophy,
1* See Chapter Four, above, pp#^ i- ^
2* The subject of the relationship between Arab nationalism 
and communism is discussed in Chapter Seven, above.
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principle and faith in general terms and also in that 
(Its opponents) consider that it is opposed to (the best in­
terests of) humanity and loftiness of mind and spirit.1’*1"*
A minority of Arab nationalist writers is particularly 
outspoken in indicating the faults inherent in the phil­
osophy and ideology of the movement. The Jordanian Dr.
Walid QamhawT, in this respect, criticises those Arab 
nationalist writers who consider nationalism as an end in 
itself and not the means of achieving Reform in social and 
economic conditions. They imagined, he considers, that the 
secret of the success of the Western nations was merely in 
their adoption of nationalism; they, too, therefore, adopted 
nationalism, neither understanding on what bases it rested 
nor how it had developed. He considers that it was this 
misconception of nationalism as an end in itself which 
has led to the identification of the movement in the minds of 
both the leaders and the people with opposition to imper­
ialism. He considers, too, that there has been complete 
neglect by Arab nationalist writers of the causes which 
led to the success of the imperialists in the Arab world. He 
concludes: ”ln this way, nationalism has become synonymous
with the political relationship between the Arabs and their
1* 1 Pi al-qawmiiyah al-'arabiyaty" p. 7.
: :?attackers \and -from - eff ortb tu; ^  .,p-:.
lihequali^tles^ tecbhpmic; ih^ and faults of character
d  and ; o:h;,ihbhg^ have de s c ended ' uponthe;1 Arabs ; as individ-
;T; ;■,!ruals and ;u^nv -nation dniparticul^v”^ T h l ^  ,
■ •/ - .  ^^  extremely trenehant ^ criticism is quitoha-typical of the 
; v attitude of the majority, of j Ar^b /natipnali ht writer s, who 
| : t : :t, A^isfy^themselve s wi th the mesh; buper^ o;f examinations 
•/ of the ideology of theMovement. v bn to say/
 ^>1 k: 7 v? that the second most: important:dangertin ths, ideplogy >Of 
1 v^'inatiphalisiii is that iitihvh&sed on the hegatlve^^.principles 
;: . d;V of enmity to to t her nationa 1 isms. he points, with concern to 
 ^t \ v •. /; periilAh v hati onaiism ahd .the manner '.in/which/it!;^ cle s troy ed
itself-and; consider s tha11some aspecte bf: Arab^ nationalism 
ht ’ ; t\i Are .analogous to this * p Hst comes:ib;the-
: ■ although^^;Arab nationaiism has not yet arrived at such a 
/level asdidj-dermah/hafipn^iism, ,there are trends discernible 
;/. ; f in this .dihec^lbn.in' the - present.. re IS t ions /betweeniihedArab 
bountrie shows himself to be in complete
■:■>/ "; t di sagreernent>"with3 oriiiy tdf/.J^ab ;hatibnali st: ;lhbori sis/ ■./.
■/;/;. inhnaintaining■ that; nationaliA X s^;:bapicaiiy-and■. indeed 
' t:: h?: t '9 bmpleteiygmat eriali stic i He goe s oh t e state; Spec if icallj 
"t--cbthabthev^thirdtdahge^^in" nationalist^^philosophy is. in
- 1. Op• c i t •, tp• v 281* This/hhtticisitris not now altogether
V ■■• ■ 2ypp,*-/ci^ 't_; :* ^ f t :'vt’^t
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considering itself as an end rather than pS/% means^/• "it/is; 
in its esseheet;mateiialisti the -litmostidegred, * *it takes' v 
care lest/any)^spiritual;; 6r.v%mahisticv tingp/should be\given ; 
to it and avoidsbexpohlngtItself to riaturpl ;and -ahsthact 
, principles*"^*
V . i ffc^^ad^,1iarwazah;p,'too, criticises what fhe refers to; as/: 
tiiie ^ihfiexlbility;*/ ahdVsuperficiality: of the nature of the f / 
Arab awakeningas one iof the fault's/ In Arab, nationali sin and ';
• one ;pf * the/pbstacles in the "path, of; unity !’:i* One of the : ;
innate or internal obstacles ip the inflexibillty of. the. 
general Arab consciousness and. =its: he^ativity and lack of 
depth. The: Arab masses ape-'jawar'e;bf |thetheCbssity for Arab; 
unity. ..but they seemywboden,. ^  and;, superficial. in ; ■ v
their awareness.1,2* / If this were not the case, he concludes, 
these masses would force; theirywill^ to main
tain, the. status quo. in . thetArab world. y; h t; t/V' y f;
■ *. - The Palestinian writer,kS^izrBa^igh; seep; three basic/ 
faults in the ideology of Arab nationalism: which;ace ount for 
the movement’s lack of%6mp3btb;:pucce'ssy^ These
are, in his opinion,: 11 Its vagueness as to form and,'At.p>,v- 
general indiff erence ' to instruments and to tfethodbp^ ^
2. Op. cit., p. 383*
oblivion to disuniting political forces; and its scorn for 
unilateral inducements Dr. Sa’igh goes on to attribute 
these failings to a series of faults in the Arab mind and 
character itself : "These three weaknessesmy be jointly
attributed to a psychological-existential attitude of the 
Arab mind; they equally reflect an imbalance in the Arab 
outlook on socio-political affairs marked by a preoccupation 
with ends to the exclusion of means and by the overshadowing 
of realistic-utilitarian values by idealistic values.1 *
He also points to a failure of the proponents of Arab nation­
alism to appreciate what he calls the "real, objective and 
stubborn elements of diversity in the Arab w o r l d . " T h i s  
incisive analysis agrees in general with the criticisms 
expressed by other Arab nationalist writers concerning the 
philosophy of the movement. From my study of contemporary 
Arab nationalist literature I cannot but agree with D£*.
6a righfs analysis in this respect. The majority of works 
propaganding for Arab unity do, indeed, display a surprising 
disregard for practical considerations concerning the form of 
the union, the economic theory on which it would be based
1. Op. cit., p. 84. The exact meaning of Dr. Sa!igh*s remarks 
is not clear.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 85.
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and the means to bring it about. They are marked in general, 
by an optimism which in the present circumstances it is 
hard to justify. The Iraqm writer, ’Amir ’Abdullah, is 
extremely critical of the vagueness of Arab nationalist writ­
ings. He comments, after quoting from some unnamed Arab 
nationalist publication; "it is most unfortunate that we find 
in the Arab world today writers who describe themselves as
philosophers and then do not hesitate to remove the national­
ist question from its context,, flying high in strange 
skies, thinking that a mere desire for something is sufficient 
to bring it about."**■•
Two Arab nationalist writers point to a fact surprising 
in itself concerning the policies of the Arab governments 
in recent years. The governments of the Arab world have for 
some time maintained their own belief in and support for the 
idea of unity while at the same time, with the exception of 
Syria and Egypt which have In fact made what they consider 
the first step towards full Arab unity by their ufljion in 
1958, have adopted quite independent and at times rival 
policies. These various governments frequently accuse each 
other of being traitors to the cause of Arab nationalism.
This apparent dichotomy between the words and actions of the
1. Op. cit., p. 20*
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Arab leaders, while they all maintain the necessity of ful- 
filing the aims of Arab nationalism has been particularly 
noted by the Lebanese writers Dr. Hannah and Kemal Jumblat.
Dr. Hannah points to the fact that lip-service to Arab 
nationalism is the ingredient considered necessary to all 
talks and speeches of a political nature in the Arab world:
"For a long time our ears have been tuned to listening to the 
music of Arab nationalism. No Arab leader ascends an Arab 
throne without singing this song on every occasion possible.
No Arab government makes a proclamation to its citizens 
without saying in it that it is the intention of that govern­
ment to work for Arab nationalism. No conference is convened 
between the Arab governments without the conferees emitting 
the music of Arab unity." * Such comment points to a wide­
spread impatience among Arab nationalist theorists towards 
their political leaders which is apparent in many respects in 
contemporary Arabic political literature. Kemal Jumblat, the 
leader of the Druze community in Lebanon and a supporter, with 
reservations, of Arab unity, questions the sincerity of the 
movement's proponents: "It is a strange fact that the majority
of the leaders of 'patriotism* or the 'Arab nationalists* in 
the Arab world never kept their tongues still from advocating
1. "khawatir hawla a1-jumhurTyah al-'arabTyah al-muttahidah"
(Remarks about the United Arab Republic.11) Beirut, * 1958 
p. 56.
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unity and Arabism and from singing night and day about 
Qahtan, *Adnan and ya'rub, while not one of them set about 
in a practical way towards achieving this unity and this 
Arabism#..Their actions, thoughts and efforts were the 
opposite of what they said.#.The attitude of the majority of 
those who work (for Arab unity) in Lebanon and the Arab 
countries is still of the following kinds it is an Arabism 
of copper overlaid with silver; you only see the overlaid 
silver while it was, is and still sees itself to be copper."***• 
Muhammad Darwazah is of the opinion that opposition 
within the Arab countries themselves constitutes a greater 
danger to Arab nationalism than do any external obstacles 
which may be placed in its way by foreign powers. He 
considers the ignorance of the ties binding the Arabs tog­
ether and local material interests to be the biggest barriers
2 «to Arab unity. * The second of these points, the local 
material interests of the separate Arab countries outside 
a union is unfortunately referred to here very briefly and 
is completely ignored in the majority of works of Arab 
nationalist theorists# Indeed some of them consider that 
common material and economic interests between the Arab 
countries constitutes one of the most important bases of the 
movement*s p h i l o s o p h y t h e y  base their argument on the
1, "haqiqah al-thawrah al-lubnanTyah11# ("The truth about the 
Lebanese revolution.") Beirut, 1959? P. 28.
2. Op. cit., p. 341*
3* See Ohapter Three above pp. 12^ - e.V
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consideration of the Arab world as a viable and self-sufficient 
area in its very diversity of economic and natural resources. 
The whole question seems to be rather, whether it is in the 
interests of the separated Arab countries to join in an all^ 
Arab union where the resources of the whole area would be 
shared between all its inhabitants. Dr. Darwazah is apparently 
conscious of this distinction and indeed, in my opinion, comes 
to the very heart of the problem when he discusses the rapidly 
increasing over population of the Egyptian Region and the 
effect this has on tlie minds of other Arabs; "Some (opponents 
of nationalism) express their fear at the growth of the 
population of ISgypt on account of their numerical superiority 
over others and their apparent predominance over others in 
the realm of unity. This is mere fancy to which no reply is 
necessary and which no one except the regionalists, fanatical 
sectarians and hired mercenaries can believe. Unity will make 
the Arabs one nation and the Arab: regions one homeland. This 
existed in the past at the time when the Arabs were united 
under the orthodox caliphs and the Umayyad state." # This 
attitude is typical of the apparent refusal of some Arab 
nationalist writers to examine the existing situation in a 
logical way and to draw from it logical conclusion. Darwazah 
shows that he is aware of a major objection in the eyes of the
1, Op. cit., p. 609.
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Arabs in the separate Arab states to a union which would give 
Egyptians predominance over them in the affairs of the state 
and yet he seeks to nullify the objection by a sing-song 
cliche* and follows this with a vague historical parallel 
which he does not attempt to justify* The fact that the 
writer does not make a more serious attempt to show that these 
fears are unjustified by employing a logical argument may 
perhaps be taken to show that such fears are not completely 
unjustified*
Opposition to nationalism within the Arab countries is 
not seen as coming from the various parts of the Arab world 
as states; opposition is seen to come from individual Arabs 
who are prosperous in the separated Arab countries* They 
are considered to constitute a force of some strength against 
Arab nationalism. The movements theorists criticize these 
1 feudal, exploiting classes1 extremely bitterly in their 
works; the Arab nationalist movement today sees itself as
■j
basically revolutionary and socialist*
The question of the leadership in the Arab world is 
similarly a subject of great discussion, as is the position 
of the hereditary, monarchical rulers in those Arab countries 
which still have this form of constitution. Dr* Haikal 
writing in 19^ *3 was, of course, well aware of this problemy
1* See Chapter Two, above, pp. ^ 4
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and .considered that the position of the hereditary rulers 
within the union would be very difficult to define. He 
wrote: **It is-not easy nevertheless to think of formalising a
plan for the organisation .of the Arab union; this is because 
there .are in the, independent Arab countries kings and'govern*- 
ments ;whom, it ’wbuld. greatly vex to give, up.::their 'external
sovereignty and to submit to the authority of a centralised 
power*M That this situation has to some extent been eased 
y^;y:the: ab o 1 i t i on: ■o f t he; monar c hies in 'Egypt and Iraq' si no e 
rf:tfisywas written is of course true* /The; comme^yAti 11- holds i
Arab cduhtrlealwhich still;-have- 
kings at their head and even applies, indeed, to those where ■
: presidential ■forms 1 ofgovernmeht; havebeehinstituted.
Dr. George . Hannah^. writing : as a Marxist, . finds no 
difficulty in deciding that the obstacle s. ill the way of Arab 
unity are, -on the:.ohe: hand, -the reactionaryeconomic and on 
. the other the reactionary political situatipnsV;if ;the form 
of the Arab states. After describing the•economic system• 
prevailing.in the Arab world as basically corrupt, full of 
parasites who live off it giving nothing back at all in return 
he • turns to examine the prevalent political system in the Arab
1* OP* Cl t * , P* Si* ' ,i,.v :■■rv i,.' V
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world. He points out that it must he considered as quite 
reactionary in that its various parts are ruled either, in 
some countries by monarchies or in the others by "autocracy 
dressed in democratic clothing.
Michel !Aflaq in an examination of the opposition to 
Arab nationalism, lays particular emphasis on the socio­
economic opposition which comes from those who are satisfied 
with the present form of social and economic system: "For 
many years past those with interests in doing so have been 
exploiting ignorance and fanaticism to split up the nation 
and prevent its freedom, progress and unity. They have 
resorted to various means to achieve this. The supporters 
of sectarianism in Lebanon build their case for separation 
from the body of Arabism 011 the backwardness of society in 
the other Arab regions.All opponents of Arab nationalism 
meet on one ground today— that is in opposing one thing—  
fine freedom-seeking Arabism, for there is within the move­
ment an end to their economic control and exploitation. The 
sectarian chiefs in Lebanon and the hired men of religion in 
Syria and Jordan and the rapacious kings and monopolists of the 
resources of the Arab homeland meet and join their efforts
p
with those of the imperialists and the supporters of Israel," *
1, "ma'ria al-qaumTyah." p. 63.
2, "ma'rakah al-masir al-wahid." p. 149.
Ahmad Sa'id, while agreeing with this basic analysis 
which considers opposition to Arab nationalism to come from 
the exploiting economic classes, fesaM-gtlo f o r s e e s  that 
opposition to nationalism from government officials within the 
union when formed can be a very effective and powerful dis­
ruptive force. His appreciation is, 1 am sure, in this 
respect, realistic and significants "The present and future 
generation of civil servants do not fully believe in Arab 
nationalism... we cannot ignore this important pre-condition 
to being a civil servant while we are in this dangerous tran­
sitory period in the annals of Arab history...for one region­
ally-minded civil servant in one administration...will be 
sufficient to set in motion a chain of trouble and difficulties* 
for Arab nationalism." # The provisional solution to the 
problem is, in S a ^ d ^  opinion to make all civil servants 
undergo instruction in nationalist affairs and in making 
them pass an examination in nationalism. This will make them 
realise the importance of their .positions in the unified 
state. The real and basic solution, he goes on, will only 
be achieved when Arab nationalism is really firmly embedded 
in the minds of all Arab officials.
1. Op. cit., p. 3^3.
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Opposition to Arab nationalism within the Arab world, 
which is seen as coming from the religious and economic fears 
of the reactionary classes is, Arab nationalist theorists are 
agreed, expressed in support for those regional nationalisms 
encburaged in the various parts of the homeland„ The 
writers who support the movement for Arab unity are unanimous 
in condemning these regional nationalisms as deliberate 
fabrications instituted and encouraged in their growths by 
the Imperialists. * They are likewise ridiculed as having 
no foundation in such solid bases as has Arab nationalism; 
the bases of common language, culture, history and interests 
are denied them out of hand. These regional nationalisms have, 
nevertheless proved to be not without some strength and Arab 
nationalist writers devote considerable space to examining 
their theses.
The main opposition from within Syria, which is considered 
by many writers to have been the birthplace of the contemp­
orary, secular, socialist Arab nationalist movement, has 
come mainly from the Syrian Nationalist Party (or Syrian 
National-Socialist Party or P.P.S.) organised by Antun Sa’adah.
V
1. Some of these regional nationalist parties as, for_
example, the Syrian Nationalist Party of Antun Sa*adah, 
have pursued anti-British and anti-French policies of 
such violence that these assertions seem obviously 
false.
"• • This party vras formed first as a secret- society and became
3 : . a . political party With, open membership in -1935• The party; ; V'3
calls in general .for tlie -unity arid independenc e of'the / : '•=•,
• ' - Fertile Orescent - ihcludihg : 0 , •’‘Lebanon,-. Palestine, Jordan J
;  ’ - and somewha t st r angely, Cyphus * -*" Later the pr oposed . vv-Y-■ ;y
union: waspwidened^^:tp .include-.1^ which ;thei>party refers
to as Eas ternr Syria. The party ls principles are laid out v .
. v - in a pamphlet published in Damascus : in 1950•, They are s ' " : ;i 
111) Syria is for Syrians, who. form one complete nation., 2) ■
V.v Syri an affairs are an internal national concern completelyV.. A •'
■;yY independent of all : other problems. 3 )  'Syrian problems- and-
affairs are those of the Syrian nation and,homeland. 4) y : - Y 
The Syr i an hat ion is"formedYby the unity of the Syrian 
\ people born through a long; history and originating in pre- j
. historic times.; 5) The Syrian homeland is that natfora'l - . , j
region where the. Syrian people have evplved. It has geo- . 
h graphical limits which set. it apart from other countries.
: It stretches from the .Taurus mountains in the North West
and the Bakhtiyari mountains in the North East ,to the Suez
1.; The basic ideology of Ythe party was first set out in a . ; .;r
Y  . • • bo ok published shortly be fore the Sec ond World'War by •
Antun Sa1adah entitled "smshu 1al-1umam" ("The Emergence /
-u' of "Nations." ): •This work, which' i s o f ' .considerable . interest,
Y--Y. examine s; the Yhatiohalis t the or i e s o f Y Euro pean and par tic -
 ^ • ulanly Gem^ add applies their 'conclusions t phove
• : the existence of a' Syrian nation. ; Re.published in Beirut
:yy.;y''in Y L 9 5 9 * Y . - • y y-:y
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canal and the Red Sea in the South including the Sinai penin­
sula and the Gulf of *Akaba and from the Syrian Sea in the 
West including Cyprus to the Arab desert crescent and the 
Persian Gulf in the East* It consist© in general of the 
Fertile Crescent with Cyprus as the crescent* s star, 6) The 
Syrian nation forms one society* 7) The Syrian National 
Socialist awakening will continue to draw breath from the 
gift of the Syrian nation and its cultural, social and national 
history* 8) The interests of Syria are above all other 
interests •"
The principles of reform of the party are given as the
divorce of religion from the state and the prevention of
religious interference in political and national affairs
with the removal of all bafriers between the various parties
and sects* The party also stated its belief in the abolition
of the feudal system and the organisation of the national
economy on the basis of profit sharing and fair treatment of
the workers. It considered necessary the creation of a strong
army capable of taking an effective part in the country's 
2
affairs•
Sati 'al-HusarT devotes a considerable part of his work
o f. o
entitled 1 'Arabism between its proponents and opponents" to an
1, Quoted in al-Husari: "al-*urubah baina du'atiha.*" p. 104/G,
2, Ibid*
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examination of the aims of the party. He considers that the 
party’s opposition to Arab unity stemmed from a misapprehension 
in the party leader’s minds "l noticed clearly that the 
thought of ’Arabism was confused in the mind of Antun Sa’adah 
with, on the one hand, desert bedouinism and with Muslim 
partisanship on the other. The fellow thought that the phil­
osophy of Arab unity was merely a veil which masked Islamic
sectarianism and so he set about attacking it just as he
1 • —attacked sectarianism in general." * Al-Husari denies com-
L *
pletely the validity of the party's claim to form a unity
based on the sole factor of geography. Sa’adah, he considers,
deliberately ignored the questions of unity^ of language and
of history as they would have clearly Indicated Syria’s place
2.
in a united Ara’b world. The other Syrian political parties 
before the union with Egypt, with the possible exception of 
the Syrian Communist party, all supported the idea of a 
United Arab State.
Opposition to Arab nationalism, as a movement seeking a 
close form of political, economic and military unio.n between 
all the Arab states, has come within Lebanon from many sections 
of the population. Muhammad Darwazah in his "Arab Unity" 
points to the confessional constitutional system in Lebanon as
1. Ibid., p. 73*
2* Ibid., p. 119#
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having been instituted and stabilised in Lebanon deliberately 
by the French to emphasise the separateness of the Christian, 
Sunni', ShT1T and Druze communities and to create among them 
a fear of Arab nationalism as an exclusively SunnT Muslim 
movement# He concludes; "All this constitutes, as is obvious, 
a severe obstacle in the way of the creation of a complete 
Arab union in which Lebanon must be.#.It may be perhaps that 
Lebanese regional sectarianism is one of the strongest 
obstacles in the way of unity#.#it appears to observers some­
times that many of the Maronites and Catholics or that many 
of their religious and political leaders, who have power and 
influence over them, would prefer Lebanon to return under
foreign rule rather than that there should come about any
1 •
union between it and any other Arab country•" He later goes 
on to generalise on this same theme of religion as an obstacle 
to unity and gives his opinion that it is religious opposition 
which constitutes a major difficulty. He considers, however, 
thpt this religious opposition of the minorities will gradually 
become less important as literacy Increases and education is 
improved* He advocates the abolition of foreign missionary 
schools or the institution of a form of censorship over their 
curricula. He makes this extremely strong criticism of these 
schools ; "The foreign and sectarian schools have an effect in
1, Op# cit., p# 352.
335
perpetuating sectarian clamour and the reins of this sectar­
ianism must not he left in their hands. They have played 
a destructive role in exciting dissention and the lack of 
communal feeling between the citizens of the Arab homeland 
and have stood in the way, to a lesser or greater extent, of 
the fulfilment of Arab nationalist philosophy*?.; They have 
distorted Arab history and have planted sinful tendencies in 
someoof the citizens which have led and still do lead to their 
adopting many harmful attitudes. It is necessary to abolish 
them and unify the teaching, making it official and nationalist 
and to ban the books which tell of religious and sectarian 
differences and quarrels.11^ *
Another Lebanese Muslim writer, *Abd al-Latif Shararah,,* $ — —  *
agrees with the apparent majority of Arab nationalists In 
thinking that it Is the 1 imperialists1 who have been primarily 
responsible in creating the “religious nationalisms" of the 
newly independent states of North Africa. Of Italian policy 
in Lybia, he writes; "in Mussolini*s time, Italy maintained 
that it desired to protect Islam to gain the support of the
1* Op. cit., p. 557# In contrast to this, many Arab national­
ist writers acknowledge that the origins of the contemp­
orary movement towards Arab unity are to be sought in the 
missionary colleges set up in Syria and Lebanon in the 19th 
century, c.f. Antonius, "The Arab Awakening" p. 79 et seq.
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Libyans, who placed their belief in Islam above all other 
considerations. They weakened their consciousness of being 
Arab, forced them to learn Italian and to neglect Arabic and
tried to make their Sennusi sect an obstacle between them and
1 —
both the Tunisians and the Egyptians." * Shararah goes on to
state that it is "religious nationalism" in the Horth African
Arab states which makes them less than completely enthusiastic1
towards pan-Arab nationalism and that this is the direct and
2 *
desired result of Western policy.
The fact that the Lebanese political and governmental 
system is organised on a strictly confessional basis permits 
one to make certain generalisations with comparative safety.
The vast majority of Christians of Lebanese origin*..who live 
In Lebanon maintain the necessity of keeping Lebanon independ­
ent while accepting fairly close ties of friendship with the 
nearby Arab states. Dr. George Hannah*s attitude may be 
considered as typical of this group from this respect. He 
first stresses that Lebanon is part of the Arab world; "Lebanon 
Is a real part of the Arab homeland. The relationship between 
those who live in Lebanon and those who live in the other Arab
1* "fi al-qaumXyah al-’arabTyah", p. 85.
2. Ibid.
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regions is that of brothers not a relationship of mere 
neighbours and friends.Nevertheless, he goes on: "There
is not one of us who will deny that the'independence of 
Lebanon is the child of the wishes of the majority, nor will 
,,one of us deny that this desire came in complete agreement 
and conformity with the wishes of their brothers in- all the 
Arab regions."2* He concludes, therefore,,: "Believing this, 
we give our blessings to the creation of the United Arab . 
Republic,.for we see in this creation and its protection a . 
guarantee of the independence of Lebanon with regard.to which 
both wishes are in agreement, those of its people and of its
- close friends.""** ,
The Lebanese Muslims,, seem to be injagreement, in the 
majority, with some, form of fairly close integration with the 
other Arab states, but there seems to be a tendency at the 
present time to wait and.see how the situation develops in 
the rest of the Arab world before actively demanding the 
complete fulfilment ,of1 Arab unity*
The Druze minority of Lebanon under- the leadership of 
* Lemal Jumblat is undecided abouf exactly fthat1 kind of relat-
- ionship should be achieved between Lebanon and the other Arab
-,1* "khawatir hawla airjumhurjhah al'arablyah al-muttahidah" 
p* 46 ■
. 2. Ibid.' V : ,
3*- Ibid., p. 47*
states* Jumblat insists on the heed for close oodperatiqnv»- f -.\.h * * «• • ■ .. • • • . it. i - -\ , v•. - - • * AA ' ‘ - \ 1
with all the Arab world, but does not; agree that there should 
:be any attempt to ' bring aboutA.dnyA really^ closeAunipn ;at the 
present time* It should of -courseybe,Rememberedwhile;dis~ 
cussing the strength of Aiab nationalism' in; Lebanon that the 
country contains a large number of Palestinian: Arab refugees- 
who have■ ado.pted Jjebanon hsV thbir home; it is this group, 
both those of ;themvwho . are Ohristlans^-And those;who are 
■;-kusiim;^  ^ strongestAsuppo fairly rapid
imion. with the"r the Arab world; - ItAshould similarly
be1 remembercdAthatAi^ere are^many, AAhdhs i in Lebanon who 
^genuinely desireAaf Close form of-union'- with theAArah^stoties 
hut are dissatisfied with what they; consider ■■-t;6;Ah,eAks.pm^ 
the policies of the; United Arab Republic; hind-thereforeAinsidtw 
on caution until the : exact nature of government in that state ;: 
becomes more clear»,
Opposition to, or rather disregard for, the pan-Arab’ 
nationalist movement in' Egypt has stemmed from two-main 
factors * First , .the widespread feeling in Egypt and ref lected 
throughout; the Arab world that " Egyptians were not Arabs at 
all and had no common intere.st with the Arabs and second, from 
the internal Egyptian.nationalist ^ movement, which based itself 
on a desire A£hr unity in complete •jindepend-*;
ence from all other states. .a a -a a
The present Egyptian tendency to consider itself the 
centre of the Arab world and those African territories with
Muslim communities is in direct contrast to the earlier
1. ' - Egyptian Isolationist feelings# The Khedive Isma’il Pasha
ia reported tolfeve said in a speech accepting: the conclusions- 
of the committee of enquiry into Egypt’s finances in August 
in 1878:- "Mon pays n ’est plus en Afrique; nous faisons 
partie de 1’Europe actuellement*" * :
Thi s. f e eling is echoed. in a statement made by Sa * ad 
Zaghlul in Eprope soon after the. first World-War to a delegation 
from the Arab countries sent to'try to persuade him to join 
forces with them; "Our problems- are Egyptian, not Arab#" # .
-Dr# Baikal himself writes that: "We do not-deny that a section
of people.in Egypt considered it, necessary to alienate them­
selves frorn^the Arab world and others asserted that Egypt - 
has no relationship with the Arab East and that its binding
* 44 - - A A V , * - A A  - A - A , : .
links- are with the West." * Similarly, Mr* T* 'Little in his 
recent work on Egypt writes: "Egypt being by temperament
1# For an interesting article on this; subject see: : "Egyptian 
. Attitudes* towards pan-Arabism." Anwar G-# Ohejne, M.E.J* 
Summer’1957* P*- 273* For a lengthy and detailed study in 
Arabic see; "al-fikrah al-*arabiyah fi misr", By AnTs 
Sayigh. Beirut, 1959* 6 ~
2# Quoted in the Earl of Cromer’s Modern Egypt", Vol I, 1911 
Edition, p. 62#
3# Quoted by Yusuf Haikal, pp# cit#, p* 26#
' a' v Insular';was not pro«Arab,V;but ;hIstory a M  Xslam had m it 
pan-Arab."
- : That Egypt; .was becoming iiiore aware of ltself as an Arab
; country; in: the years immediately .predeedi^
War is demonstratedAby. 1939 of a special
f  a a ,edition of the magazine ^ al^Hilnl ■entitled *'Arabs ;:and Islam 
AAr:  ^New; Era"^ Aponsorbd :hy the other
a ;a ■^.■:l;-;:hpyal;leaders ^ of This editlbn jcpntalns many
- ■ a ‘ Artic le s • btres singtjie^ni ty of a 11: the",AT^ic. ^ speaking
a , S:; Peoplesyv^Jhhne b f  thbse ei^ ,
f ;a a ;^ k^r ’ Tibalct -Fash^ ;:the.:Eg^tI&Apeople, come
.$£ dSveAbeeh-c^ to- the
:_a a ;:a >;/"^abbfin-'-regard to vdpldury^^AlAngUage-and spiritual, and: radial 
characteristics." * It is -interesting to see how the author 
makes a claim .that Egyptians haveabeen ’closest * to Arabs 
-since ancient times, hot as the majority of contemporary 
Arab nationalist writers contend today that Egyptians are and 
f  a • alvfays: have been Arabs . a : ’Ubaid goes on to give his opinion that 
:;^ a ;;"a :;:' Arab uhityvis tile mosh importantab-tbr:-:! of
: ‘"theiiAfab^EaB.tj -J.'there must be unity against the common European 
enemy and theVAr^^ more aware of their
■ \ . Arabism, which contains elements on which a flourishing 
.; V: , 7 •; civilisat i on can be bui It •
a ll^ T * Litt le ^Egypt":* Behh, . .
aa.< 2^; Gpv;C.it.>; p. 32 # ; : '"^ a "^-, a; ::;-— a 'V-^^ a /a ^ ’
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a: The Syrian propagandists of Arab nationalism .began at
about.this time to make'serious efforts to persuade Egypt 
to support the movement, pointing out that Egypt’s "geogra~ 
phical position made hef7the .very heart of the Arab countries-*"I 
Amin Sa’Id indicates- the knovm danger of Italian colonial ■ 
expahsion in North Africa and in the Red Sea; Egypt, he 
days;,: ;has; not;7bhe: armed strength t,o.\r:eslst" this danger her­
self y h a h  expect no help from the united Kingdom and must 
therefore look to the Arabs for allies, He concludes: "The 
national and patriotic interests of.Egypt demand that she 
workSAtoW&rdsA%he;hreatfe of an Arab J
■union*".2'* a 7 7 7 - '  '' V - - . 7^7^ 77S;"7-77'a.. 7'7 7
7 , There .is coiisiderable emphasis ln the works of the
Byriah p^oj^gaxidists of unity on the .economic benefits which 
would ysuppoBediy come' to"Egypt7^ part of an
\bffeptivevArab union. Now that .this desire has indeed become 
strong it Is interesting to observe Dr.: Clovis Maqsud*s ;
remarks.. He stresses the economic hasisyof Egypt*s denial 
of Arabism when the Egyptians were on the one hand occupied 
with the struggle for.- their own independence and were on the 
other hand economically self-sufficient.- Its geographic and ■ 
economicposition enabled ity;,ih^his opinion, especially in.. 
view of its distinctive ancleht: culture ,^;a to maintain its
■ly Yusuf Halkal: Op. cit. , p.* 26 i
:2*. "al-daulah al-’arabiyah al-muttahidah,", ("The United 
7;'7^ab/%tate.") -Cairo, "1939» p. 644* . .
self-suffieney. The other Arab countries, In his opinion,
.,' 7 ’/ 7-v ;■ In. contract^y^^dldvhot eh j oy thlf 7same:. economic strength and
- indepe ndenc e. He cbncltides that: "The awar©nes,s of the
7VC 7 7 : Arabism bf ;the national^impersonality- In any:Arab region is
■ / ndbpende^ the,extent7pf7:lts7I^ 7; 7
;V.. ; This remark is perhaps ;df7ConsIderahle -significance; the 
7 7^:77 7 growthof Egypt1 -s::.:-awareness 7qt.;its,; pant in the Arab; world 
; 7” does seem to have corresponded:to;;a markei extent"with a;
7-77 ■ ^decrease i h i  and, economic health^at a
7- 7 ;7 - time when Its;pbphlati b n h af  shown a rapid increase * 7 *
; it/hasybeem^ some observers that acceptance
7,777 7 of a pan-Arab .poll c y in Egypt was pro King Farouk
; 7 . and his advisers r:4 u^ hpp"either7out of; pbrsonai.ambItibri or
77 v77 77:doctrihaire'^ conviction,’Conceived the, dream; of7ah A u t h o r - 7'7;. 
"7V7 itatlve'7fcbiiin-: stat,ev in Egypt y- embracing :gradual a 11 the ;;: 77' 7 
7 7 Aj^bsxbn&::perhaps ,-:ihttto , " all ;the: Muslims
7: thatAitwaS7;:the7 ambition:of7 Fahpu^ to be 77.777
7;'7 7  ^J7acc;eptbd.;a^ knqwxi;^that -Farouk > ; 7 f  7;:
777 : may have: seen himself "likewise71nthat /position-is^ certainly^ 7 7
7 7 77 7'7: pbs sible. 7 "77;': 7.7 . 7.7 '7 7:;\ 77 -7 7 ,7 7; ■ ;:7 v-; 7^ 77;-,:7V 7'. f.Vf;
•V/-1\ 7 V 7777--; Egypt,Ian; sbeptiQlsm vl^thd ^
of;; success / of ;h7blosef1 demonstrated bl©arly7by77
■ Ty ■ 77 7 li Op* cit., p . 8 8 . -7 7 :7. 77'; ,/ y ' - - i 7 " : '7-77;. , '; 7 77'- 7; _7 7.7-77
;7 7 . ,.72.:- Elle Kedourie : " panr^abism and: British/ Policy" V " Article ;
7*. 7 in " Political vQudr't^r^ f\,p; 142. =■ f y ; 77
the attitude4 of the Egyptian elder statesman Muhammad Husain 
/Baikal.,- He is quoted as saying at the time of the first
formal conference on Arab unity held between the Arab states, 
in 1944: "it is doubtful whether the union will be a political
one; it is doubtful whether, in case one of the Arab states is 
attacked the others will hurry to its aid.' It is also doubtful
if an effective, cultural union, * or a union of some other kind ^ 4 - * f 1
could take, place, because'the history, the legal codes, > 
agriculture and industry are necessarily different in the 
different:Arab states.",* V However true: this/has so .far been 
proved, It is clear that the Arab League was set up in' 1945 
with' strong .Egyptian support and with Egypt /recognised as 
occupying the position of first among equals.'
Since the Army revolution-of 1952, of course,, there has 
been a growing' tendency to stress the place of Egypt in'the 
Arab world and indeed as its centre and obvious and undisputed 
leader. That the leaders of the revolution were determined to 
wor^k in close • conjunction with the other Arab states and that- 
they were. themseIves persuaded that Egypt was itself an Arab 
country seems demonstrated by the insertion of an article into
the new Egyptian constitution of 1956 specifically stating.that
- 2. ' , ' , 7. i
Egypt is part of the Arab.nation* This determined acceptance
' T \  . v . * <• . *. rf-.. ‘ ’ . , - • « r **, * . ’ '  ' '  7  , \ \ .T • .. ,* ' .M. : ■ -“i . .vA’ J : •'* i . ' V :,v 1 j ! '•*•••. . *• j; ' x : .• / J /
1. Ibid., p. 147* (Quoted .from Qriente Moderno, - 1944,' p. 2*}
2. Until 1956j however, Jamal fAbd.al-Nasir, leader of the 
Egyptian revolution seems to have laid greater stress on1
//the need to strengthen Egyptian rather than Arab national­
ism. " See:; Chapter /Eight: above4
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of the cause of Arab unity culminated in the union between 
Syria and Egypt .at the request of the former,' iri 1953* The 
United Arab Republic thus formed claims to be, the first 
concrete step towards a wide all-Arab: union; it' similarly 
claims, and no small number of Arab nat i onali st the or1st s are 
in agreement, to be carrying out a policy both internally 
and in foreign affairs which is based on the accepted principles 
of the modern, socialist, secular: Arab nationalist-movement• 
Remarkably; little’is said in,Arab nationalist literature 
concerning opposition to the movement in-the other Arab \ 
countries. Before the July, 1958 anti-monarchist revolution, 
in Iraq the, fact that.thex'e was'-obvious rivalry coming 'close 
to enmity between Iraq and Egypt* is referred to, where if is’ * . 
mentioned at all,' as the .result of the policy of the late King, 
‘Faisal, the Regent 1 Abdul Ilah and the late Prime Minister 
Nurl al-Sa^id* Similarly, Arab nationalist works give little 
comment: of a constructive nature- to account for opposition 
t o Arab nati onali s t uni on in Sudan, Tuni sia, Morocc o and Saudi. 
Arabia* That there is opposition to all Arab union in all 
•these-: c ountri e s;‘seems undeni able and thi s *. opposition has • 
obviously so far proved stronger^ them
^wbrking towards: a: union with the:’^  The
attitude of. *Smir 1Abdullah aIthough he is reputedly a 
communist, despite his claim to support Arab nationalism, may
jflibe taken;^ ^ r h ^  .individuals in each of.
the Arab countries who do not wish-to surrender, their independ­
ence immediately by uniting with therTOitediJrab^ 
we refused to link up Iraq with the U.A*R* in the artificial *
sand .hasty way In which the union between Egypt and Syria was
formed, we only did so because, we feel that: this would not-
1 ■
serve In any way the cause of Arab unity* ■' # After summing 
up the historical path travelled so far towards union and the 
77 ^various /factorsbinvblyed c oneludes : ; "The •••fulfil-
7; ; -7-ment; of7the:-^abs i great plan to unite their nation ^  an 
easy -matter, nor binewhich will be attained in the near 7 
• :7 '■ • U7‘-'7;' f  -
7 7 / 7 7 ;  : I;7 ;The;:..&$ or£ty:vof Arab nationalist ,^;6m^iSt;fin^feeiAr^ic 
\>7V7;:'?-press>: /radio “ahd> j^bllshed pam]&leis^
; . in Iraq ;sihce;;the revolution of; July 1958 seems . agreed' that
; 1 ;'‘tiie:7bomMiiists'’r are, fh:control and that?thbyoppbsitlon/to;
> ’ the Idea of an ;immediate a 11-Arab union doesstem from thls
? communist influence. alone./ IbrahimJurni* akIs in the minority :: 7 .;
7 ?7 7 : who look;a t h ©  situation; in What is, in my opinion, a more
";i- -V;. realistic/; Mannerv ? ifer?commeiits on how^ 1958 revolution in 
: ! : ’ Iraq brought delight to all who ~ thought that thedays of the.77:’7
: ■ V? reactionaries were oyer:7 and.that \Iraq: had at last joined the
7 : ranks-“of; the /fhee^  Arabs :*K:; >Howevery he? writes; f t 11Immediate ly- ■:
1. and 2. Op* cit*, p* 38*
i'lbi . the position ^  the ideas of the free 'men • were .
disappointed. Religious rivalry, sectarianism and eeparat- 
7 ::7V. io.nism took the Vj2b.ce of: re dot I on- and . Iraq, once’again tumbled x ■ v 
• there / is no. e s c a p e - ; V
: 7 7'/ft--'71 Arab natioiialist w in general adopt what seems: to 7 ,:
;;r ,?:.7?7.77l7 be ^ an o xtr erne ly unr e a 11 s t i c. a 11 It ud e ?: t o the who le que s t i On V
7.77:77 of ? the opposition to the /movement; wh1ch. exists l n : the .separ- ■ .;-j
1.7/ V 1 y ated Arab;:coimtrles thems ely e s v-y They are /quite content, in ..
.V :• th.e Vmaj orityy ^.to^  ^dismiss/‘thisybpppsltlonyper^ out j
y-A' v y;7qf ?hand ;as;Va\ mpre; fabric ofVthe imperialists.. . Ahmad V
: V ,;? ;:fV i/'Safi^y .exampleylglyesyM^ present day 7: %
: ;VV: /yV opposition/ toynatI onaii sm pf e sehted . by. impefi all sm takes the y. 7;:
7 ■ 1 77'f 1ol.rpwliig fbrms>?V7These f irstly :j'I’^Phe encouragement of /;V 7y
V: ;; vVfeglonaiism,V .which clalms;, for example, that the Iraqi people V
y V; ..are . ndf pure Arabs, and are71n ;fact' a mixture of Arabs : and i; /
■ 7? ;:  ^ihf: Sudanese ai^./^ and a? people
V ; V . with no .coxinectibn with the Arabs - at all, and that the people
7: of Morocco-are a mixture' of Arabs, and Berbers, . each with Its ...
7 ; own origins y race and interests•M?*// The /second means adopted
. -■ i*■ -bp. cit.,, p* R2o* ■’ ■
’ V v 7 / 2i Op* cit., p* 61. ;Sdf!d*a7i^^ is somewhat dif ficult
...: ;7 : : • to understand; .no Arab hationalist work, .as far as :I am V : 
777, v y-7 777. awarey : claims ; ^  existencd of pure racial connectionsyy / ' • 
V;;;' V77 / between the; Arabic speaking. peopies. 7?: See- Chapter Three; 7:
’ y7; ’ 77v'-7y  ^ ^'hp^^above...;7/;7 ' 7? Ty' 7? ?'/ 77 : '• -7 '7 7'7:- ■/■■.■
V-. " 1,: v'.' ';7etSdjy ;• . . . , 7,7’7'7-77.;.‘:7 7;'-,'. v-'y’V "'t- 7 ■ 7;;',;/,-.-.7'?...‘7 f V
'■•?by7im£(eriaii^ 1 s opinion in opposing Arab nationalism
V Is tplbhGpurage ihibf-^Arab dissent ion concerning the-leaders 
• ship of the; Arab world. This, SafId rather mysteriously 
Vremarks^vibvniyn^ because there is -no; difference
1betweenthe various: parts of the Arab world. The leaders of 
each;;see;W world are Arabs even if they do not
agree! ’ .
It is interesting that Muhammad Darwazah considers that 
Turkey is an external enemy of Arab nationalism. He writes:
7“These,, incidents and continuous indications of the aims and 
/reality/ of recent, Turkish policy and the relations which 
■ exi s t ed be tween the Arabs and Turks r under the; authority of 
the.Ottoman state force one to consider Turkey as one of the 
enemies of unity or Arab union and one of its external 
o b s t a c l e ’reason which-Darwazah/gives; for this . . 
.opposition is'basically a religious one : Arab unity will 
/bring:about7adrenalssanee of Arab culture, reputation and • 
influence. This will,-he considers, in turn bring about a 
reaction in the minds of modern' Turks9- who will feel that the 
/Arab success/will destroy or shake the building which they 
have constructed - “an independent national structure 




A minority of Arab nationalist writers do show in their 
works1: that theyvare1 cons cions of ;■faults.;and widespread mis**
. conceptions of the ideology of the movement for -pan-Arab 
unity, they support;, . These faults, they write, are stressed 
and exploited by their opponents to criticize:.nationalism; 
they realise that there is opposition to Arab nationalism . 
from within the Arab world from those who fear? that the 
proposed union would mean the loss of at least part of the 
religious, and economic ,as well as political freedom they 
enjoy to some measure now. Arab nationalist writers are 
almost unanimous,in dismissing these fears as,quite un- :
^;founded and moreover as mere fabrications ofiimperialismvand.
of which-they, stiii in the’ majority see as 
;. definitely opposed to Arab unity. These theorists, make 
- little effort to deal in logical terms witiL.;:tiie; main--.argument' 
.against the separate Arab countries;^ oining: an all-Arab 
union. This main argument seems to be:that the sharing of 
the resources of these - countries/ with-Egypt, which : has a 
large:and rapidly growing population at a subsistence- level ; 
of living, would seem inevitably to mean that this redis­
tribution of the wealth of the area would work to. their
1# Ibid., Darwazah, it should be recalled, sees Arab '
, unity as a necessary prelude to. Islamic unity. See .
Chapter Five pptc\*above.
disadvantage and to Egypt1 s obviou's advantage. This argument., 
is valid, of course, for only as long as the oil resources . ,-V, 
of the area are both present.and required in the•world markets,.
Standing against, this; opposition to nationalism on 
economic, religious and political grounds is the strong feeling: 
of being an Arab which is commonly felt by the majority of •' 
those who live In the area. between the Perskn CuIf and the ; /
Atlantic Ocean. ,This^;U^ may, however, be said, is only ;
, more strongly felt than the pride.that the Iraqi has for being 
Iraqi, the Lebanese for being; Lebanese ,and so bn,: at those 
times when there seems danger of attack from,an external force,
. At such times feelings of shared Arabism are ..at their strongest; 
it. must be similarly remembered that a main basis of -the 
argument for. Arab .unity is the necessity to-combat; the.common . 
enemies, of imperialism and;Zionism.. If It should happen, as 
seems likely, that the Arab world 'remains a 1neutra1 zone * 
in the Cold War struggle, with. no. .foreign, power, daring to .
employ force within it, ■the: strong c onsci ousness of. Imperialism 
as a danger will probably disappear , and with it, one of the. 
most powerful reasons for unity, ^
Arab fears of the danger of Zioni st expansi on.aims * which 
Arab nationalists genuinely believe to exist, seem, of course, 
likely-to remain for as long as. Israel exists. Time alone will
350
prove whether these fears of Israeli expansion are justified 
and-whether or not suoh fear will-provide a motivation strong 
enough to bring about pan-Arab unity*
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARABIC SOURCES PUBLISHED IN BOOK FORM:
1. al-A'zamT, Muhammad Hassan: "al-wahdah fi al-aharq". Beirut, 
1950• r. : V - V  , 1 - *•/ 0 ; - XvL " /■'.
; 2. fAbd Allah, ^ jSmir;"‘‘al^arlq al-tarikhTii wahdah al-tumah ;j 
air1 afrabiyah^ •  ^: .v11;:k. •
■ 3. ^ rAbi al^Daflm, Dri. fA M  Allah!;"Durtfb al-qaumiyah al*-
^ V ?arabiyah* -^BelrutV-1959»: ; " -/'• .£ V ' . J kV  v’ ‘V
4 # *Abd al-Itolr, Jainal: "kikitub wa taisrlhat 'ai«ratTs';'Ja^ ilal•;■:,'
; U h d  al-NasIr, 1952-1959.H^ Vols. 1-7. "‘Edition "ikhtarna 
f  lak11,  Cairo, 1959 and I960. • . •  - v . - i y . ■ > ■ ■ , : '  ‘ ;  ~  ■
■i'-:-}tv ;,Atd! al-Nur, :*Umar r '‘raa'rakah al-maslr al-'arabiy baina al«
”, '. gharb :wav 1958# c "K'-
6. ?A:fiaq>^  Micheli.;-V^a^pakah; al^naej^;:al-\^idi,, Beirut , 1 9 5 8 ^
7. Ideim: ,rfi sabil al-Ba^th". Beirut, 1959* . ¥
" 8.^al~Ml^yll±,*AbdAllah: ‘‘diiatur^ al*-^arab al-qaumi*n Beirut,.
::^.v 1941. ;,r y/.., ; ; ■'^v:. ^-2;;; ■'i::
;v 9. al^fAyad3T, 'AyadT al- *Abd; Hal~masihiyah .wa al-qaixmiyah al- ^
;V '' • ^aratCyah*” Cairo, 1958* > , ' ■•>/■ \ 2''V’" C-l
- ■ !10. al^^qurli; Ahmad ;Hassan: 11 *Urubah wa din*" Cairo, ■;';i959V\'^ 
v lli ;;DarWa2iali, M h a n M a ^ : ; / ' ' a l ^ a f c f t a h  TalwVar&M 
12•: Haikal, Dr*. Yusuf r J,»ahwa al:^wahdah al-1 arabiyah.u Cairo,
1943. ; ;
■ 13i • al-I^j i , :fAzla: nal-qaumTyah- al-!arabiyah wa ;d&uqmtiysQb.*;,,V
Beirut, 1959 ($) : ;v
l4* al-HaJj,: J & i  :‘^ m a l , . ' ' ' a l ^ a u i ^ y a h  laisat^^ mArhalahM^ V;v; 
f Beirut, /':-!3L95^ *;'-v■ ^:V i ' V - ^ l- ;r' /:> ; 'r
: ^ ; :-15* Hanha^,Dr*^ebrge i’1 "ma'na al^qaumiyah ai-’arabiyah*'': 3 /  ;3;
. •, / :B e l r u t ^  - : -y
ylyy V . 16:*,yjdem: v'*^awit,ir hawlayal-jm^ al-JferabTyah al- ;■
3 ;  • mirttahidah*'1 ‘Beirut,; .1958* 3  , - 3  ” 'r ;: .
V 17*al-HusAinT,;.^^ Hkitab al^nu^tamar*** (Editor) Beirut,
\ 3 - / ' . 1939 (?) \'2; .:.v:;,n2 ; 3 . 3  • * — 3 3 !
l&wal^Husari,; Abu^^alduny Satl * : :uMuhadarat Vf3nushu®, at- 
V 3 3  fikrafryal^qaiamiyah..11 /. Cairo,; 1951*-" ' V ;. 33-.''" v3 ; 3 3 3 i
V y 3 1 9 . Idem^^^dlfST*; *an al-^rubah.1 Beirut, 3rd. edit., 1957* I
20.. idem: "al-'urubahbaina du * at iha ■ wa m a 1 aridiha.11 Beirut,
;23;' 3rd* edit. / 1957• ; 3 3 f 3 3 - 3 rv  \
3  21 . Idem: 111 ara wa ahadXth -fi. al-qaumlyah al- *arablyah.1 
. Beirut, 3rd. edif., 1959*3 ■ :333;
22. Idem: Mma hiya al-qaumiyah?,, Beirut, 1959•
23. Jumfah, Dr. Ibrahim: "al-qaumiyah al-rarabiyah.H Cairo, f
V  ; ; 1959* '  ^ • 2 : 3. ^  33.;:3 ;r / /; : ; 3 ' ' ' 3 '  3 3  3 v J  3 *  3 3 : 3
y ; - 3  '■ : 24.. Jumblat, ; Kamal: "haqiqah al-thaurah/ a 1-lubnSnTyah.H . 3 3  
;.3. 33, B e i r u t i 1959* ' 3  3- ’-3 3r 3 3 3  3-. 3 3  3 3 :; 3 V  /;
25*. al-Ma^luf , Raflq: Mal*-ta^alghul a l - s h u y U ^ l i  al-sharq ;v ;
3 3 v \3 y^^ei-awBat.^/Bei^ ; 3 3 3 \ 3 3  3 3 3 -  ;33' 3
' 2 6 -i>sMel j<dhSb,/ D^v Muhammad: ,'alriumhuriyah al- ,arabi'yah al- *;3
. mut^ahldahv1■%Beirut, 1958. V
27.^ Maqsud, Dr; Clovis: ”m h w a  ishtirakiyah ; *arabTyah.11
3 3 3 7 . Beirut, 1957. 3.3 -3- - v3~”’: .3; 3 3 3 3 -, 3 3  73;3373 3
^■^^S^-'Mufari^ 3^iJd~ Khalil r Ual-mu*tamar al*-jarabXy al*-*3 3 ' 3 3 : 
qaumi ffi Bludan^3(^^ 33/ :33
■ 29. Nasiral^DXn,3 :  nqadTyah al- *arab. “ Beirut,, 1955V
2nd. Edition. - 3<  3 3 3 7 3 3 3  3, 2 3 3 7 3 ^  V
y; . ; :30V/-QamtowlV-;vPr:i Wali^:V^al-nA3^aii w a : alV^ -ba'thV; /' y
'-;/:':yV, ';ial«watah->a'lW*arab3?#.^B©ir^ ; V ;
k 31# al-^tah, .Mal-\rahdah alr^aj^bijali wa mastou .* ? /7
: buriyah-ai-kubra :wa7al^ "
■ ,7- y>V y 7 D a m a s c u s 19^-5V 7. /..%■■ 7;^- , . - . :v- ' r  -r/,' * v 77 <i-:. ■' ’-V ./■ 7 7,7
32 * Sa.^ab, Dr* Hassan* "al-wa1 y al-1 aqa1 ffidtj.1 Beifcut, 1959# 7v3
rK7v 7y :33*-'13^ "al-dawlah al-1 arabTyah al-muttahidah.1
Cairo, 1939* •' /.■■’ ''” . ‘ * - " w / ,  :1
11 al-qaumlyah al-1 arabTyah--thawrah wa bina*'1 -7 
':"v-• Oairo, 1959• .V; "
35 * SharSrah^ ’Ahd al-Latlf s "ruh al- ‘urubah.M Saidah, Lebanon* •-
7 7 , ; ■  ^ 7 ^ 7 ; 7;--777 — ;-V
; : - 36• Idem?^ "i^yal-qaumS^ & 1 - rarabiyali*M Beirut.i.-‘/1957-V
37* W ahbl, K^ammad;: 1 'u ru b a h  wa insanTyah . '' B e i r u t , 1958*:
38• Ziyadah, Nicbia: ''al-turilbah^ fl mizan al-qaumlyah* u Beirut , -
.v 1950* ■ :7\7y>v  ; -f- 7 7 V v ;: V 7 . '-oV'.' 7 -7 - - '7:7'' -V. 7 V-,:\ . c , \  7 7 7 7 \
: v ;;;i39*; Zurayq, DrV^ Constantine: 'fad*-wa*y; al-^aumT *" Beirut,/1939. 7/7-
7,777'''7 4b *7 Idem;. "mafn& al-nakbah." ■ Beirut, 1948* 7. 7^ 777777
7 7y|; 7 4l^i Idem s HAyy :^ a d i n ? fty Beirut ,. 1957• /'7 * - ■7 ■ ■ 7; ';; 7 7'7!’i'v,
-V; BOOKS ON ARAB NATIONALISM BY ARABS WRITTEN IN ;i^&LISH^
7 1 * . Far! s , Nabih;. Amin and Hus sain, Muhammad Taufi q ? " The ; ;7 7
,3'v v ; .Ctoeseehtr ill/Crisis ■ •. ;:'7-: 7/-"-
2* Nusaibah/ :HK Ideas of Arab ;l^tiohaliSmM ^Corneil ; V
r v r ' '■■■■•“ -'  y./Hniversity-'^I^ess^jIthaoa, \Hew-. Yorhj 1 9 5 6 *  / ' ’ 7 - - 7 7 7  7 - 7 ;
3* Sayigh>7Fs*;i£^ "-'7\ ■; ■’^cv' '77'7777-
.V‘V4*- .yiZlyadah, vNieola :  n;Syr ia/aqd77Lebanon7n7 Bbnn,7
